


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Directorate of Operations

Intelligence and Security Operations
of the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam
Ministry of National Defense
Enemy Proselytizing Department

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December 1979

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"Beginning 26 March (1975) Danang city was in a chaotic situation ... 3,200 new recruits undergoing training at the Hoa Cam military training center revolted, deserted and joined the revolution or returned to their families ... self-defense forces personnel and the people led the way for our troops to quickly capture enemy positions and hold surrendered enemy troops and POWs.

"On joining the campaign ... the (Saigon) municipal unit also included the main force regiments which had already been deployed in Gia Dinh, not to speak of our cadres and combatants who for many years had been carrying out special activities in the city or working in enemy organs and who were supplying us with timely and vital information as they awaited the arrival of the great army.

"The total secrecy of the plan had to be preserved since it was to be disseminated to all wards, subwards, and our political and military proselytizing bases in the city. ... The Saigon-Gia Dinh party committee printed and disseminated hundreds of thousands of leaflets and set up armed propaganda units. ... In a few days, we introduced into the center of the city many hundred more cadres and armed unit members. ... The tasks of proselytizing the troops and personnel of the puppet administration were also urgently carried out before the general offensive day. Our cadres responsible for these tasks in Saigon, so very persevering and skillful in the past, were now in the new situation very alert and courageous. They contacted enemy troops and showed them the path to save themselves, their families and relatives and to bring these oppressed people back to the just cause and the nation. Some of our cadres were arrested and killed. However, their sacrifices for the revolution won the sympathy and hearts of countless enemy troops who were now awaiting an opportunity to act. So, when we launch a general offensive on Saigon, favorable conditions should be promptly created for these policemen and personnel of the enemy administration to side with the revolution and the people to fight the stubborn enemy ringleaders. The revolutionary administration's policies towards prisoners of war and surrendering enemy troops should be urgently disseminated well before and during the general offensive."

Senior General Van Tien Dung, "Great Spring Victory," *Nhan Dan*, April-May 1976."

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Intelligence and Security Operations
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TABLE OF CONTENTS


	<i>Page</i>
Introduction	1
Background and Development	2
The French Resistance War: 1946 to 1954	2
The Interim Period: 1954 to 1959	7
The Buildup: 1960 to 1964	8
Missions	9
Administrative Practices and Training	11
Organization	12
Handling and Exploitation of US POWs in North Vietnam	15
The American Target in South Vietnam	20
The SVNLA Enemy Proselytizing Office (PDV)	21
The Region 5 Enemy Military Proselytizing Section (EMPS)	24
The Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region Enemy Military Proselytizing Section	26
The Korean Target	27
The Thai Target	30
Foreign Communist Party Support in East Asia	30
Operations in Laos and Kampuchea	33
Laos	33
Kampuchea	35
Operations Against the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) During the Vietnam War	38
Handling of ARVN Prisoners of War (POWs)	45
Operations in the COSVN Area	46
Operations in Central Vietnam	54

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	<i>Page</i>
The Postwar "Reeducation" and Exploitation of the ARVN	58
· Registration and Reporting	58
Indoctrination, Interrogation and Screening Procedures	61
Categorization of Internees for Imprisonment and Release	62
Prison Camp Life; Mail and Visiting Privileges	65
Treatment of VNAF Personnel; the PAVN Air Force Experiment	65
The Prison Camp System in North Vietnam	67
The Prison Camp System in South Vietnam	68
Annexes	
CDV Interrogation Questionnaire for US POWs in South Vietnam	73
Biographic Profiles on CDV Staff Officers	76



Organization of the SRV Ministry of National Defense Enemy Proselytizing Department

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Introduction

The Enemy Proselytizing Department (Cuc Dich Van/CDV) of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense (MND) General Political Department is the psychological warfare, fifth column penetration, and military prisoner of war (POW) indoctrination and handling arm of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN). It provides access to POWs to the MND General Staff Department's Research (Military Intelligence) Department (Cuc Nghien Cuu/CNC) in coordinated action with the MND General Political Department's Military Security Department (Cuc Bao Ve Quan Doi/CBV). All POW affairs are coordinated with the Ministry of Interior (Bo Noi Vu/BNV) General Research Service, which monitors the exploitation of POWs for the Premier's Office headed by Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) Politburo member Pham Van Dong.

The VCP Politburo has confidence in the CDV and has entrusted it with primary responsibilities for the psychological exploitation of enemy military forces, the subversion of enemy military forces through fifth column and psychological warfare means, and for the psychological exploitation of enemy military POWs. The CDV plays a key role in administering the detention and "reeducation" of former Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) POWs. During the Vietnam War years, it was deeply involved in the interrogation, indoctrination, and handling of US and Allied POWs, and was the responsible PAVN service in charge of supervising the activities of military POWs who cooperated with Hanoi in the preparation of psychological warfare pamphlets, leaflets, and radio broadcasts.

The CDV was the responsible PAVN service in charge of fifth column agent operations in the ARVN, as well as in US and Allied forces. Fifth column penetrations of US and Allied forces focused on the recruitment of locally employed Vietnamese interpreter/translators. With the assistance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the CDV developed a capability against Republic of Korea (ROK) forces. The CDV also directed its operations against Australian, Filipino, New Zealand, and Royal Thai Government (RTG) combat units in South Vietnam.

The CDV had considerable success in penetrating former Republic of Vietnam (RVN), ARVN, Regional Forces (RF), Popular Forces (PF), People's Self-Defense Forces (PSDF), Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU), Rural Development (RD) Teams, the Open Arms (Chieu Hoi) program, the National Police Command, the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), the ARVN Military Security Service (MSS), the RVN Presidential Office, and other RVN and ARVN agencies. Heavy emphasis was placed on the recruitment of fifth columnists in "grassroots" district and village-level RF/PF and PSDF units. In 1974 alone, CDV fifth column assets assisted PAVN forces in overrunning 2,800 outposts and in seizing over 600 hamlets in the Mekong Delta area. At the time of the April 1975 Communist takeover of South Vietnam, CDV field

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components had over 50,000 agent assets down to the village level. CDV fifth column assets contributed greatly to the disintegration of ARVN forces during the 1975 "Great Spring Victory" PAVN offensive.

Background and Development

The origins of the CDV can be traced back to the period following Ho Chi Minh's establishment on 19 May 1941 of the Vietnam Independence League (Viet-Nam Doc-Lap Dong-Minh Hoi/Viet Minh). Vo Nguyen Giap, currently the SRV Minister of National Defense and a VCP Politburo member, was tasked with making preparations for an armed insurrection and the development of guerrilla bases for Hoi Chi Minh's Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). Giap proceeded to create a covert intelligence apparatus by converting his guerrilla units into armed propaganda units. Through the use of selected terrorism, Giap's armed propaganda apparatus forced other Vietnamese nationalist and ethnic minority groups to join the Viet Minh in providing logistical support and in collecting tactical military intelligence on Japanese and Vichy French forces. It was from Giap's clandestine apparatus that the future Vietnamese military intelligence, enemy military proselytizing, and military security services took root and expanded.

On 22 December 1944, Ho Chi Minh signed an official directive which established the "Armed Propaganda Brigade for the Liberation of Vietnam" under the command of Giap. Formed by Giap with a core of 34 elite cadres, the Armed Propaganda Brigade engaged in proselytizing and intelligence collection activities. In April 1945, an ICP Politburo conference resulted in the consolidation of guerrilla forces into a Vietnamese Liberation Army under the command of Giap. The Vietnamese Liberation Army was then organized into staffs. Van Tien Dung headed the political staff which included subordinate military security (bao ve) and enemy proselytizing (dich van) sections. On 2 September 1945, Ho Chi Minh announced the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).

On 22 March 1946, DRV Decrees No. 33 and 71 officially established the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN). Decree No. 71 formalized the PAVN staff organization and authorized the organization of a political officer system in PAVN. The PAVN Political Staff, headed by Van Tien Dung, became the highest organ in PAVN for ensuring party control. Its Civilian Proselytizing (Dan Van), Enemy Proselytizing (Dich Van) and Military Security (Bao Ve Quan Doi) Sections ensured the coordination of military intelligence with party objectives and the internal security of the armed forces. Close coordination existed between these PAVN Political Staff components, the PAVN General Staff Military Intelligence Department (Cuc Quan Bao), and the civilian DRV Directorate General for Public Security (Tong Nha Cong An/TNCA).

The French Resistance War: 1946 to 1954

When hostilities between the DRV and the French came to a head on 19 December 1946, Giap's PAVN attacked French garrisons throughout Vietnam and the DRV Government withdrew from Hanoi to Viet Bac Province to set

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up its headquarters. The French Resistance War then expanded and intensified. The TNCA and PAVN intelligence and security services were in-place and intensified their coordinated operations against the French. PAVN political officers established party controls down to the platoon level. Military region and brigade/division-level political officers headed political staff offices which directed the activities of subordinate military security and enemy proselytizing sections.

By 1948, the PAVN Political Staff's Enemy Proselytizing Section was upgraded in status and became known as the Enemy Proselytizing Office (Phong Dich Van/PDV). The PDV had a 150-man staff organized into administrative, *phai khien* (agent) penetration, propaganda, prisoner of war (POW), and enemy research sections. The PDV provided professional staff guidance, direction, personnel, and training for five 50-man military region political staff enemy proselytizing sections; the 50-man Hanoi Special Region Political Staff Enemy Proselytizing Section; and to the enemy proselytizing components on the political staffs of brigade/division and regimental-size units. Each of the military region enemy proselytizing sections were in turn responsible for directing the operations of 15-man provincial unit enemy proselytizing subsections, which in turn supervised the activities of their subordinate three-man district enemy proselytizing cells. Every battalion-size unit had a political staff assistant for enemy proselytizing.

In South Vietnam, the PDV maintained two forward command headquarters—the Enemy Proselytizing Section of the Interrregion 5 Political Staff in Central Vietnam; and the Enemy Proselytizing Section of the Nam Bo (South Vietnam) Region, which became known in 1950 as the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) Enemy Proselytizing Section. By 1950, the COSVN Enemy Proselytizing Section had a 100-man headquarters staff which directed the activities of the Eastern Nam Bo, Western Nam Bo, and Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Special Region Political Staff's Enemy Proselytizing Sections. Each of the latter had a 50-man headquarters staff.

In spite of its size, the PDV was by far the least understood and the most dangerous component of the PAVN Political Staff's control system. The PDV and its subordinate commands were heavily engaged in psychological warfare activities, preparing and distributing leaflets and pamphlets to the civil populace, French military personnel, European and African members of the French Foreign Legion, and Vietnamese personnel of the French armed forces and their dependents. PDV agents were sent into French military camps to encourage treason, desertion, defection, mutiny, and to spread demoralizing propaganda. They did not hesitate to make coercive threats and to carry out approved assassinations of selected pro-French Vietnamese personnel and their dependents, as well as approved actions against French armed forces personnel. They recruited pro-French Vietnamese military personnel to collect military intelligence on the French armed forces, to recruit other Vietnamese personnel, and to remain in-place as fifth column agents with the mission of fomenting mutiny, collecting intelligence, and of conducting sabotage and terrorist actions. PDV armed propaganda teams were dispatched into French-controlled areas in advance of regular PAVN forces to spread demoralizing propaganda and to conduct sabotage operations. Carefully

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thought out enemy proselytizing and intelligence-gathering programs were incorporated into all PAVN campaign planning.

The PDV took into full account the ethnic and national differences between various individuals in the French armed forces. Tactically oriented operations were specifically designed to reduce the combat effectiveness of the French. Long range strategic operations were designed to induce individuals to serve the Communist cause upon return to their units and their homelands. In the latter category, special leaflets were prepared and distributed to major ethnic groups, such as Algerians, Czechs, French, Germans, Greeks, Moroccans, Poles, Romanians, Senegalese, Spaniards, Tunisians, and other nationalities.

Heavy emphasis was placed on targeting foreign nationals of the French armed forces, particularly French Foreign Legionnaires. The PDV was assisted in this activity by the Algerian, Czech, French, East German, Greek, Moroccan, Polish, Romanian, Spanish, and Tunisian Communist Parties. The French Communist Party distributed leaflets and pamphlets to French seamen onboard French military transport ships. A French naval petty officer, Henri Martin,* was arrested in 1951 for distributing such leaflets to French naval personnel. The East German United Socialist (Communist) Party (SED) also distributed similar leaflets in the name of the German Democratic Republic to Foreign Legionnaires of German origin. German language leaflets were sent to secure DRV zones via the USSR and the People's Republic of China (PRC) for distribution by PDV teams in Foreign Legion garrison areas.

Three East German SED members, who deserted from the Foreign Legion in Vietnam, played a key role in the PDV targeting of Foreign Legionnaires of German origin. One Rudolf Schroeder alias Ho Chi Long was the first European to defect to the DRV on 17 December 1945. Between 1946 and July 1954, Schroeder was responsible for the indoctrination and psychological exploitation of captured European Foreign Legionnaires at PDV administered detention camps in northern Vietnam. Two other German SED members, who later defected and assumed the Vietnamese names of Ho Chi Dan and Nguyen Nhan, directed psychological warfare efforts against European and North African members of the Foreign Legion. Each headed a PDV armed propaganda unit composed of European defectors, which conducted psychological warfare activities against non-French members of the French armed forces. Their units occasionally posed as French units before attacking isolated French outposts.

In the southern part of Vietnam, one Hoang Van Nhi alias Willy Hoang, an ethnic North Vietnamese who had collaborated with the Nazis during World War II in Paris and Berlin, was responsible for writing psychological warfare leaflets against German Foreign Legionnaires. Assigned to the Nam Bo/COSVN Political Staff's Enemy Proselytizing Section, Nhi directed

*Since July 1961, Henri Martin has been the chairman of the French Communist Party's (PCF) Franco-Vietnam Friendship Association Secretariat. He is a PCF Central Committee member in charge of its Southeast Asian Section. In November 1967, he wrote a report entitled "Vietnam Solidarity," which highlighted meetings he had with DRV Lao Dong Party (now the VCP) officials in Hanoi on how the PCF could best fulfill Hanoi's political action propaganda requirements in France.

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political indoctrination courses for Foreign Legionnaire defectors and deserters. Nhi was known by the French security service to be a political commissar responsible for German Legionnaires.

The following is an example of a German-language psychological warfare leaflet which was distributed to German Legionnaires in Vietnam:

"The Government of the German Democratic Republic appeals to all Germans who have been impressed into the French colonial army as Foreign Legionnaires to cease their dirty and criminal war against Vietnam and to come over to PAVN . . . thus they shall not only save their lives, but also the honor of the German Nation . . . the Government of the German Democratic Republic guarantees to all German soldiers who . . . come over to PAVN, a full amnesty, work according to their wishes and ability, and possibilities for professional training (and) will do its utmost to facilitate the return home of those German soldiers."

Such appeals had a certain amount of success, and several transports of former German Foreign Legionnaires were repatriated to East Germany via the PRC and the USSR. Similar convoys of nationals from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania were also repatriated to their countries of origin. It is not known whether they were voluntarily repatriated or returned as prisoners.

Throughout the duration of the French Indochina War, DRV authorities released small groups of French civilian and military prisoners by simply arranging for a local ceasefire or by merely letting them walk back to French lines from release points. All such releases were arranged by the PDV with party approval, and were intended to serve PDV objectives of creating fifth column movements in the French armed forces.

The treatment given French prisoners was similar to that given to United Nations prisoners in Korea by the PRC and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Treatment included intensive ideological indoctrination and impressment as laborers hauling military supplies for their captors. The PDV directed this activity. In December 1953, 297 French prisoners (European and North Africans) were released under a Christmas amnesty and addressed the following appeal to other members of the French armed forces:

"... The lenient measure taken in our favor by the DRV Government is an expression of the policy of a mighty state. . . . The French People have realized that peace in Vietnam has become a national need for France to safeguard her independence. . . . In the French colonies in Africa, more and more people have risen up to fight for national independence and to put an end to colonialist exploitation and repression. . . . The DRV Government, the sole Government which has released its prisoners when war is still raging on its territory, undertakes to awaken through correct and convincing explanations the men deceived by the propaganda of the French colonialists, lackeys of American imperialism. . . . Let this International Day of struggle be an opportunity for the whole French Expeditionary Corps to take part in the building of peace in Vietnam and the world . . . Long live President Ho Chi Minh."

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In many respects, the above declaration outdid the work carried out by PRC and DPRK propagandists during the Korean War. It made the repatriation of African prisoners an extremely complicated problem.

Captured French pilots were subjected to a thorough "convincing explanation" and were used to broadcast appeals to their fellow pilots in the French Far Eastern Air Force:

"... For 17 months I had fought against these people which I did not even know. If people asked me the reason why I came to Indochina, and why France has been waging war in this country, I would feel ... ashamed of my ignorance. ... As for us, what are we fighting for? We are fighting for a handful of French capitalists and for American imperialists who, forced to sign an armistice in Korea, are compelling the French rulers to drag on this war ... with the blood of French soldiers. ... Comrade pilots, we should no longer fight against the Vietnamese people ... we must fight for the cessation of this dirty war through repatriation of the French Expeditionary Corps and immediate negotiations with the Vietnamese People's Government headed by President Ho Chi Minh."

The indoctrination of prisoners did not cease with their release and repatriation to France. The French Communist Party (PCF) irregularly published a newspaper, *Voix du Rapatrie*, written allegedly by former prisoners, which kept other repatriates informed on developments in the DRV even though they had returned to civilian life. The families of prisoners who died in captivity received letters of condolence from the DRV posted in Czechoslovakia by the PCF's Franco-Vietnam Friendship Association front. Such a thorough follow up of each individual case constituted a rather unique example of the potential of unlimited psychological warfare conducted by the DRV and its PDV.

The PDV had considerable success in inducing the defection and desertion of African Foreign Legionnaires with the active assistance of the French, Algerian, Moroccan, and Tunisian Communist Parties. An estimated 500 African personnel defected or deserted to the DRV. In 1950, the Communist Parties of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia on behalf of the Soviets and the PCF sent a Moroccan Communist Party Central Committee member, alias Major Marufo Khoan, to Vietnam where he played a key role in inducing the defection and desertion of several hundred African Foreign Legionnaires. Major Marufo Khoan prepared leaflets printed in Arabic for North African Foreign Legionnaires. One such leaflet read in part:

"Moroccan soldiers, you fight for an unjust cause at the service of your oppressors. ... The Americans and the French carve up your country. Moroccan soldiers, the Vietnamese are your brothers ... the soldiers of the Vietnamese Army fight against your oppressors for the liberty and independence of your country...."

In 1951, Major Marufo Khoan established and commanded a training camp for North African deserters in Tung Thien District, Son Tay Province, which was known as the Ba Vi Afro-Asian Agricultural Worksite. It was Major Khoan's intention to train North African deserters for later return to North

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Africa, where they would participate in further nationalist liberation struggles against the French colonial administrations.

Between 1952 and 1954, a number of Foreign Legion Moroccan Spahi tribesmen, who had served with the French Foreign Legion in Korea, deserted to PAVN after their arrival in Central Vietnam. They were assigned to the PAVN Interregion 5 Vietnamese Veteran's Regiment commanded by PAVN Colonel Pham Kiet in Central Vietnam, and participated in combat actions against the French. This is but yet another example of how former Foreign Legionnaires were utilized by PAVN during the French Indochina War.

The Interim Period: 1954 to 1959

Following the February 1954 agreement made between the US, the USSR, the UK and France to convene a Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina, the Lao Dong Party tasked its civilian and military intelligence and security services with the mission of selecting and training cadres for dispatch to South Vietnam under the cover of refugees from North Vietnam. In March 1954, the PDV began training 30-man groups in compartmented three-month courses under the guidance of two Soviet advisers and one PRC adviser. On 21 July 1954, the Geneva Accords on Indochina were signed which provided for the partition of Vietnam along the 17th parallel, the regroupment of PAVN personnel from South to North Vietnam, the resettlement of refugees from North to South Vietnam, the establishment of an International Control Commission (ICC), and the holding of national elections on 20 July 1956.

Beginning in August 1954, one million refugees began their exodus to non-Communist South Vietnam. In September 1954, the PDV became known as the Military Proselytizing Department (Cuc Binh Van/CBV) of the DRV Ministry of National Defense General Political Department. By August 1955, the CBV had trained and dispatched 150 staff officers to South Vietnam in the refugee exodus with contact instructions to fill the vacuum left by the regroupment to North Vietnam of the COSVN Military Intelligence Branch. In South Vietnam, the dispatched CBV cadres were contacted according to prearranged agent communications plans, and were assigned to command positions in the Region 5 (Central Vietnam), Nam Bo (South Vietnam), and Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Special Region Military Proselytizing Sections (MPS). About 70 were assigned to the Nam Bo (former COSVN) Public Security Office MPS; 50 to the Region 5 MPS in Central Vietnam; and 30 to the Saigon Special Region MPS. By this time, all North Vietnamese directed civilian and military intelligence, proselytizing, and security operations were centralized under the Nam Bo Public Security Office (So Cong An)—the forward command of the DRV Ministry of Public Security (Bo Cong An/BCA).

These three major MPS components of the CBV in South Vietnam maintained contact with the CBV headquarters in Hanoi through radio communications, couriers flown on ICC flights to Hanoi, the DRV delegation to the ICC in Saigon, and through land courier lines which extended across the 17th parallel's demilitarized zone (DMZ). MPS components in South Vietnam were tasked with the mission of undermining the power base of Republic of

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Vietnam (RVN) Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem in paving the way for the takeover of South Vietnam through the holding of national elections if agreed upon by Diem. The CBV instructed these MPS components to subvert Republic of Vietnam Army (ARVN) officers, penetrate ARVN division and regimental-size units, and to collect military intelligence through nonviolent and nonterrorist means. In July 1955, Diem rejected the holding of national elections and became the first RVN President in October 1955. At this stage, the Lao Dong Party tasked its CBV and subordinate MPS components in South Vietnam to resort to enemy proselytizing actions through the use of terrorism to foment conditions for a civil war in South Vietnam.

In January 1959, the 15th Plenum of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee issued a resolution to guide the southern party apparatus in waging armed and political struggle activities against the Diem government. Nam Bo Region Party Secretary and Politburo member Le Duan was called to Hanoi to give a report on the situation in South Vietnam. Le Duan was accompanied by Phan Xuan Thai alias Hai Van, head of the Nam Bo Public Security Office, who in turn gave a report to the Politburo on military proselytizing, security and intelligence activities in South Vietnam.

The Buildup: 1960 to 1964

In September 1960, the Third Congress of the Lao Dong Party laid down strategic tasks for waging a war of national liberation in South Vietnam, and for the reestablishment of the Nam Bo Region Party Committee as COSVN. The PAVN Military Proselytizing Department became known as the Enemy Proselytizing Department (Cuc Dich Van/CDV). On 20 December 1960, the Lao Dong Party established the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLFSVN) as its overt political front in South Vietnam. In February 1961, the South Vietnamese Liberation Army (SVNLA) was established as the overt military arm of PAVN in South Vietnam. In March 1961, Major General Tran Luong arrived as the political officer of the SVNLA, and was immediately tasked with reorganizing the military proselytizing branch of the Nam Bo Region Party Committee's Public Security Office. This development preceded the official October 1961 reestablishment of the Nam Bo Region Party Committee as COSVN. Major General Tran Luong then became a COSVN Current Affairs Committee member and secretary of its Military Affairs Committee under which the military proselytizing branch was reorganized. In December 1961, the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) of South Vietnam was established as the southern branch of the Lao Dong Party with Major General Tran Luong as its secretary-general and as the PRP representative to the NLFSVN Central Committee. All power rested in the Lao Dong Party's forward COSVN headquarters with PAVN in full control of the SVNLA.

By 1962, the civilian security, military security, military intelligence, enemy and military proselytizing branches of the former Nam Bo Region Party Committee's Public Security Office had been reorganized. Civilian security operations in South Vietnam were centralized under the Ministry of Public Security's (BCA) COSVN Security Section (Ban An Ninh) forward command with a 150-man staff; MND Military Security Department (CBV)

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operations were centralized under the SVNLA Political Staff Department's Military Security Office (Phong Bao Ve/PBV) with a 50-man staff; MND Research Department (CNC) military intelligence operations were centralized under the SVNLA Military Staff Department's Military Intelligence Section (Ban Quan Bao) with a 60-man staff; and CDV military proselytizing operations were centralized under the COSVN Military Proselytizing Section (Ban Binh Van/MPS) with a 25-man staff.

The SVNLA PDV was responsible for the detention of ARVN and US/Allied military personnel, and for their psychological warfare exploitation. The COSVN MPS was responsible for psychological warfare programs, and penetration and fifth column operations against ARVN. The COSVN MPS coordinated its penetration operations with the BCA COSVN Security Section, as well as with the SVNLA PDV which was used as a spotting ground for the recruitment of ARVN prisoners prior to their release with operational security clearances obtained by the SVNLA Military Security Office. The COSVN MPS also coordinated its psychological warfare programs against ARVN and US/Allied forces with the SVNLA PDV as well as with the COSVN Propaganda and Training Section. Headed by Major General Tran Luong, the day-to-day operations of the COSVN MPS were handled by his deputy Tran Van Du alias Bay Du through the COSVN Military Affairs Committee.

Significant developments vis-a-vis the US occurred after the August 1964 attack by North Vietnamese naval patrol boats against US naval ships in the Gulf of Tonkin. On 5 August, the first US naval aviator was captured, and exploited by the PAVN intelligence services. CDV specialists participated in his initial handling, interrogation, and psychological assessment. The CDV became responsible for supervising the handling, political indoctrination, and psychological exploitation of US prisoners of war (POWs) under MND jurisdiction in coordinated action with the Ministry of Public Security (BCA), the BCA People's Armed Public Security Forces (PAPSF), the MND General Political Department's Military Security Department (CBV), and with the MND General Staff Department's Research (Military Intelligence) Department (CNC).

In February 1965, the Republic of Korea (ROK) sent its first contingent of 50,000 combat forces to South Vietnam. This preceded the introduction of US combat forces in March 1965; Australian, New Zealand, and Philippine combat units; and the later introduction of Royal Thai Government (RTG) combat troops in September 1967. At the height of their involvement in Vietnam, Australia had 8,000 troops, and the RTG had 11,000 troops. The CDV became responsible for directing psychological warfare programs against these allied forces of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

Missions

Assisted by Soviet advisers, the CDV is the central psychological warfare and military prisoner of war (POW) handling arm of PAVN. The CDV has the mission of subverting enemy military forces through demoralizing psychologi-

cal warfare and fifth column penetration operations. It drafts and establishes enemy military proselytizing programs and POW indoctrination and handling procedures for implementation by PAVN and its CDV field commands in Kampuchea, Laos, and Vietnam. It is responsible for organizing, training, directing and monitoring the development of the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Kampuchean People's Republic enemy military proselytizing branches through assigned advisers.

The CDV studies and researches the history, morale, and organization of enemy military forces and their commanding officers for weaknesses to be psychologically exploited; establishes guidelines for the preparation of demoralizing propaganda themes to be used against enemy forces in and outside Vietnam; drafts and disseminates measures to counter enemy psychological warfare programs against PAVN; maintains a central registry of all military POWs exploited by PAVN; and has the primary responsibility for the political indoctrination and psychological exploitation of enemy POWs.

During the Vietnam War, the CDV and its forward field commands were deeply involved in subverting ARVN, US, and Allied military forces. It targeted ARVN, Australian, Filipino, Republic of Korea (ROK), New Zealand, and Royal Thai Government forces in South Vietnam. It has an English-, French-, Khmer-, Korean-, Thai-, and Chinese-language capability.

The CDV field commands in South Vietnam were responsible for fifth column penetration operations against ARVN, US, and Allied Forces, as well as against the ARVN and Republic of Vietnam (RVN) Regional Forces (RF), Popular Forces (PF), People's Self-Defense Forces (PSDF), Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU), Rural Development (RD) Teams, and pacification personnel. The CDV had considerable success in this area. As of 1968, its field commands had over 20,000 assets with a goal of 50,000 agent assets by 1969. Based on the analysis of captured documents, the latter figure of 50,000 agent assets is a conservative estimate on the extent of CDV operations in South Vietnam. No figures are available on the number of recruited agent assets employed by US and Allied forces, although captured documents clearly spell out priorities for the recruitment of US/Allied forces interpreter/translators. CDV penetration operations were coordinated with the Ministry of Public Security (Bo Cong An/BCA) and PAVN Military Security Department (CBV) forward field commands in South Vietnam. The CDV, as well as the BCA and the CBV, were heavily engaged in dispatching false defectors to disrupt the RVN Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program, utilizing it as a vehicle to legalize penetrations of ARVN, US and Allied forces.

In the POW field, the CDV was the PAVN service in North Vietnam which conducted the initial interrogations of US POWs. Using results of these interrogations, the CDV drafted tailored interrogation programs for the psychological exploitation of US POWs. It supervised the political indoctrination of US POWs and gathered information from interrogations and handwritten statements to prepare psychological warfare pamphlets, leaflets, and materials for radio broadcast. The CDV was the service which directed the activities of POWs, ARVN as well as US, who cooperated with their captors. The CDV exploitation of POWs was coordinated with the BCA and

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with the CBV. The CDV recommended release for selected POWs, but was not the ultimate approving authority in this matter. The CDV forward commands in South Vietnam similarly functioned.

Administrative Practices and Training

The vast majority of CDV personnel come from the farmer-worker class. Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) or VCP Youth Group membership is a prerequisite. A large number of old-line officers have a public security or military intelligence background. New officer candidates are usually spotted at the Son Tay Infantry Officer's School, and usually have at least a high school education. A large number of English-language and Korean-language specialists are graduates of the Hanoi Foreign Language Institute. New enlisted personnel are carefully screened and Ministry of Interior (BNV; formerly the BCA) security records are consulted via the MND General Political Department's Military Security Department, which is charged with supervising the PAVN draft system. Like the BNV, the PAVN General Staff Department's Research (Military Intelligence) Department (Cuc Nghien Cuu/CNC), and the PAVN General Political Department's Military Security Department (CBV), the CDV is inclined to resort to nepotism in recruiting relatives of CDV personnel, who have demonstrated their political reliability. CDV staff personnel are always chosen at the initiative of the service.

CDV training is given to all new enlisted and officer personnel after being admitted to the service. Training is given in the specialized areas of psychological warfare propaganda, interrogation, the indoctrination and handling of POWs, and intelligence tradecraft for agent handlers. About 2,000 officers were trained by the CDV between 1961 and 1974. All CDV operational personnel have received periodic specialized training and political indoctrination. Selected CDV officers have been trained at the BNV Central Public Security School. Other CDV officers spent the early part of their careers in BNV and PAVN CNC assignments before being formally transferred to the CDV. An unknown number of officers received KGB training in the USSR. A few have been trained in the PRC.

Between August and November 1965, the CDV held its first course for 12 CDV POW specialists who were dispatched to South Vietnam in early 1966 to reinforce the CDV Enemy Proselytizing Office forward command of the COSVN/SVNLA Political Staff Department. All 12 trainees received instruction on the policies of the revolution in South Vietnam, policies applied by the NLFSVN, policies toward enemy officers and enlisted personnel, the political situation in enemy units, the mission of enemy proselytizing, and the indoctrination, handling, and interrogation of prisoners and defectors. All participated in practical interrogation exercises with US POWs in the BCA/BNV Central Hoa Lo Prison—the "Hanoi Hilton."

Between May and August 1966, the CDV held its first course for 28 CDV detention camp specialists who were dispatched to South Vietnam in early 1967 to head provincial-level enemy proselytizing detention camp subsections under the CDV SVNLA Enemy Proselytizing Office forward command. All trainees were from the rank of aspirant to senior lieutenant, and were ethnic

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South Vietnamese who had regrouped to North Vietnam after the July 1954 Geneva Accords. The training course was given at a CDV training facility in Thuong Than Village outside Hanoi. Trainees received instruction on the administration, reeducation and release of POWs. They were briefed that provincial-level detention camps detained ARVN enlisted and noncommissioned (NCO) personnel, while officers and US/Allied forces personnel were detained at regional-level enemy proselytizing detention camp subsections before transfer to CDV SVNLA Enemy Proselytizing Office detention facilities in southern South Vietnam or to Hanoi from Central Vietnam. Provincial-level detention camp chiefs were responsible for properly receiving, searching, and storing POW personal effects in a bag marked with the POW's name and rank; indoctrinating POWs on NLFSVN clemency policies and camp regulations; maintaining status records on detained POWs and those being interrogated. Interrogations were conducted to obtain basic biographical data, exploitable tactical military intelligence, and political information on enemy unit morale and combat effectiveness. Interrogation results were sent to the provincial unit and/or military region headquarters for followup exploitation by military intelligence components.

By mid-1970, the CDV had centralized all enemy military proselytizing training under Military Proselytizing School 105 in Ha Dong City, Ha Tay Province, North Vietnam. CDV School 105 trained 140 cadres annually between 1970 and 1974 for assignments to various field commands in South Vietnam.

CDV personnel wear regular armed forces uniforms, receive salaries in accordance with PAVN pay scales, and hold PAVN ranks.

Organization

Headed by Major General Le Quang Dao, the CDV headquarters is located inside the Hanoi Citadel compound of the MND on the right hand side of the east gate on Ly Nam De Street. Within this area, the CDV maintained a maximum security detention facility—"Alcatraz"—where a small select group of uncooperative US POW officers underwent intensive brutal indoctrination and interrogation.

Although the personnel strength of the CDV is a closely guarded secret, its total estimated strength in the armed forces is about 15,000. It has an estimated 250-man headquarters staff inside the Hanoi Citadel compound, plus an unknown number of interrogation, indoctrination, and military POW detention camp specialists assigned to about 30 detention camps for an estimated 120,000 former ARVN personnel in Vietnam.

During the Vietnam War years in South Vietnam, the CDV had about 10,000 personnel assigned to four forward commands. About 1,500 were assigned to the SVNLA Enemy Proselytizing Office forward command and its field components; 4,600 to the COSVN Military Proselytizing Section forward command and its field components; 3,500 to the Region 5 Enemy Military Proselytizing Section forward command and its field components in Central Vietnam; and about 400 to the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region Enemy

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Military Proselytizing Section forward command and its field components in northern Central Vietnam. Following the Communist takeover of South Vietnam in April 1975, the CDV became responsible for the detention and reeducation of over 1,000,000 ARVN, RF/PF and PSDF personnel. The four CDV forward commands in South Vietnam then became responsible for and redirected their personnel to the administration of ARVN "reeducation camps." Surplus district and village-level cadres were reassigned to party agencies. As of 1979, over 120,000 ARVN personnel are still held in CDV administered detention camps in Vietnam. Most ARVN officer personnel with the rank of major and above are held in CDV camps in North Vietnam.

CDV field strength in Laos is about 600 personnel plus 60 advisers assigned to the Enemy Military Proselytizing Department of the Lao People's Democratic Republic MND General Political Department. Following the December 1978 PAVN invasion of Kampuchea, about 3,300 CDV personnel were deployed in Kampuchea, where PAVN currently (July 1979) has an estimated 225,000 personnel engaged in combat against the pro-Chinese Kampuchean Democratic Republic People's Liberation Army (KPLA). The CDV also has an unknown number of advisers currently assigned to the pro-SRV Kampuchean People's Republic Revolutionary Army (KPRA) enemy military proselytizing branch.

The CDV headquarters is organized into a number of staff-line administrative and operational components. The basic organizational component is the office (phong). The headquarters provides professional guidance, training and personnel to the enemy proselytizing components of major PAVN command and corps political staffs, as well as to the enemy proselytizing sections of division, brigade, and military region political staffs. Each PAVN division, brigade, and military region political staff has a 50-man enemy proselytizing section with at least one 25-man detention facility for military POWs. Each regimental, group and provincial unit political staff has a 10-man enemy proselytizing subsection. Each battalion, subgroup, and district unit political staff has a three-man enemy proselytizing cell.

The CDV headquarters in Hanoi is organized into the following known subordinate offices:

1. **Secretariat:** It handles routine administrative and logistical support for the department, and functions as the personal staff of the director.
2. **Battlefield Proselytizing Office:** It drafts and monitors the implementation of enemy military proselytizing programs by field elements attached to PAVN units in the Lao, Kampuchea, and Vietnam theaters of operations.
3. **Enemy Situation Office:** It prepares programs to counter enemy psychological warfare activities. It researches and collates information on the history, morale, and biographical background of enemy unit commanders, intelligence officers, and personnel who opposed the war, deserted or refused to participate in combat actions. Emphasis was placed during the Vietnam War on evidence of racism in the US armed forces, relationships between enlisted and officer personnel,

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- and on the combat effectiveness of unit commanders and their personnel.
4. **Files Office:** It maintains all CDV files, reports, and professional documents.
 5. **Foreign Affairs Office:** It supervises the enemy military proselytizing operations of the Lao and Kampuchean People's Republic enemy military proselytizing branches, whose officers it has trained. It monitors the activities of at least 60 CDV advisers assigned to the Enemy Military Proselytizing Department of the Lao People's Democratic Republic MND General Political Department, and an unknown number of advisers presumably assigned to the enemy military proselytizing branch of the Kampuchean People's Republic MND Political Staff. During the Vietnam War, it presumably maintained liaison with North Korean Embassy psychological warfare military advisers, who assisted the CDV in its targeting of Republic of Korea forces in South Vietnam. The office also maintains contacts with Soviet KGB advisers in Hanoi.
 6. **General Research Office:** It is responsible for establishing enemy military proselytizing doctrine and prepares enemy military proselytizing training programs and directives for the armed forces.
 7. **Indoctrination Office:** It is responsible for the political "reeducation" of military POWs, and was deeply involved during the Vietnam War years in directing the political indoctrination of US POWs.
 8. **"Phai Khien" Agent Operation Office:** It monitors the activities of field elements which are responsible for penetrating enemy military units. During the Vietnam War years, forward field elements directed agent and fifth column operations against ARVN and US/Allied forces.
 9. **Policy (POW) Office:** It is responsible for conducting the initial interrogations of military POWs; drafts interrogation plans; and establishes criteria for the handling, billeting, feeding, and care of military POWs. It has a central registry of all US POWs who were processed in or evacuated to North Vietnam, of POWs who died in captivity, as well as all records of interrogation and indoctrination results, and handwritten statements made by US POWs in North Vietnam. The Policy Office maintains close contacts with the BCA/BNV Interrogation and Prisons Departments, particularly with BCA/BNV authorities at the Central Hoa Lo Prison—the "Hanoi Hilton." It brokered interrogations for military intelligence information conducted by the MND General Staff Department's Research (Military Intelligence) Department (Cuc Nghien Cuu/CNC).
 10. **Propaganda Office:** It is responsible for the preparation of psychological warfare materials for distribution against enemy military personnel. Psychological warfare products were based on information obtained from POW interrogation and indoctrination sessions, and information obtained in the field by the various CDV

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forward commands. Other information was developed from agent and fifth column operations, and from liaison with foreign Communist Parties.

11. Training Office: It operated Military Proselytizing School No. 105 which graduates over 140 cadres annually for service in Laos, Kampuchea, and Vietnam. The office conducts courses in the specialized areas of psychological warfare propaganda, interrogation, the indoctrination and handling of POWs, and intelligence tradecraft for agent handlers. About 2,000 officers were trained by the CDV between 1961 and 1974.

Handling and Exploitation of US POWs in North Vietnam

In the US POW field, the CDV maintained a central registry of all POWs exploited by the MND, and had primary responsibility for the political indoctrination and assessment of military POWs. Whenever a POW was captured in North Vietnam by MND elements, both the CDV and the Research (Military Intelligence) Department (Cuc Nghien Cuu/CNC) of the MND General Staff Department were notified. If a POW was captured by Ministry of Public Security (Bo Cong An/BCA) elements, the BCA notified the CDV before his arrival at the BCA Central Hoa Lo Prison—the "Hanoi Hilton." When informed of the capture of a US POW, the CDV notified the MND General Political Department of the capture before taking any action. The CDV Policy (POW) Office then sent a cadre to the Central Hoa Lo Prison to make arrangements for the POW's reception and housing. Arrangements were also made for the initial interview of the POW by a CDV Policy Office cadre to conduct an initial psychological assessment.

After arrival at the Central Hoa Lo Prison, the POW was stripped and searched (if not already done), particularly for the POW's "gold blood chit" which contained his military serial number. Senior cadre of the CDV Policy Office believed that these "gold blood chits" were intended for prisoners to buy off guards to facilitate their escape. After the search was completed, all the POW's personal effects, documents, military clothing, handcarried equipment, and dog tags were brought to the CDV Policy Office for examination and storage. When the body of a dead US pilot was recovered or when a POW died in captivity in North Vietnam, all personal affects were turned in to the CDV Policy Office which arranged for the burial at an unknown location. The CDV Policy Office maintained a central master listing of all US military POW's detained or recovered in North Vietnam.

Although the CDV did not maintain a permanent representative at the Central Hoa Lo Prison, BCA prison and CDV Policy Office authorities maintained close coordination with each other. One room at the Central Hoa Lo Prison was reserved for CDV personnel where they interrogated and indoctrinated POWs. After the POW arrived at the Central Hoa Lo Prison, the BCA prison authorities informed the CDV Policy Office POW Reception Unit of his arrival, and the CDV Policy Office POW Reception Unit sent a cadre to the prison where he conducted a preliminary interrogation for basic biographical data and vulnerability data.

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Based on the psychological assessment, CDV officers drafted an indoctrination and exploitation plan based on the degree of the POW's cooperation. The CDV recommended what treatment and what interrogation techniques would be used in exploiting the POW. The CDV indoctrination and exploitation plan included an evaluation of the POW's character; family background, strong and weak personality characteristics; his attitude before, during and after capture; and how the prisoner should be approached in future indoctrination and detailed interrogation sessions. Indoctrination plans were approved by the CDV Policy Office and then by CDV Director Major General Le Quang Dao, a Lao Dong Party Central Committee member and a deputy director of the MND General Political Department.

The exploitation of the POW depended upon the category to which he was assigned. The categorization of US POWs depended upon the affiliation of the initial capturing/screening unit; the extent to which he had been exploited before his transfer to Hanoi; the POW's apparent areas of knowledgeability established during preliminary screening; the POW's age, grade, intelligence, and position; evidence of potential compromise of DRV national security; national origin and race; assessment of the POW's intent or desire to escape; and, probably most important, the POW's degree of cooperation with his captors.

Using these factors as criteria for exploitation, the CDV segregated US POWs into the following three categories:

- Category A: Those considered special because of the importance of the information which they offered.
- Category B: Those considered to have the same potential but who refused to cooperate.
- Category C: Those whose continued presence in North Vietnam after thorough interrogation offered little or no advantages to Hanoi. These were released whenever it best served Hanoi's purposes. Those in this category were usually labeled "progressive" and had voluntarily turned over material in their possession upon capture. "Progressive" POWs provided all information available to them, including information about themselves and their friends, relatives and families; and had been successfully indoctrinated into realizing the "realities of the war and its effect upon the DRV." Not every "progressive" POW was suitable for exploitation because of intellectual limitations; because they had few or no contacts in the US of political value; because some were overly concerned with the well-being of their families and the negative effect their actions might have; and others refused to engage in propaganda or collection activities even though they otherwise cooperated with their captors.

Within the MND, the CDV Policy Office and the CNC were responsible for determining whether a POW would be eligible for release. These recommendations were then approved by Major General Le Quang Dao, the CDV Director; Lieutenant General Song Hao, the MND General Political Department Director; Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap, the Minister of

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National Defense, a Politburo member; and finally by Lao Dong Party First Secretary Le Duan, Chairman of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee's Central Military Party Affairs Committee.

Despite the fact that some US POWs were labeled by BCA and MND CDV and CNC interrogators as "adamant" (cung dau) or "stubborn" (ngoan co) because of their uncooperativeness, they were still considered to be potentially valuable sources of information and suitable for future exploitation. This particularly applied to Category B prisoners.

Category A and B POWs were not exploited for the purposes of collecting intelligence information through their contacts in the US or by attempting to persuade their contacts to engage in antiwar activities. This was not done because it might have led to the surfacing of their identities. The identity of Category A POWs was carefully guarded because identifying them as POWs rather than as missing or killed-in-action would permit the US to employ countermeasures to negate the value of the information which they provided. The identity of Category B POWs was similarly not revealed because some may have not survived the interrogations or other techniques used to coerce them to cooperate.

After a POW was initially categorized, CDV and CNC representatives met to discuss how the CDV indoctrination and exploitation plan was to be implemented and what techniques would be used on the POW. CNC interrogators complied with CDV recommendations. BCA prison authorities and interrogators were also required to follow CDV recommendations on the billeting, feeding, indoctrination and interrogation of the POW. The CNC conducted interrogations for military information with or without a CDV cadre present. In the case of a "stubborn" POW, a CDV cadre was present in the interrogation room with the CNC interrogator. The CDV was required to make all US military POWs available for CNC interrogation. The CNC also maintained a master listing of all US military POWs captured in North Vietnam. Sanitized listings were prepared for other armed forces branches on only those POWs who fell within their area of jurisdiction. Naval and Air Force Air Defense interrogators obtained access to POWs through the CNC, and systematically exploited specific technical subjects falling within their areas of jurisdiction.

With the assistance of the Soviet KGB, the BCA and the MND prepared various types of interrogation questionnaires to be used by BCA and MND interrogators and indoctrination specialists. US POW interrogations conducted by either the BCA or by the MND covered the following:

- American combat tactics, techniques and order of battle, especially AAA and SAM evasive tactics.
- American personnel, morale, fighting spirit and motivation factors.
- American weaponry, technical equipment, and war materiel; with special attention given to American use of armor, armored vehicles, and aircraft ECM equipment.
- American knowledge of PAVN forces in South Vietnam.

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- History of American presence in South Vietnam with details on units, activities and unit commanders.
- War-making potential of the US and its forces both in South Vietnam and other areas where American support units and reinforcements were present.
- Nature of coordination and cooperation between US and other Allied forces, including relationships between Allied units and ARVN.
- Economic war-making potential of the US, including information on the war production capabilities of US industries.
- Class origin of US military service personnel.
- Professional background, psychological makeup and aspirations of the prisoner.
- General knowledge and understanding of Americans in South Vietnam of the military, political and economic situation in South Vietnam and other countries.
- Behavior, mental attitude, and point of view of Americans under combat conditions in South Vietnam.
- Professional background and previous assignments of other US POWs held in North Vietnam.
- Effectiveness of ideological indoctrination on US POWs in North Vietnam and results of Communist enemy military proselytizing programs in South Vietnam and elsewhere.

Interrogations were aimed at gaining the complete cooperation of a POW for use in antiwar propaganda activities. BCA and CNC interrogators insisted upon handwritten statements from POWs condemning American involvement in Vietnam and admitting "crimes" against the Vietnamese people. Political indoctrination was emphasized during all interrogation sessions.

CNC interrogation and indoctrination results were channeled in report form through the CNC Director to the MND General Staff Department which distributed them to the MND General Political Department's CDV and Military Security Department (Cuc Bao Ve Quan Doi/CBV), the BCA General Research Service, and to the Office of the Premier. The BCA forwarded its knowledgeability briefs and interrogation reports through Party channels to the MND General Political Department and its CDV, as well as to the Office of the Premier, where Premier and Politburo member Pham Van Dong closely reviewed BCA and MND interrogation results. The BCA General Research Service was the highest body in the DRV intelligence community for the research, analysis, and collation of intelligence information derived from US POW interrogations. BCA and MND interrogation reports were reviewed to ensure that a POW was thoroughly exploited for intelligence and operational leads in Vietnam and abroad. The BCA General Research Service drafted programs for the exploitation of US POWs abroad by the BCA's Central Intelligence Department (Cuc Tinh Bao Trung Uong/CTB). This included the CTB administration of letter mailing programs between US

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POWs and their relatives in the US. The CDV had no responsibility for this psychological warfare activity, other than determining which POW was allowed to write home and have his identity surfaced as alive in North Vietnam in a POW status.

From BCA and CNC interrogation and indoctrination reports, the CDV was able to select candidates for exploitation in psychological warfare programs. The CDV Indoctrination and Propaganda Offices were deeply involved in this activity. Handwritten POW statements on political subjects were studied and used to develop indoctrination materials and psychological warfare propaganda leaflets and pamphlets for distribution in South Vietnam and abroad. Handwritten statements made in South Vietnam to CDV field components were similarly studied and sent to the CDV headquarters in Hanoi for incorporation into POW indoctrination, and enemy military proselytizing programs. All interrogation and indoctrination reports, and handwritten statements were recorded in detail and incorporated into the POW's Preliminary Personnel Record dossier. Information was correlated against that obtained from other POWs and used in subsequent interrogations and indoctrination sessions if required. Personnel of the CDV Indoctrination and Propaganda Offices had direct access to POWs; conducted and supervised indoctrination sessions; distributed indoctrination and propaganda materials; supervised the preparation of handwritten POW statements from selected cooperative and "progressive" POWs; and supervised "progressive" POWs who were utilized in press conferences and in antiwar broadcasts over Radio Hanoi.

Indoctrination sessions were designed to convince the POW of the heroism and the determination of the Vietnamese people in their struggle for independence from foreign domination. POWs were required to read books, documents, and pamphlets on Vietnamese history and the reconstruction of North Vietnam. However, reading materials were considered by the CDV to be not as effective as oral question and answer sessions, where the POW was guided to provide desired responses. Indoctrination took priority over intelligence collection. One of the most effective methods of indoctrination was the use of intensive lectures followed by demonstrations through pictures of injuries inflicted on women and children. Following oral sessions, the POW was usually required to make a handwritten statement on the question and answer topic. If the POW refused to make a handwritten statement, various forms of physical force and torture were applied as a last recourse until the POW complied. These handwritten statements were also included in the POW's Preliminary Personnel Record dossier.

Annex A represents what is believed to be a standardized questionnaire implemented by the CDV in South Vietnam against US POWs between 1966 and 1972. The questionnaire was specifically aimed at collecting information on military morale and motivations for use in psychological warfare propaganda programs against US military personnel in South Vietnam and abroad. The goals of which were to persuade US military personnel to ask the US Government to send them home; not to fight against the just cause of the liberation forces; not to support the RVN and its ARVN; and to oppose military operations against civilians in liberated areas.

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The American Target in South Vietnam

Following the August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident, the capture of the first US naval aviator in North Vietnam, and the introduction of US combat forces in South Vietnam in spring 1965, the CDV headquarters in Hanoi instructed its forward commands in South Vietnam to initiate comprehensive programs for US and Allied military personnel in Vietnam. Until spring 1965, COSVN and its CDV forward commands had no comprehensive program for US and Allied military forces in South Vietnam.

COSVN, which was then responsible for all party and military operations in South Vietnam, was tasked with fulfilling this requirement which had been handed down to the CDV by the Central Military Party Affairs Committee of the Lao Dong Party's Central Committee. The COSVN Military Affairs Committee entrusted the execution of this program to the CDV COSVN Military Proselytizing Section (MPS) and the CDV SVNLA Political Staff Department's Enemy Proselytizing Office (Phong Dich Van/PDV) forward commands. COSVN Military Affairs Committee members, Major Generals Tran Do and Tran Luong, supervised the programs implemented by the COSVN MPS and by the SVNLA PDV. Major General Tran Do supervised the SVNLA PDV headed by CDV Lieutenant Colonel Ngo Dai Trai, who had been transferred from the COSVN MPS. The COSVN MPS was supervised by Major General Tran Luong, who left the running of the MPS to CDV Lieutenant Colonel Tran Van Du.

The COSVN MPS Propaganda Subsection was tasked with responsibilities for preparing psychological warfare leaflets and radio broadcast materials in coordinated action with the SVNLA PDV. PDV Chief Ngo Dai Trai was well versed in this field, having headed the COSVN MPS Propaganda Subsection between 1963 and early 1965. The MPS Propaganda Subsection monitored US Armed Forces Radio, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts for exploitable information to use in its preparation of psychological warfare materials against US military personnel. Most MPS prepared leaflets, handbills, and pamphlets consisted of impassioned claims that the Vietnam War could not be understood nor effectively fought by foreigners. Racial themes were stressed. The MPS Propaganda Subsection was particularly interested in collecting information on US civil rights and black power movements for exploitable propaganda themes against US Negro personnel, and against US prisoners of war (POWs). All US POWs were considered to have potential for psychological warfare exploitation. The MPS was charged with the mission of "promoting the antiwar movement and urging US and satellite troops to refuse to take part in operations and to demand prompt return home."

The SVNLA PDV had primary responsibility for the administration, indoctrination, interrogation, and psychological exploitation of ARVN and US/Allied civilian and military POWs. The PDV compiled information from interrogations to draft psychological warfare materials; maintained central POW records and logs; arranged POW release ceremonies; drafted enemy proselytizing programs for implementation by PAVN/SVNLA enemy

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proselytizing components; and spotted potential fifth column agent candidates amongst ARVN POWs for the COSVN MPS.

In July 1965, the CDV dispatched its first groups of English-speaking psychological warfare and interrogation specialists. All were graduates of the Hanoi Foreign Language Institute. About 50 were assigned to the SVNLA PDV and about 20 were assigned to the Region 5 Enemy Military Proselytizing Section (Ban Binh Dich Van/EMPS) in Central Vietnam. One, Nguyen Be, had participated in the exploitation of US pilots in North Vietnam before his assignment to the Region 5 EMPS.

In response to the large buildup of US forces in South Vietnam, Hanoi ordered the restructure of the CDV forward commands in South Vietnam in early 1967. COSVN and its SVNLA relinquished direct control over the Region 5 Party Committee in Central Vietnam, which now fell under the direct control of Hanoi. Although COSVN and its SVNLA became responsible for party and military operations in the southern half of Vietnam, it coordinated its operations with Region 5 in Central Vietnam. The northern provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien and Hue City were reorganized into the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region (TTHMR) under the operational control of PAVN Military Region 4 headquartered in Vinh, Nghe An Province. Consequently, the CDV established direct control over its operations in Region 5 and in the TTHMR. The Region 5 EMPS coordinated its operations with the COSVN MPS and with the SVNLA PDV.

The SVNLA Enemy Proselytizing Office (PDV)

Between 1968 and March 1970, the CDV SVNLA Enemy Proselytizing Office (PDV) forward command administered at least seven detention camps for captured US/Allied civilian and military personnel, and at least three other detention camps for ARVN personnel. All captured foreign civilian personnel were categorized as enemy intelligence agents, and were detained and treated as captured foreign military personnel in PDV detention facilities.

In April 1970, the PDV camp system was reorganized since the anticipated receipt of large numbers of US/Allied and ARVN POWs never materialized after the 1968 Tet (Vietnamese New Year) general offensive. Between April 1970 and 1973, the PDV administered four detention camps for captured US/Allied civilian and military personnel, and at least two other camps for ARVN personnel. The PDV had no responsibility for the detention of PAVN/SVNLA deserters, criminal and party offenders, which was the responsibility of the SVNLA Political Staff Department's Military Security Office (Phong Bao Ve). The PDV also had no responsibility for the detention of captured RVN civilian prisoners, which was the responsibility of the COSVN Security Office (So An Ninh).

PDV held POWs were made available for interrogation to the COSVN MPS and to the SVNLA Political Staff Department's Military Security Office. The latter was responsible for military counterintelligence interrogations. The SVNLA Military Staff Department's Military Intelligence Office (Phong Quan Bao) was informed of the capture of all US/Allied civilian and military personnel, and sent its own interrogators to the capturing unit where the

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POWs were temporarily detained and exploited for perishable tactical military information.

Following the overthrow of Khmer Chief of State Norodom Sihanouk in March 1970 and the installation of the American-backed Khmer Republic Government (GKR) of Lon Nol, COSVN and its SVNLA were tasked with operations in Kampuchea. The PDV then staffed the combined civilian and enemy proselytizing (dan dich van) components of five PAVN/SVNLA military regions established in Kampuchea. Over 300 PDV and 200 MPS personnel were committed to action in Kampuchea.

The PDV headquarters was composed of 75 personnel assigned to six major sections. About 200 personnel were assigned to PDV detention facilities, and about 1,500 personnel were assigned to subordinate enemy proselytizing field components in the southern half of South Vietnam. The PDV headquarters was organized as follows into a:

1. **Command Section:** headed by CDV Colonel Ngo Dai Trai. Trai was assisted by two deputies, CDV Majors Pham Tran Ban and Bui Thanh Ngon, and one English-speaking interpreter/translator.
2. **Administrative Section:** 20 personnel.
3. **Battlefield Proselytizing Section:** 10 personnel who monitored the results of interrogation and indoctrination sessions conducted by the propaganda and enemy research sections. The section studied the results and prepared enemy proselytizing programs for implementation by the enemy proselytizing sections of division-size units and of six military region political staffs, which each had a 50-man staff, including a 25-man detention camp facility for captured POWs. Regiment, group, subregion, and province unit political staffs had a 10-man enemy proselytizing subsection. Battalion and district-size units had a three-man enemy proselytizing cell headed by their deputy political officers. Reports were sent from field elements in a vertical chain of command to the PDV Battlefield Proselytizing Section for review and collation into reports for the CDV headquarters in Hanoi, the PAVN/SVNLA Military Staff and Political Staff Departments for distribution to their Military Intelligence and Military Security Offices, and to the COSVN Military Affairs Committee.
4. **Enemy Research Section:** 10 personnel responsible for the interrogation of US/Allied and ARVN POWs for information on the history, morale, combat effectiveness, and biographical data on division-level units and their commanders. Emphasis was placed on the identification of personnel who opposed the war, had deserted, or who had refused to take part in combat actions. Attention was given to the degree of racism in US combat units, and on the relationships between enlisted and officer personnel.
5. **Propaganda Section:** 15 personnel responsible for the political indoctrination of US/Allied and ARVN POWs. Following oral group sessions, POWs were required to make a handwritten statement

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condemning the US as aggressors. Handwritten statements were later studied to develop new indoctrination materials and to prepare psychological warfare materials for distribution near US/Allied and ARVN bases. The handwritten statements were also sent to the CDV headquarters in Hanoi where they were used to assist in the indoctrination of US POWs held in North Vietnam, and in the preparation of psychological warfare leaflets and radio broadcasts.

6. **Policy (POW) Section:** 15 personnel plus 200 others assigned to six detention camps under its control. The Policy Section was responsible for administering the PDV detention camp system for captured US/Allied civilian and military personnel, and ARVN POWs; maintaining a central registry of all POWs and US/Allied deserters processed through and/or detained by the PDV; recommending POWs for release in coordinated action with the SVNLA Political Staff Department's Military Security Office; arranging POW release and exchange ceremonies in coordinated action with the SVNLA Political Staff Department's Military Security Office; and for ensuring the implementation of POW administrative and handling procedures by subordinate PDV field elements. Although the criteria for releasing POWs is not known, most ARVN enlisted and noncommissioned officers were usually eligible for release, but ARVN officers were not. The PDV rationale for the release of ARVN POWs was based on the assumption that the released ARVN POW would return home to his family and/or his parent unit as a fifth column penetration asset. ARVN POWs considered for release were individually interrogated, and indoctrinated by staff officers of the SVNLA Political Staff Department's Military Security Office and of the COSVN MPS. MPS cadres interviewed each ARVN POW and tape recorded approved letters to the family which were later broadcast over the NLF SVN Liberation Radio. The MPS had considerable success in recruiting ARVN POWs as fifth column assets. The ARVN Military Security Service estimated that at least 25 percent of all released ARVN POWs had been recruited by the MPS for missions against ARVN. Most were recruited as fifth column intelligence-gathering assets; others, for sabotage operations; and others as support assets for MPS penetration operations against ARVN. The MPS was assisted by the PDV in its spotting of agent candidates. The PDV sent the MPS information copies of all ARVN indoctrination and interrogation reports through the SVNLA Political Staff Department and the COSVN Military Affairs Committee. At least 10 former ARVN POWs were recruited by the PDV for assignments in the PDV Policy Section detention camp system which was organized as follows:

- a. **POW Interunit A:** Established in May 1968 with a 25-man headquarters staff, it had four 25-man detention camps and one 25-man POW escort unit. Interunit A was responsible for the detention of US/Allied civilian and military personnel. Camp 2A/21 held about eight US POWs as of April 1970; three other US POWs were released in January 1969 in Tay Ninh Province. Camp 3A/26 held

about seven US POWs as of April 1970; one US POW died of malaria in October 1969. Camp 4A held one US Negro deserter, his Vietnamese/Khmer wife, and two children from different fathers under a loose form of house arrest. An unknown number of US POWs were detained in Camp 1A/20 as of April 1970. In April 1970, Interunit A was reorganized into two 25-man detention camps for US/Allied civilian and military personnel.

- b. **POW Interunit B:** Established in May 1969 with a 25-man headquarters staff, it had three 25-man detention camps for ARVN POWs. In April 1970, Interunit B was reorganized into one 25-man detention camp for ARVN POWs.
- c. **POW Interunit C:** Established in May 1968 with a 25-man headquarters staff, it had three 25-man detention camps for US/Allied civilian and military personnel. In April 1970, Interunit C was reorganized into one and possibly two 25-man detention camps. There is no information available on the number of US/Allied prisoners held in the POW Interunit C camp system.

The Region 5 Enemy Military Proselytizing Section (EMPS)

Region 5 Enemy Military Proselytizing Section (EMPS) operations against US military personnel emphasized the recruitment of Vietnamese interpreter/translators, as well as the preparation and distribution of English-language psychological warfare leaflets and pamphlets to subordinate provincial-level EMPS. The Region 5 EMPS organized intelligence teams to collect information on US/Allied sweep operations; promoted antiwar sentiments in US combat units; and supervised the administration, detention, indoctrination, and interrogation of captured US/Allied and ARVN personnel. According to an undated captured document, the Region 5 EMPS targeted ARVN, Australian, Filipino, ROK, Thai, and US military personnel with the objective of creating and exploiting friction between them in order to reduce their combat effectiveness and to induce increased desertions and acts of mutiny against participation in combat actions. Allied forces of the US were branded in EMPS propaganda as hired US mercenary forces who had no national interest in fighting a war in Vietnam.

Two subordinate components of the Region 5 EMPS were involved in operations against the American target. They were the Region 5 EMPS Propaganda Subsection, and the Interrogation and Detention Camp Subsection. Its subordinate Quang Da Special Region (QDSR) EMPS was similarly organized against the American target. Eight other subordinate provincial EMPS had enemy military proselytizing subsections involved in operations against the American target.

The Propaganda Subsections of the Region 5 and QDSR EMPS each had 25 personnel organized into research and printing, armed propaganda, and propaganda proselytizing cells. The research and printing cell was headed by a CDV English linguist who monitored US Armed Forces Radio, British Broadcasting Corporation, and Voice of America broadcasts to gather background information which was used to prepare English-language

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psychological warfare materials for US military personnel. Anti-American themes urged US military personnel to refuse to take part in combat operations, to request the US Government to return them home to their families, and to stop the killing of Vietnamese civilians. During the year 1968, over 100,000 English-language leaflets were distributed by the QDSR Propaganda Section. The armed propaganda cell was responsible for loudspeaker broadcasts against US and ARVN military bases, and had four English-language speaking members. The propaganda proselytizing cell had five English-language speaking cadres who were assigned to US military base areas with the mission of collecting information on US military attitudes towards the war which were used later in the preparation of psychological warfare leaflets against US military personnel.

Between 1966 and 1969, four US POWs worked in the QDSR EMPS Propaganda Subsection where they assisted in the preparation and translation of anti-American materials into good colloquial English for distribution by district and village-level EMPS components near US military bases in the QDSR. At least one of these Americans was reported to have assisted the QDSR EMPS Interrogation and Detention Camp Subsection in the interrogation of US POWs. He assisted in the initial interrogation of US POWs; attempted to convince them to support the cause of Hanoi's National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLFSVN); and monitored the attitudes of US POWs which he reported to the detention camp commander. After the QDSR EMPS Interrogation and Detention Camp Subsection was dissolved in late 1968, he was moved with other US POWs to the Region 5 EMPS where he taught English-language courses to other Region 5 and QDSR EMPS cadres. In late 1969, he was admitted to the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) and was reportedly transferred to North Vietnam for medical treatment.

The Interrogation and Detention Camp Subsection of the Region 5 and the QDSR EMPS each had 40 personnel organized into a five-man command group, a 10-man administrative staff, and a 25-man security guard force. The QDSR EMPS Interrogation and Detention Camp Subsection maintained the Hon Tau Temporary Camp for US/ARVN/Allied POWs in Que Son District, which transferred POWs to the permanent Tra Khe Camp along the Kampuchean border area of Tra Bong District, Quang Ngai Province. The Tra Khe Camp was commanded by CDV Senior Captain Nguyen Phuong. Phuong was assisted by two English-speaking interrogators, who had graduated from the Hanoi Foreign Language Institute. Two English-speaking leaflet writers also assisted in the interrogation and indoctrination of US POWs in the camp. In late 1968, the QDSR EMPS Interrogation and Detention Camp Subsection was dissolved, and all POWs along with the camp command group and administrative staff were transferred to the Region 5 EMPS Interrogation and Detention Camp Subsection.

In each of the other eight subordinate provinces in Region 5, the provincial EMPS Enemy Proselytizing Subsections were involved in psychological warfare operations against the American target. Headed by the deputy chief of the provincial EMPS, the subsections were staffed with seven English-speaking personnel. The subsections were responsible for preparing and

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distributing English-language leaflets, and making loudspeaker appeals against US military personnel in the province. Five of seven members of the Quang Ngai Province EMPS Enemy Proselytizing Subsection were professional ethnic North Vietnamese CDV staff officers. They supervised targeting against US Infantry Brigade battalions in the province. According to a captured document covering the period January-April 1971, it distributed 4,000 English-language leaflets and made about 50 loudspeaker appeals monthly. The Enemy Proselytizing Subsections of the Binh Dinh, Dac Lac, Gia Lai, Khanh Hoa, Kontum, Phu Yen, and Quang Nam (RVN Quang Tin) Province EMPS were similarly staffed and engaged in operations against the American target.

The Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region Enemy Military Proselytizing Section

According to an April 1967 dated captured document, the TTHMR EMPS directed the Quang Tri, Thua Thien, and Hue City EMPS to establish seven-man American proselytizing subsections with English-speaking cadres by 30 June 1967. The TTHMR EMPS provided one CDV officer to head the American Proselytizing Subsections and one CDV English-speaking interpreter/translator to serve with their interrogation and detention camp subsections. PAVN combat units were informed to provide captured English-language documents to the American Proselytizing Subsections for translation into Vietnamese. The TTHMR EMPS also provided the American Proselytizing Subsections with loudspeakers, tape recorders, radios, and printing equipment to utilize in their operations against US units.

Another captured document dated September 1967 written by TTHMR EMPS Deputy Chief Nguyen Cao Thieng outlined a plan for proselytizing American troops. According to this document, the American proselytizing objective was to undermine the morale of US military personnel and Allied forces, to stir up American antiwar sentiment, and to reduce the combat effectiveness of US military units. English-speaking cadres of the American Proselytizing Subsections were instructed to prepare leaflets, slogans, and posters for distribution near US military bases, as well as themes for Liberation Radio and Hanoi Radio broadcasts in English against US military personnel in South Vietnam. "American soldiers, especially Negro soldiers, are our principal targets, then come the noncommissioned officers and officers up to captain who have proved to be relatively progressive." Subordinate EMPS components were instructed to use interpreters, fifth column (penetration) agents, and "progressive" assets in contact with American military personnel. "All districts and units should assign comrades to take charge of the task of proselytizing American soldiers . . . will send translators to all locations when they are available."

All known English-speaking personnel of the American Proselytizing Subsections were CDV graduates of the Hanoi Foreign Language Institute. They interrogated US POWs for political intelligence. Interrogations for military intelligence were conducted by the TTHMR Military Staff's Military Intelligence Section and by the Quang Tri and Thua Thien Province Military Staff's Military Intelligence Subsections. The TTHMR Political Staff's Military

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Security Section—a forward command of the PAVN Military Security Department (CBV)—coordinated and monitored the interrogations of US POWs.

The Korean Target

Following the introduction of Republic of Korea (ROK) combat forces in South Vietnam in February 1965, the CDV received assistance from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in preparing psychological warfare programs against the 50,000-man ROK force in South Vietnam. Close relationships were presumably established between the CDV Foreign Affairs Office and the DPRK Embassy in Hanoi, and between the DRV Embassy and the DPRK Workers' (Communist) Party in Pyongyang.

Relationships between the DRV MND and the DPRK MND expanded in December 1964 following the visit to Hanoi of a DPRK military delegation headed by DPRK MND Minister Kim Chang-pong. General Kim Chang-pong met with MND Minister Vo Nguyen Giap, Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung, Deputy Chief of Staff Hoang Van Thai, General Political Department Director Song Hao, and General Rear Services Department Director Tran Sam. Dung, Thai, Hao, and Sam were all Vice Ministers of National Defense. Lieutenant General Song Hao was the central supervisor of the MND General Political Department's CDV. The nature of their discussions with the DPRK MND delegation remains unknown.

In August 1965, DPRK Central Committee member and General Kim Sin-in arrived at the PAVN SVNLA's Political Staff Department in South Vietnam for 15 days of meetings and research with the SVNLA Political Staff Department. He also met with leadership cadres of the COSVN Current Affairs Committee (CAC), the COSVN CAC Military Affairs Committee, and the SVNLA headquarters. Among those with whom he held meetings were SVNLA Political Staff Department Director Major General Tran Do, the supervisor of the SVNLA Political Staff's Enemy Proselytizing Office; COSVN CAC member Major General Tran Luong, the supervisor of the COSVN Military Proselytizing Section; and Deputy COSVN CAC Secretary Phan Xuan Thai alias Hai Van, the supervisor of the COSVN Security Section.

In October 1965, the Region 5 Enemy Military Proselytizing Section (EMPS) received responsibilities for targeting ROK military personnel in Central Vietnam with emphasis placed on the recruitment of Vietnamese interpreter/translators employed by ROK units. In 1966, the DPRK Embassy in Hanoi sent an eight-man team to the Region 5 EMPS headquarters. The North Korean team assisted the EMPS in carrying out propaganda and proselytizing activities against the ROK Blue Dragon Division in the Quang Da Special Region (RVN Quang Nam Province), the ROK Tiger Division in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen Provinces, and the ROK White Horse Division in Khanh Hoa Province. The North Korean team was equipped with its own printing equipment, and provided the EMPS with Korean-language psychological warfare leaflets for distribution throughout Region 5.

Most leaflets were printed in North Korean, while a few were drafted and printed by the North Korean team at the Region 5 EMPS headquarters. North

Korean propaganda themes included praise for North Korean Premier Kil Il-sung and living conditions in North Korea; appeals to ROK personnel to request their president to recall them home; offers of political asylum for ROK deserters and defectors; and pleas to ROK personnel to stop the killing of South Vietnamese civilians and the destruction of civilian homes and livelihood. Leaflets were distributed by subordinate provincial EMPS echelons at ROK unit locations and in the predicted paths of ROK units on operations. Members of the North Korean team were also involved in the interrogation of ROK prisoners, who were usually indoctrinated and released as examples of North Korean good faith for subsequent propaganda exploitation.

The content of North Korean-produced psychological warfare materials was not coordinated with the Region 5 EMPS except to pass on leaflets for distribution. The Region 5 EMPS initially had no Korean-language specialists and was unable to check on the content of the North Korean propaganda themes. All contact was channeled through one Vietnamese-speaking North Korean captain. As time passed, the Region 5 EMPS began to realize that their North Korean counterparts were there to further the interests of the North Korean Government and had little concern for the Vietnamese revolutionary cause. On Region 5 EMPS insistence, the North Koreans conducted a one-year Korean-language course for Region 5 EMPS personnel in 1967. The course, however, failed to produce Korean-speaking Region 5 EMPS linguists. Most instruction was given through a Chinese-speaking North Korean interpreter. Region 5 EMPS trainees were taught mostly North Korean slogans, and were required to memorize and recite North Korean propaganda leaflet themes.

The same situation prevailed in the COSVN area of jurisdiction in southern Vietnam. The COSVN Military Proselytizing Section (MPS) neither possessed nor expressed interest in developing a special military proselytizing program tailored for Third World Military Assistance Command forces. It had no staff personnel who could speak, write or understand Filipino, Thai, or Korean. In July 1967, at the insistence of the COSVN Current Affairs Committee, the COSVN MPS agreed to accept and to receive bimonthly shipments of North Korean-produced leaflets for distribution by subordinate field components near ROK installations in the Saigon Capital area. Later, in early July 1968, a three-man North Korean military proselytizing delegation arrived at the COSVN MPS headquarters where they were briefed on the organizational system and activities of the COSVN MPS. COSVN MPS Chief Tran Van Du conducted the briefings which were designed to give the North Koreans an on-the-spot assessment of Vietnamese military proselytizing methods of operations.

An April 1968 dated captured document from the "enemy proselytizing cell staffed by Korean personnel of the Quang Da Special Region to comrades of the People's Liberation Army of Quang Da" confirmed North Korean presence in South Vietnam. In this document, the Koreans congratulated the Quang Da Special Region (QDSR) for attacks on the ROK Blue Dragon Division and for the capture of ROK personnel.

In spring 1968, the Region 5 EMPS requested the CDV headquarters in Hanoi to provide it with CDV Korean linguists in order to establish its own

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compartmented capability in the ROK proselytizing field. The CDV initially provided the EMPS with three Korean linguists without the knowledge of the North Korean team attached to it. Two were assigned to the PAVN 3rd Infantry Division Political Staff's EMPS in Binh Dinh Province, where the ROK Tiger Division operated. The third linguist, CDV Senior Lieutenant Nguyen Quoc Hoat, was assigned to the Region 5 EMPS headquarters, where he began reviewing the North Korean leaflet product. Those leaflets considered not to be useful to the EMPS were either destroyed, censored, or revised to present the EMPS point of view. Hoat drafted other EMPS Korean-language leaflets, and worked closely with the QDSR EMPS to which he was attached as its sole Korean translator. Hoat's product was handwritten and mimeographed while the North Korean product was machine printed. Thus, the originator of Korean-language leaflets in Region 5 was easily identifiable.

CDV Senior Lieutenant Hoat also began conducting Korean-language courses for Region 5 EMPS cadres without the knowledge of the North Korean team. The training was designed to provide the EMPS self-sufficiently in Korean. The first Korean-language course was conducted between April 1969 and February 1970. Two Korean linguists were then assigned to each subordinate provincial EMPS which had an ROK target in its area. Two were assigned, according to a captured document, to the B-3 Front Gia Lai (Pleiku) Province EMPS in the Central Highlands. About 15 Korean linguists were assigned throughout Region 5.

By early 1970, the QDSR EMPS had one Korean translator, Nguyen Quoc Hoat, and printed for distribution over 2,000 Korean-language leaflets monthly. The Binh Dinh, Khanh Hoa, and Phu Yen Province EMPS received monthly supplies of Region 5 EMPS-produced Korean-language leaflets for distribution by subordinate district and village-level enemy military proselytizing components near ROK bases. Each distributed about 4,000 Korean-language leaflets monthly. The Binh Dinh Province EMPS targeted two regiments of the ROK Tiger Division; the Phu Yen Province EMPS, one regiment of the ROK Tiger Division; and the Khanh Hoa Province EMPS, the ROK White Horse Division.

The North Korean team at the Region 5 EMPS headquarters was reduced to four officers. The team was composed of a colonel, two lieutenant colonels, and a Vietnamese-speaking captain. It was denied permission to organize its second Korean-language course on the grounds that the combat situation was insecure. Nevertheless, the North Korean team continued to prepare and print leaflets for distribution. It was unaware of the fact that the Region 5 EMPS headquarters now had three Korean-language specialists, who reviewed their product, prepared other Korean-language leaflets, and conducted Korean-language courses for the Region 5 EMPS.

An undated captured document stated that the Region 5 EMPS targeted ARVN, Australian, Filipino, ROK, Thai, and US military personnel with the objective of creating and exploiting friction between them in order to reduce their combat effectiveness and to induce increased desertions and mutiny against participation in combat actions. Allied forces were branded in EMPS

propaganda as hired US mercenary forces who had no national interest in fighting a war in Vietnam.

In April 1972, a captured Binh Dinh Province Unit courier provided unconfirmed information on North Korean targeting of the ROK Tiger Division in the An Khe, Binh Khe, and Tuy Phuoc areas of Binh Dinh Province, and in the northern portion of Phu Yen Province. Other confirmed reports (dates unknown) had earlier provided indications of North Korean proselytizing teams operating in Binh Dinh Province; however, they had been asked to leave by the Region 5 headquarters which had discovered them performing other than agreed upon propaganda activities in the area.

The Thai Target

Following the introduction of Royal Thai Government (RTG) combat forces in South Vietnam in September 1967, CDV field components in South Vietnam began developing psychological warfare programs against RTG forces. An August 1968 dated captured document confirmed the involvement of the CDV SVNLA Enemy Proselytizing Office in the printing and distribution of Thai-language propaganda materials against the RTG Black Panther Regiment headquartered in Phuoc Tuy Province by a subordinate enemy proselytizing field component. As of August 1968, this field component was scheduled to be reinforced with one CDV Thai-language specialist. According to another undated captured document, the Region 5 EMPS was responsible for the preparation and distribution of Thai-language propaganda materials against RTG military personnel.

Foreign Communist Party Support in East Asia

The CDV was indirectly assisted in its collection of information on the US antiwar movement, which was used in the reeducation of US POWs in North Vietnam, by various pro-Soviet Communist Parties. In East Asia, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and the Australian Communist Party (ACP) assisted the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP: formerly known as the Lao Dong Party) in this collection effort via their International Departments.

In the case of Japan, close relationships were established between the Foreign Affairs Department of the VCP Central Committee and the International Department of the JCP Central Committee. The JCP International Department handles official party-to-party liaison with the VCP Foreign Affairs Department through the JCP's Representative Office in Hanoi. The JCP Permanent Representative Office in Hanoi maintains contacts with at least the BNV, although specifics concerning this relationship are not known. The JCP Representative Office has over a 10-man staff which is responsible for *Akahata (Red Flag)* and Nihon Dempa News Agency journalist activities, and for the coordination of various types of support activities with the VCP, the Vietnam-Japan Friendship Association, and the Vietnam Committee for the Investigation of US Imperialist War Crimes.

The JCP International Department and the JCP United Front Department directly supervise the activities of the JCP's Japan-Vietnam Friendship

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Association (JFVA), the Japanese Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikyo) and its Vietnam Support Center, the Japan Committee to Investigate War Crimes in Vietnam, and the Committee for Peace in Vietnam (Beheiren). During the Vietnam War years, the primary objective of the JCP towards Vietnam was to hinder the effectiveness of US and Australian military forces in South Vietnam. The JCP and its JFVA front elevated "Japanese imperialism" to an equal rank as a primary target along with "opposition to the Vietnam War being waged by American imperialism assisted by Japanese monopoly capitalism."

On behalf of the JCP International Department, JVFA delegations frequently traveled to Hanoi to coordinate and to exchange political action and psychological warfare materials. Delegations brought packages of materials from the JCP Gensuikyo and Beheiren fronts, which contained reports on US military bases in Japan and Okinawa. JVFA delegations were asked to assist in the collection, review and clipping of articles from American newspapers and periodicals that reflected antiwar sentiments, pacifism, or opposition to US involvement in Vietnam. VCP officials in Hanoi commented that these articles were needed both for the purpose of analyzing US Government policies and American public opinion, and for use in the "reeducation" of captured US personnel, the latter being a CDV charter responsibility. The JVFA sent shipments twice monthly to the VCP *Nhan Dan* (*People's*) editorial office and to the Vietnamese State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries for use by an unidentified Vietnamese "research committee" which met twice monthly to study Japanese and American affairs.

JCP American affairs specialists of the JCP Committee to Investigate War Crimes in Vietnam (JCIWCV) traveled several times to Hanoi where they provided VCP officials with information collected on the antiwar movement in the United States, and where they received from the VCP materials and "evidence" of US war crimes in Vietnam. These materials were used effectively by the JCP in conducting an anti-American activity called the "Tokyo Court." (The "Tokyo Court" was used as a political action forum to publicize and condemn US war crimes in Vietnam.) The JCP also used these materials at International War Crimes Tribunal meetings and at various pro-Soviet international conferences in Europe, such as the War Crimes Commission of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam.

The JCP Gensuikyo front and its Japan-Vietnam Support Center (JVSC) played upon the fears of the Japanese people towards the possible involvement of Japan in the Vietnam War through the presence of US military bases in Japan and Southeast Asia, and on the general desire of the Japanese people for peace. The JVSC asked the Japanese Socialist Party to distribute antiwar letters written by US POWs in North Vietnam—a CDV directed activity—to US military personnel and civilians at US military bases in Japan, and at airports, ports and railroad stations in the country. These US POW antiwar letters were printed and distributed by the JVSC to create American antiwar sentiment, particularly against American women, and to demoralize American personnel stationed in Japan.

The JCP Beheiren front was an anti-Vietnam War front which, at first, resorted to "nonviolent direct action." It established ties with antiwar organizations in the US and in other countries, helped US deserters flee Japan to other countries and attempted to form "rebel military groups" within the US Armed Forces. Thus, the CDV was indirectly assisted in its mission of inducing US military desertions and in fomenting "mutiny" in US military units. In return, the VCP supported JCP demands for the abrogation of the US/Japanese Security Treaty, the return of Okinawa to Japanese control, and the withdrawal of US forces in Japan and Southeast Asia.

VCP anti-American campaigns in Japan were supported by the travels of Vietnam-Japan Friendship Association (VJFA) officials to Japan in coordinated action with the JCP's International Department and its JVFA. VJFA delegates coordinated propaganda efforts against US military presence in Japan and psychological warfare collection programs with JCP International Department front organizations. With JVFA assistance, VJFA delegations toured the perimeters of US military bases in Japan and Okinawa, and familiarized themselves with the status of US military bases and forces in Japan. VCP delegates regularly attended annual JCP Gensuikyo Conferences, meeting with Gensuikyo JVSC officials.

For example, one Hoang Xuan Nhi, a long-time CDV psychological warfare specialist since the days of the French Resistance War, headed a two-man VJFA delegation to the JCP's 20th Gensuikyo Conference in August 1974. Before leaving Japan, Nhi met with JVFA and Gensuikyo JVSC officials, and levied requirements for the collection of political intelligence on US Presidents Nixon and Ford, and on the "Watergate affair." Nghi was accompanied by BNV staff interpreter and security escort officer Nguyen Trung Hieu.

The JCP International Department had good access to sympathetic pro-Hanoi support groups in both the US and Australia, and increased its liaison with the American and Australian Communist Parties. Contacts were maintained with the Australian Communist Party as well as with Australian and New Zealand support groups. Australia and New Zealand both had combat units deployed in South Vietnam under the US-sponsored Third World Military Assistance Command in Saigon, which was a CDV target. The JCP assisted the VCP in coordinating the distribution of demoralizing antiwar psychological warfare materials in Australia and New Zealand. The main thrust of this effort focused on demands for the withdrawal of Australian and New Zealand forces, which, according to CDV-produced propaganda, had no national interest in fighting a war in South Vietnam as hired US mercenary forces. VCP officials also established contacts with the Australian and New Zealand Anti-Vietnam War Movements, and with the New Zealand Wellington Committee on Vietnam for the purpose of conducting coordinated psychological warfare campaigns against US, Australian, and New Zealand involvement in Vietnam. An Australian Communist Party member assisted Hanoi's Vietnam News Agency in Hanoi in preparing English-language psychological warfare materials for distribution in Australia and in South Vietnam against Australian military personnel. The Australian Communist Party supported Hanoi's effort to isolate the Republic of Vietnam and the US from their military allies in East Asia.

Operations in Laos and Kampuchea

The CDV Foreign Affairs Office is responsible for supervising the development of the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) Ministry of National Defense General Political Department's Enemy Military Proselytizing Department, and the pro-SRV Kampuchean People's Republic Revolutionary Army (KPRA) enemy military proselytizing branch. The LPDR and KPRA enemy military proselytizing branches currently operate as extensions of the CDV in Laos and Kampuchea. The CDV Foreign Affairs Office also monitors the work of about 60 CDV advisers to the LPDR Enemy Military Proselytizing Department and an unknown number of CDV advisers to the KPRA enemy military proselytizing branch.

Another CDV office is responsible for monitoring the operations of CDV field components attached to PAVN forces in Laos and Kampuchea. About 600 CDV personnel are currently assigned to three PAVN infantry divisions and two mainline regiments in Laos. Another 3,300 CDV personnel are currently deployed in Kampuchea, where PAVN has an estimated 225,000 personnel engaged in combat against the pro-Chinese Kampuchea Democratic Republic People's Liberation Army (KPLA).

Laos

As background, CDV predecessor organizations began developing their capability in Laos in 1946, when PAVN established its Laos Front for the French Resistance War. CDV personnel were assigned to enemy proselytizing components under PAVN military region political staffs. Their activities were compartmented from the CDV advisory role in developing the Pathet Lao (PL) enemy proselytizing branch. Following the July 1954 Geneva Accords on Indochina, CDV advisers were attached to PAVN Advisory Group 100 in Laos, which controlled the development of the PL.

In support of increasing requirements for PAVN involvement in Laos, the Lao Dong Party established in September 1959 a central control authority over all PAVN activities in Laos. Designated after the date of its establishment, Group (Doan)/Office 959 was under the dual command of the Central Committee's Central Western Affairs Department (Ban Cong Tac Mien Tay Trung Uong) Military Staff and the Ministry of National Defense. Until 1968, Office 959 was responsible for the control of all PAVN combat units in Laos, as well as for all PAVN advisory assistance to the Lao People's Liberation Army (LPLA). In 1968, control over PAVN combat units and advisory personnel to the LPLA was reorganized. Office 959 relinquished its control over PAVN combat units in north Laos to the PAVN Northwest Military Region, and its control over PAVN units in central and south Laos to PAVN Military Region 4 Group 68, which later became known as Group/Division 968. Office 959 and its subordinate advisory groups became solely responsible for advisory assistance to the LPLA, although it continued to coordinate its activities with the PAVN Northwest Region and with PAVN Military Region 4 Group 68. This organizational system for PAVN operations in Laos remained intact through at least 1975.

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Office 959 had four major advisory groups to the LPLA under its command. These advisory groups were assigned to the Supreme LPLA Headquarters, and to the three LPLA military region headquarters for north, central, and south Laos. Initially, four-man advisory teams were assigned to each LPLA province unit headquarters. Each team consisted of a military adviser who was responsible for the collection of military intelligence, a political adviser responsible for military security and enemy proselytizing affairs, a code clerk, and a radio operator.

By 1963, 100-man advisory groups were attached to each of the three LPLA military region headquarters. The Office 959 central advisory group to the Supreme LPLA Headquarters was responsible for north Laos with subordinate advisory groups responsible for Louangphrabang and Oudomsai Province (Group 95), and Xiangkhoang and Vientiane Provinces (group designation unknown). Two subordinate advisory groups operated in central and south Laos. One (designation unknown) was responsible for the provinces of Khammouan and Savannakhet, and Group 763 was responsible for the remaining provinces in south Laos. The three military region advisory groups were responsible for the assignment of PAVN military and political advisers at the province (khoueng) and district (muong) unit levels. CDV advisers were represented in these advisory groups.

In 1965, Office 959 strengthened and reorganized its advisory system to the LPLA. The two advisory groups in central and south Laos were merged in May 1965 to form PAVN Advisory Group 565, which was attached to the LPLA South Laos Military Region (SLMR). Group 565 was staffed with 300 personnel. Advisory groups to the LPLA North and Central Laos Military Regions also had 300 personnel. Over 100 advisers were assigned to the Office 959 forward command advisory group at the Supreme LPLA Headquarters. Each was organized into military, political, and rear service (logistics) staffs. Their political staffs had an enemy proselytizing section (ban dich van) staffed by CDV officers. An estimated 1,000 PAVN advisers were assigned to the LPLA as of 1970. Of this number, about 200 represented the combined total of PAVN intelligence and security service advisers, including an estimated 40 CDV advisers.

The organization, personnel, and activities of PAVN Advisory Group 565 provide hard evidence of the degree of control and direction it exerted over the LPLA SLMR intelligence and security services in the past and now over the LPLA Military Region 3 and 4 services. Twelve CDV advisers were assigned to the SLMR Political Staff's Enemy Military Proselytizing Section (Suan Sua Ka Sua).

CDV advisers controlled and directed the operations of the SLMR Enemy Military Proselytizing Section headed by a CDV-trained LPLA officer. The section interrogated all Royal Lao defectors, refugees and POWs captured in the SLMR. Interrogations were conducted for the collection of military, political and economic intelligence in coordination with the SLMR Political Staff's Military Security Section advised by PAVN Military Security Department (CBV) staff officers and with the SLMR Special Operations (Dac Cong) Reconnaissance (Military Intelligence) Section advised by PAVN

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Following the official establishment of the LPDR in December 1975, the Supreme LPLA Headquarters was installed in Vientiane as the LPDR Ministry of National Defense (MND), and Laos was divided subsequently into four military regions. Since PAVN presence in Laos has not radically diminished in recent years, there is no reason to believe that PAVN intelligence and security assistance and controlling influence has diminished. On the contrary, the number of PAVN intelligence and security advisers has probably increased, as reflected by current reporting.

Kampuchea

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Ho Chi Minh's aid and sponsorship during the French Resistance War and became known as the Khmer Viet Minh headed by Son Ngoc Minh. In May 1949, PAVN established under COSVN a Khmer Front which was organized into several military regions. Enemy proselytizing sections were established under their political staffs, and CDV staff officers proceeded to direct the development of Son Ngoc Minh's Khmer Liberation Army (KLA) enemy proselytizing branch. Following the July 1954 Geneva Accords on Indochina, about 2,500 PAVN and about 2,000 KLA personnel were withdrawn to North Vietnam, where KLA personnel were put into compartmented training sites. The North Vietnamese civilian and military services proceeded to develop their covert structures in Kampuchea, and trained and dispatched an unknown number of ethnic Vietnamese and ethnic Khmer agent assets to Kampuchea. KLA cadres began filtering into northern Kampuchea by 1960.

Between 1960 and 1965, several hundred KLA personnel were trained at PAVN facilities. Political training included instruction by CDV staff officers. During this period, an unknown number of KLA enemy proselytizing cadres were trained by the CDV. In 1966, the Lao Dong Party Central Committee established under its direct control an entity designated Group P-36 to handle Hanoi's aid to the Khmer Communist Party (KCP) and its now known Kampuchean People's Liberation Army (KPLA). Based in Hoa Binh Province, P-36 was subordinate to the Central Committee's Organization Department headed by Politburo member Le Duc Tho. Although not involved in specialized professional training programs, the P-36 Training Office made all arrangements for such training by the appropriate parent agency. KPLA enemy proselytizing cadres were trained by the CDV. By 1967, over 3,000 KCP and KPLA cadres were processed through the P-36 system, an unknown number of whom were enemy proselytizing cadres who became the nucleus of the KPLA enemy proselytizing branch. All were dispatched to COSVN for service with the KCP/KPLA in Kampuchea.

The 18 March 1970 overthrow of Khmer Chief of State Norodom Sihanouk created a new operational environment for the PAVN services in Kampuchea and in their liaison advisory relationships with the KCP and its KPLA. Within hours, COSVN and its PAVN/SVNLA received orders from Hanoi to support the KCP/KPLA with whatever means was necessary to topple the American-backed Lon Nol government, including the use of PAVN/SVNLA troops and the assignment of advisory personnel. On 27 March, COSVN Directive No. 6 instructed lower echelons to establish liaison with and to send advisory groups to their KCP/KPLA counterparts. By late March 1970, political and military advisers began reporting for duty across the Vietnamese border with the KCP/KPLA.

In May 1970, COSVN Military Proselytizing Section (MPS) Chief Tran Van Du returned to COSVN from Hanoi with 70 CDV personnel. All were given additional training and indoctrination by the COSVN MPS on specific problems they would encounter in South Vietnam and Kampuchea. Of the 70, 45 were assigned to COSVN MPS units in Kampuchea. Most were agent handlers. This marked the beginning of CDV COSVN MPS forward command operations in Kampuchea, where COSVN MPS units were tasked with

penetrating ARVN units in Kampuchea and with assisting the KPLA enemy proselytizing branch in developing its capability against the Kampuchean National Armed Forces (FANK) of Lon Nol.

The CDV SVNLA Enemy Proselytizing Office and COSVN MPS forward commands were tasked with establishing units under the political staffs of five newly established PAVN/SVNLA military regions in Kampuchea. The CDV forward commands drew personnel from subordinate field elements attached to various regional and subregional party committees under their jurisdiction in South Vietnam. Special training courses were organized to prepare selected cadres for political, intelligence, security, and military proselytizing assignments in Kampuchea. For example, between April 1971 and January 1972, the Region 6 Party Committee* conducted two five-month training courses for Kampuchean operations attended by 100 trainees. Of this number, 35 cadres were assigned as political cadres for Kampuchean operations, 22 as intelligence cadres, and 31 as civilian and military proselytizing cadres. All were trained within their specialty fields, as well as in the Khmer Language and customs. An unknown number of Khmer-speaking cadres were similarly drawn from other subordinate regional party committees. The activities of Khmer proselytizing components of regional MPS in the Mekong delta area expanded as they were tasked with operations against ethnic Khmer personnel of ARVN throughout the COSVN/SVNLA area of jurisdiction.

Combined civilian and enemy military proselytizing sections (ban dan dich van) were established under the political staffs of the five PAVN/SVNLA military regions in Kampuchea. The sections were responsible for enlisting local Khmer support for the KCP/KPLA, as well as for developing fifth column penetration operations against ARVN and FANK forces in Kampuchea. They also administered detention facilities for ARVN and FANK POWs. Operations were also coordinated with their KPLA military region counterparts.

The civilian and enemy military proselytizing sections had about 50 personnel, who were organized into a small headquarters staff, at least one 30-man detention camp for FANK, ARVN/Allied POWs, and one 15-man armed propaganda team which had the mission of recruiting local Khmers to support the KCP/KPLA and of distributing Vietnamese prepared psychological warfare pamphlets and leaflets. The sections interrogated defectors, deserters and POWs for military, political, and economic intelligence, and prepared psychological warfare pamphlets and leaflets which were designed to reduce the combat effectiveness of ARVN and FANK personnel by inducing defections and desertions. The sections also engaged in fifth column penetration operations against ARVN and FANK. The sections monitored the activities of subordinate regimental-level three-man civilian and enemy military proselytizing cells. About 400 civilian and enemy proselytizing personnel were assigned to the five military regions in Kampuchea. Most were withdrawn with their military region staffs to South Vietnam by August 1973

*The Region 6 Party Committee of COSVN was responsible for civilian party and military operations in Binh Thuan, Lam Dong, Ninh Thuan, and Tuyen Duc Provinces, South Vietnam.

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on KCP/KPLA request. Others remained in Kampuchea with military region staffs along the Kampuchea/Vietnam border, where PAVN/SVNLA units continued to operate.

After the KCP/KPLA takeover of Phnom Penh on 17 April 1975 and the establishment of Pol Pot's Democratic Republic of Kampuchea (DKR) with Chinese backing, relations between the KCP and Hanoi continued to deteriorate. The last vestiges of Vietnamese influence over the KCP and its KPLA disappeared as Vietnamese-trained Khmers were systematically removed from their positions. New developments occurred after Pol Pot's KPLA began launching cross-border attacks into Vietnam. The PAVN services, including CDV field elements, supported PAVN retaliatory attacks into Kampuchea. This eventually led Hanoi to make the decision to topple the Pol Pot government and to remove it from power with a Khmer Government which Hanoi could control. Hanoi proceeded to create the anti-Pol Pot Kampuchean National Union for National Salvation (KNUS) front, and developed its Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Army (KPRA). The PAVN services, including the CDV, were undoubtedly involved in the training and development of the small KPRA enemy proselytizing service, which now operates as an extension of the CDV in Kampuchea. On 25 December 1978, PAVN launched its major offensive into Kampuchea which seized Phnom Penh on 7 January 1979 and which installed its KNUS front as the Kampuchean People's Republic (KPR) under Premier Heng Samrin.

As of July 1979, PAVN has an estimated 225,000 personnel committed to action in Kampuchea against the KCP/KPLA. About 3,300 CDV personnel accompanied PAVN forces into Kampuchea. Each infantry division political staff has a 50-man enemy proselytizing section, including a 25-man detention facility for POWs. Each regimental political staff has a 10-man enemy proselytizing subsection, and each battalion has a three-man enemy proselytizing cell.

Operations Against the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) During the Vietnam War

The CDV was entrusted by the Central Military Party Affairs Committee of the Lao Dong Party's Central Committee with the systematic penetration of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and the Regional Forces (RF), Popular Forces (PF), People's Self-Defense Forces (PSDF), Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU), and Rural Development (RD) Teams of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). The recruitment of penetration and fifth column agents was coordinated by the COSVN MPS in the southern portion of South Vietnam with the Ministry of Public Security's (BCA) COSVN Security Office forward command, the CDV SVNLA Political Department's Enemy Proselytizing Office (PDV), and with the SVNLA Political Staff Department's Military Security Office forward command of the PAVN General Political Department's Military Security Department. Recruitment operations in Central Vietnam were the responsibility of the Region 5 Enemy Military Proselytizing Section (EMPS) and of the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region Political Staff's EMPS. EMPS operations in Region 5 and in the Tri-Thien-Hue

Military Region were coordinated with the BCA Region 5 Party Committee's Security Office, the Military Region 5 Political Staff's Military Security Office, the BCA Tri-Thien-Hue Region Party Committee's Security Section, and with the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region Political Staff's Military Security Section.

According to a captured document, the CDV forward military proselytizing commands in South Vietnam had six primary missions:

1. Destruction of the accelerated pacification program, the assassination of "tyrants," the seizure of control over the populace, and the motivation of the masses to seize control of rural areas.
2. Development of revolutionary forces in enemy units to undermine enemy combat potential, and to eliminate oppressive forces, tyrants, and pacification cadre.
3. Kindling of an all-out political struggle in ARVN units in conjunction with an all-out uprising of the people.
4. Conduct of three-pronged attacks (military, political and military proselytizing) to resist the enemy plan to relocate the populace and his Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) defector activities.
5. Promotion of the antiwar movement and the urging of US and satellite troops to refuse to participate in operations and to demand prompt return home.
6. Recruitment of agents to penetrate RVN organizations, some of whom to remain dormant until the coalition government is established.

Two types of penetration agents were recruited: tactical and strategic. A tactical penetration agent was usually recruited in local RF/PF, PSDF, PRU, and RD units as fifth column assets to support PAVN/SVNLA attacks against ARVN. These types of agents played a key role in the 1974 PAVN/SVNLA offensive in the Mekong Delta area, where over 2,800 outposts and 600 hamlets were seized and put under SVNLA control. A strategic penetration agent is one who served in an important ARVN unit, a critical warehouse, depot or general reserve force, where he was in a position to collect intelligence on ARVN strengths, table of organization (T/O), armament, intentions, and plans, and to recruit other ARVN personnel. The strategic agent had the potential to hold more important positions, in order to arouse dissension among other ARVN personnel, to support PAVN/SVNLA forces during a general offensive, and to serve as an accommodation link between PAVN/SVNLA and ARVN or with the RF/PF. ARVN junior grade officer penetrations of aspirant to first lieutenant rank in an ARVN provincial-level position were approved by the provincial party committee with the concurrence of its security section. Recruitments of ARVN officers of captain rank and higher were approved by the region or COSVN MPS with the concurrence of their security sections. Officer penetrations were rarely used to spot, assess, develop, and to approach other fellow officers for recruitment.

The mission of fifth columnists included fomenting unit revolts, aiding Communist attacks, performing acts of sabotage and assassination, collecting intelligence, stealing munitions, promoting desertions and defections, recruit-

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ing new agents, and setting up accommodations whereby local ARVN units refrained from actively participating in the war. The military proselytors' most ambitious goal was to spark revolts, i.e., mutiny, in ARVN units, which were referred to in Communist military proselytizing terminology as "uprisings." A COSVN MPS document reported 284 such uprisings in the first six months of 1969, and cited several instances in which ARVN units refused to participate in sweep operations or act as reinforcements. Cases were cited in which ARVN soldiers beat up or killed their officers, and in which ARVN military trainees refused to carry out military exercises. The most spectacular example of an inside rebellion which the ARVN tried to conceal occurred north of Saigon in March 1966 when a group of ARVN soldiers deserted with six tanks. The dissident soldiers shot up the ARVN compound and headed for Communist held territory. Allied air strikes were called in, and all but one tank was destroyed. The surviving tank was used later by the SVNLA as a training aid. ARVN in succeeding years repeatedly covered up all such incidents as being an internal Vietnamese affair.

Another COSVN MPS document reported 151 instances of military proselytizing agents aiding SVNLA attacks in the first half of 1969, which resulted in the SVNLA destruction of a number of outposts, warehouses, and vehicles. In August 1969, an ARVN officer in charge of a platoon of 105-mm howitzers in Vinh Binh Province secured the small arms of his soldiers and then permitted SVNLA forces to enter his compound. Most platoon members were killed, and SVNLA forces used the howitzers to fire on the provincial capital. The incident was covered up by ARVN, which mentioned neither the officer nor his treasonous action to US officials. This type of action increased dramatically during 1974 when SVNLA forces overran hundreds of ARVN and RF/PF outposts in the Mekong Delta and other areas of the country. Similar actions occurred during PAVN's 1975 general offensive which seized South Vietnam.

Other captured documents and reports cited numerous cases of sabotage committed by military proselytizing agents. For example, between August 1968 and March 1969, the MPS of the Danang Second District Party Committee engaged in 34 acts of sabotage, which resulted in the destruction of a fuel depot, a tank, a truck, four jeeps, a helicopter, a reconnaissance aircraft, and two howitzers. Other sabotage included the destruction of records, the misrouting of orders, and general misadministration of unit affairs.

Selected acts of assassination were used to cause terror and disruption of RVN civilian and military agencies. A captured document of March 1967 stated that a fifth columnist, who served as the chief of a security element in a district in Chau Doc Province, assassinated his district chief and misdirected the blame for the killing on the deputy district chief who was later arrested for the act. In another case, three enlisted men of the ARVN 7th Infantry Division in the Mekong Delta killed their commanding officer, wounded several other unit members, and then defected to the SVNLA in early 1968. Subsequent investigation of the incident resulted in the arrest of 20 additional ARVN fifth columnist assets in the ARVN 7th Division.

Fifth column assets were also used to collect intelligence for use by MPS agent recruiters. Intelligence included biographic data on unit members, information on troop morale, and unit plans and operations. Although the collection of intelligence was a secondary function, the pervasiveness of MPS agent operations enabled the Communists to target specific individuals and groups by giving extensive insights into all manner of ARVN activities.

A review of captured documents and reports provide numerous instances of MPS agents supplying the SVNLA with stolen munitions and equipment. Although a few reports described moderately sizable thefts, most were small scale. The MPS was but one source of leakage from ARVN stores.

Fifth column assets were most successful in inducing desertions and defections to the SVNLA through psychological warfare means. They capitalized on legitimate complaints of low pay, poor living conditions, excessive discipline, short leaves, and transfers away from native areas of birth and livelihood. Agitation was laced with traditional themes of anti-Americanism and allegations that ARVN was but a US puppet tool. Highest priority targets appeared to be new recruit training depots for ARVN. Captured documents cited several such depots as heavily penetrated. The MPS gave their recruiters considerable credit for the high ARVN desertion rate. A COSVN MPS report claimed credit for 32,534 desertions in the first half of 1969. This figure was about half the 60,851 deserters carried in ARVN statistics for the same period. The only known ARVN estimate of desertions caused by the Communists was made in March 1969. In this report to RVN President Nguyen Van Thieu, ARVN estimated that 25 percent of all ARVN desertions was inspired by the MPS. This conservative estimate was valid through the Communist takeover of South Vietnam in April 1975.

Fifth column agents were particularly active in setting up local accommodation agreements whereby ARVN military units refrained from actively participating in combat actions against SVNLA forces. These understandings sometimes delineated territory to be controlled, sometimes restricted certain types of combat actions, and occasionally called for advance warning of ARVN military operations. According to a captured document which described such actions in ARVN III Corps, the SVNLA permitted an RF garrison to leave its post only on the condition that it did not carry any weapons. This was later amended to allow the RF garrison to carry weapons and to shoot them in areas prescribed by the SVNLA. Another unit which gave the SVNLA a fairly large amount of ammunition stayed in its post and obeyed the stipulated conditions. When the unit was replaced, it passed the stipulated conditions on to its replacement unit. Another PF unit allowed a Communist psychological warfare entertainment group to perform at the textile plant which the PF unit guarded. Other agreements proposed that ARVN/RF/PF units refrain from sending personnel out on patrols, from drafting youths, from organizing agent networks, and from requesting artillery or air support at night. In return, the SVNLA promised not to attack the units if they complied with the agreed upon inaction. Individual instances of ARVN, RF/PF accommodation with the enemy were not made with the approval of higher ARVN, RF/PF echelons.

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A 1969 dated captured document provided a vivid picture of the scope of COSVN MPS penetrations in the southern half of South Vietnam. The document claimed a figure of 20,000 military proselytizing agents as of early 1968 with a goal of 50,000 by late 1969. Another captured COSVN document stated that subordinate Region 6 had 9,480 persons organized into military proselytizing cells. A review of captured documents dated 1968 and 1969 indicated control over 400 fifth column agents, 10 percent of whom held officer rank in ARVN. The document review revealed that several agent assets held key posts. The agents included nine signals personnel (including six noncommissioned officers), an officer in a district intelligence and operations coordinating center, two civilians assigned to an intelligence unit on an airbase, a warrant officer attached to the ARVN Naval Headquarters, a sergeant serving at the Da Lat Military Academy, two sergeants and a lieutenant in an infantry training base, one local Vietnamese "CIA" employee, the bodyguard of a district chief, two soldiers in the office of the ARVN Chief of Ordnance, and a national policeman—a Party member since 1956—who was assigned to the Presidential Palace in Saigon. Other penetrations included a translator with a liaison group attached to the headquarters of the US Third Marine Division, a captain assigned to a communications office near Da Nang, an instructor at a Revolutionary Development Training Center, two artillery officers, a lieutenant and a captain engaged in training, a regional forces company commander, and the chief of regional and popular forces in a district.

Operations targeted ARVN field grade rank officers. In July 1968, ARVN Major Dao Ngoc Diep, a staff officer of the Da Lat Military Academy, was arrested. (For further details, see the biographic profile on COSVN MPS agent handler Pham Minh Duc.) As of late 1968, one ARVN colonel, one lieutenant colonel, and one major were under investigation as being long-term MPS agent assets. ARVN Colonel Nguyen Ho, who worked as a penetration since 1954, had attended the US Army Command General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth in 1960 and 1961; served as deputy commander of the ARVN Special Forces in 1963; deputy chief of staff (1964) of ARVN IV Corps; chief of staff (1965), ARVN First Division of ARVN I Corps; chief (1966) of regional and popular forces in ARVN II Corps; and later as head of the ARVN II Corps Inspector General's Office. The lieutenant colonel was a regimental officer with the ARVN First Division. ARVN Major Tran Dinh Khue, who worked as a penetration since 1947, had participated in an unsuccessful 19 February 1965 coup d'etat in Saigon.

The COSVN MPS also attempted to approach General Cao Van Vien, ARVN Chief of Staff, through his MPS brother-in-law in mid-April 1968. Vien reported the approach and CDV Major Nguyen Thanh Nhung was arrested. Other documented attempts at high-level contacts included the ARVN Chief of Ordnance in Saigon, the Commanders of the ARVN First and Second Divisions, and three successive commanding generals of ARVN I Corps. In early 1964, the brother of ARVN General Duong Van ("Big") Minh was dispatched by the CDV to South Vietnam to recruit Minh, who for a short period was the RVN Chief of State. The brother (Duong Van Nhat), whose

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family lived in Minh's Saigon residence, tried on several occasions to persuade Minh "to have the RVN enter into a coalition with the Communists."

The middle and lower levels of ARVN's officer corps were also recruitment targets. A captured document indicated that military proselytors were making efforts in Kien Hoa Province in 1966 to approach a colonel, a major, and four second lieutenants, and had "established secret liaison" with a captain, a lieutenant, six second lieutenants, and an aspirant. Military proselytizing plans for Binh Dinh Province in early 1968 provided for approaches to the Binh Dinh province chief and Binh Dinh district chiefs. In January 1970, the Region 2 MPS approached 19 majors, 23 captains, and 67 lieutenants with no indication on how the recruitments progressed.

Most approaches were aimed at the ARVN rank and file. A COSVN MPS report asserted that 41,341 approaches were made in a single area in the Mekong Delta area during the first quarter of 1969. Another report from Hoai Nhon District in Binh Dinh Province stated that 378 cadres penetrated enemy posts and bivouacking areas to motivate ARVN troops in May 1969. A district in My Tho Province reported that it proselytized 1,260 ARVN personnel in March 1969. Another report dated December 1969 claimed that proselytors in a district of Kien Hoa Province had approached 500 ARVN soldiers belonging to the ARVN 10th Infantry Regiment and 650 RF, PSDF and pacification personnel. ARVN personnel rarely reported military proselytizing approaches, which were made during personal contact or by mail. Over 722 military proselytizing letter approaches were made during one month in 1969 in Binh Dinh Province alone.

During the year 1968, the ARVN Military Security Service (MSS) reported that it had neutralized 812 military proselytizing operations, arresting 284 military proselytizing cadres and 1,823 ARVN personnel. For the year 1969, the MSS claimed that it had neutralized 695 military proselytizing operations, arresting 1,479 military proselytizing cadres and 634 ARVN personnel. For the year 1970, the MSS claimed it had neutralized 650 military proselytizing operations, arresting over 1,500 military proselytizing cadres and over 1,000 ARVN personnel. Of the arrested ARVN personnel, about 15 percent were officers from the rank of aspirant to captain. In subsequent years, the ARVN MSS rarely provided figures with breakdowns such as these, claiming that information on this subject was an internal Vietnamese affairs not of interest to Allied forces.

Between 1968 and 1970, the ARVN MSS conducted antimilitary proselytizing indoctrination sessions for 1,811,829 ARVN and RF/PF personnel. However, only 907 ARVN personnel voluntarily admitted to having operated for the Communist cause. The MSS antimilitary proselytizing effort was made more difficult and more complicated by a too rapid increase in ARVN military induction programs. ARVN accepted increasingly larger numbers of draft age males with questionable security backgrounds. Between 1968 and 1970, the MSS investigated and established security dossiers on 31,216 draftees who had past records of or relatives working with the Communists. No figures are available on RF/PF, PSDF, PRU, and RD personnel, where the security factor was completely forgotten until mid-1970.

By June 1970, military proselytizing successes in the Mekong Delta area of ARVN IV Corps prompted the ARVN MSS to initiate programs to improve and consolidate the security of the RF/PF forces to resist military proselytizing penetration attempts. ARVN IV Corps had over 4,000 RF/PF outposts and 200,000 RF/PF personnel. RF/PF personnel were generally recruited without basic background security checks. In June 1970, the ARVN Joint General Staff approved the establishment of 249 MSS detachments with a total strength of 1,890 personnel. By March 1971, 246 MSS detachments were operating with a total of only 629 personnel (70 percent understrength); 718 new MSS recruits were in the process of receiving security clearances. Despite being understrength, the ARVN IV Corps MSS with 93 detachments and 243 out of 730 authorized personnel was able to neutralize 142 military proselytizing cases in the RF/PF, arresting 511 military proselytizing cadres and 256 RF/PF personnel.

The ARVN MSS arrests and indoctrination sessions did little to halt the systematic penetration of ARVN by the CDV forward commands in South Vietnam. Cadres and agents were able to infiltrate RVN agencies, ARVN, and the paramilitary RF/PF, PSDF, PRU, and RD with relative ease. Cadres and agents acquired legal papers and joined ARVN by either enlisting or permitting themselves to be drafted, or by falsely defecting to the RVN through the open arms (chieu hoi) program. Several thousand false defectors were dispatched. False defectors found it particularly easy to infiltrate ARVN, since, in December 1969, RVN President Nguyen Van Thieu ordered the drafting of all physically qualified "ex-Viet Cong" not in prison. By January 1970, over 300 false defectors were dispatched in Binh Dinh Province alone in Central Vietnam; 27 in Can Tho Province; 50 in Bien Hoa Province; and 25 to the ARVN 25th Infantry Division.

Other selected cadres were provided with forged documentation which was used to gain entry into or exit from ARVN. Document forgery technical elements were provided with hundreds of genuine blank civilian identification cards, ARVN discharge papers, travel mission orders, national police identification cards, seals, and a host of lesser document forms. The laxity of the RVN/ARVN identification card system abetted attempts to obtain or forge legal documentation. The rigid RVN/ARVN procedures that governed the reporting of lost identification cards were seldom followed. Official RVN statistics show that 1.7 million new identification cards were issued between October 1968 and April 1969. Of the thousands of new cards that were stolen or destroyed during that period, only 13 were reported lost. The ineffectiveness of the new identification card system was illustrated by a report dated October 1969 which indicated that in the previous 12 months only "35 known or suspected Communists" had been detected as a result of the new cards.

Other attempts to counter military proselytizing efforts were further hampered by the penetration of the RVN/ARVN security and counterintelligence apparatus. These penetrations hampered the arrest of military proselytizing agents by providing them with advance warnings of impending security actions, by misdirecting investigations, by falsifying or destroying records, and by performing other acts of administrative sabotage.

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Another limiting factor was the RVN's continuing inability to keep Communist operatives under detention. A report by the US Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (MACV) in August 1969 stated that 75 to 90 percent of all prisoners were released within six months to a year of their capture. Captured documents indicated that many cadres who were released were given a short period of indoctrination before being dispatched back again against the RVN/ARVN.

The ARVN MSS had limited success in identifying ARVN, and RF/PF personnel who had been captured and later recruited by the CDV forward commands and released. The MSS Rehabilitation Center was responsible for the reindoctrination of all ARVN, RF and PF personnel who had been Communist POWs. The year 1966 was the first year that the MSS processed released RF personnel, while it was not until 1968 that it began processing released PF personnel. As of August 1970, the MSS estimated that 25 percent of all released prisoners had been dispatched by the CDV forward commands.

MACV reports also outlined a number of ARVN MSS deficiencies. MACV studies indicated that the MSS was overextended, undermanned, and without a clear chain of command. As of 1969, the MSS had 2,800 personnel. By 1971, the MSS had about 6,500 personnel, of whom about 1,400 were assigned to 246 field detachments which were 30 percent understrength. Only about 25 percent of MSS personnel were assigned to counter military proselytizing penetrations. The vast majority were assigned to ferreting out corruption, to routine police work, and to apprehending other Communist operatives who were easier to detect and investigate. RVN political matters received priority attention. Only a few hundred ARVN personnel reported annually on military proselytizing approaches, although the CDV forward military proselytizing commands, according to captured documents, made several hundred thousand approaches annually.

Handling of ARVN Prisoners of War (POWs)

Prior to the Communist takeover of South Vietnam on 30 April 1975, there were at least four detention camps in North Vietnam for ARVN POWs. One camp for 200 ARVN NCO and enlisted personnel was located in Quynh Thanh District, Nghe An Province; another in Lang Son Province; another in Bat Bat District, Ha Tay Province, for ARVN officers; and a large facility on Lo Duc Street, Hanoi, which had about 1,000 ARVN officer (80), NCO (100) and enlisted personnel (800). The latter camp was guarded by BCA PAPSF troops, and was a site used by the CDV for briefing trainees on North Vietnamese policies towards ARVN POWs. According to one released ARVN POW officer, at least 26 ARVN officers had been reclassified by Hanoi as defectors, and were employed with the CDV in preparing psychological warfare propaganda leaflets, pamphlets, and radio broadcasts over Radio Hanoi and Liberation Radio. The vast bulk of detained ARVN personnel had been captured in Laos and Central Vietnam. ARVN POWs captured in the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region and in Region 5 in Central Vietnam were evacuated to North Vietnam. RF/PF and PSDF personnel were not evacuated to North Vietnam.

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In South Vietnam, the Region 5 Enemy Military Proselytizing Section maintained at least two detention camps for ARVN personnel. Each of its subordinate nine provincial enemy military proselytizing subsections had a temporary detention facility for captured ARVN, RF/PF, and PSDF personnel. Most captured RF/PF and PSDF personnel were detained for a short period of time during which they were interrogated for tactical military intelligence, indoctrinated, reeducated, and released with the proviso that they not engage in further combat actions against the revolution, and, if reassigned to their units, would engage as fifth column penetration assets.

Within the COSVN area of jurisdiction, there were at least two major detention camps for ARVN POWs administered by the SVNLA Enemy Proselytizing Office. At least four of its subordinate military region enemy proselytizing sections had a detention camp for ARVN officer personnel, while provincial-level enemy proselytizing subsection detention camps detained most ARVN NCO and enlisted personnel, RF/PF, and PSDF personnel. Most of the latter were similarly considered for release after a short period of detention.

Regardless of what level they were detained, ARVN POWs were screened by enemy proselytizing components for military intelligence information, psychological warfare propaganda exploitation, and for fifth column penetration operations upon release. The ARVN POW was interrogated in detail about himself, his past activities, his unit and commanding officers, the identity of anti-Communist unit members, as well as the identity of relatives working for the RVN/ARVN or for the revolution. ARVN armored, intelligence, marine, ranger, security, and signals personnel were subjected to more extensive and intensive interrogations. RF/PF personnel were intensively interrogated for their knowledge of local RF/PF intelligence nets to which PAVN/SVNLA was particularly sensitive. Following interrogation, POWs were given continuous political indoctrination and reeducation with the view towards preparing them psychologically for release. At this stage, local military proselytizing cadres entered the picture with the mission of recruiting as many ARVN NCO and enlisted personnel, RF/PF and PSDF personnel as possible prior to their release. Most were dispatched with the mission of serving as fifth column penetration assets in their former units to collect intelligence, conduct sabotage and assassinations, and to foment mutiny in unit ranks when ordered. The recruited POW assets when released were usually handled by provincial and district-level military proselytizing components. The ARVN Military Security Service (MSS) estimated that at least 25 percent of all such released ARVN enlisted and NCO personnel had been recruited by the military proselytizing branch. This figure was based on results obtained from the ARVN MSS indoctrination and investigation of released ARVN POWs who cooperated with the MSS. The ARVN MSS estimate did not include RF/PF and PSDF personnel.

Operations in the COSVN Area

According to established COSVN MPS recruitment policies, various MPS echelons were assigned specific areas of responsibilities for recruitment operations. The COSVN MPS was responsible for recruitment in the: RVN

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Presidential Office; the RVN Central Intelligence Organization (CIO); the RVN National Police Command Headquarters; the ARVN Joint General Staff; the ARVN Military Security Service (MSS); the Saigon Capital Military District; the ARVN III Corps Headquarters in Bien Hoa; the ARVN Engineering Department; the ARVN Air Force (VNAF) Headquarters; the VNAF Bien Hoa, Phan Rang and Tan Son Nhut Air Bases; the ARVN 468th Marine Brigade; the ARVN 1st and 2nd Airborne Brigades; the ARVN 3rd Armored Cavalry Brigade; the ARVN Quang Trung Training Center; the ARVN 5th, 7th, 18th, 23rd, and 25th Infantry Divisions; other RVN/ARVN agencies; and US advisory and intelligence facilities. Between May and August 1974, the ARVN MSS neutralized four COSVN MPS networks, arresting four agent handlers and 57 ARVN penetrations. Of those ARVN personnel arrested, 20 were penetrations of VNAF; 14, penetrations of the ARVN 5th Infantry Division; 12, penetrations of the ARVN Airborne and Armored Cavalry Brigades and the ARVN Engineering Department; and 11, penetrations of the ARVN Naval Headquarters. These arrests hardly affected the operations of the COSVN MPS, which still had over 55 agent handlers under its direct control.

The Region 2 MPS, which was responsible for penetration operations in An Giang, Ben Tre, Go Cong, Kien Phong, Kien Tuong and My Tho Provinces in the Mekong Delta area, targeted: the ARVN 7th Division; the ARVN 12th Artillery and Armored Regiment; the Hung Vuong Training Center; ARVN marine, naval riverine, military security service, and national police units; and US advisory and intelligence facilities in Region 2. In October 1972, one MPS agent handler revealed the identities of 40 penetrations in the ARVN 7th Division and the ARVN 12th Artillery and Armored Regiment. By early 1974, the Region 2 MPS had over 15 penetrations in the ARVN 7th Division alone.

The Region 3 MPS, which was responsible for penetration operations in Ca Mau, Can Tho, Kien Giang (Rach Gia), Soc Trang, Tra Vinh, and Vinh Long Provinces in the Mekong Delta area, targeted the: RVN National Police Command Regional Headquarters in Can Tho; the Lo Te Prison; US advisory and intelligence facilities; the ARVN IV Corps Headquarters; the ARVN 9th and 21st Infantry Divisions; the VNAF Binh Thuy Air Base; the Can Tho Radio Station; the RF Provincial Control Group; the ARVN S-2 Headquarters; provincial national police and special branch headquarters; and armored car, naval riverine patrol, ordnance, artillery, and ranger units. As of 1974, one penetration *cum* (unit) succeeded in inserting 10 cadres with false identification papers into the ARVN 9th and 21st Infantry Divisions, where they succeeded in recruiting 60 agent assets.

The Region 4 MPS, which was responsible for operations in Saigon and its environs, was targeted against the: RVN National Police Command Special Branch; the RVN Central Intelligence Organization; the ARVN MSS; the ARVN Capital Military District; the ARVN Joint General Staff; the RVN Presidential Independence Palace; the Saigon City National Police Command Headquarters; the Saigon Radio Station; other intelligence, security agencies; other RVN civilian offices and ARVN installations in the Saigon area; and US advisory and intelligence facilities. In early 1974, the COSVN MPS established

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a special 15-man penetration *cum* (unit) with the mission of assisting and supporting the operations of the Region 4 MPS. Subsequently, an unknown number of important Region 4 MPS agent penetrations were transferred to the control of this COSVN MPS penetration *cum*, which had four agent handlers.

The Region 4 MPS had over 200 personnel under its control organized into a 50-man headquarters staff and into twelve 15-man political operations *cums* (units). *Cums* were established in each of Saigon's 11 precincts with a combined total of 36 agent handlers. Each *cum* had the mission of undermining the RVN and its ARVN through the distribution of propaganda leaflets, collecting funds for the revolution, and through the recruitment and handling of in-place agent handlers and agent assets in various RVN and ARVN agencies in the Saigon Capital area. Each *cum* was organized for this purpose into three-man agent penetration, propaganda, fundraising, and courier cells. The national police were special targets for recruitment because of the cooperation they offered in processing legal identification papers, reporting on national police penetration operations, and in alerting their agent handlers to impending national police arrest actions. The propaganda cell distributed leaflets to ARVN officers, RVN and national police officials and their dependents through the mail. The agent penetration cell infiltrated legally documented cadres into disabled veterans, religious, students, women's and labor organizations with the objective of nurturing political struggle movements to weaken the RVN security forces. It recruited agents and sympathizers to remain dormant in-place until a coalition government was established. Each agent handler had the mission of recruiting three assets to form a cell, which became the nucleus for the recruitment of other assets into more cells. Each cell leader was responsible for assessing and developing recruitment candidates, making recruitments, and for assigning mission tasks to recruited assets.

Subordinate provincial MPS of the regional MPS targeted ARVN Sector (S-2) Command RF Battalions, PRU units, and RD Teams. District MPS targeted RF outposts and units. Village military proselytizing cells targeted local PF, PSDF, RD and pacification teams.

Each of the six provinces in Region 2 had a 50-man MPS. Subordinate district MPS had 10-man staffs and village military proselytizing cells had three personnel. The My Tho Province MPS was the largest with 110 personnel. In April 1969, the ARVN MSS arrested three female My Tho Province MPS agent handlers, nine ARVN agents and four national policemen. Nevertheless, the My Tho Province MPS continued to handle several hundred other agent assets who were untouched by the arrests; 400 fifth column assets were recruited in 1969 and 1970. As of 1973, its subordinate My Tho City MPS handled four agents in the ARVN 7th Infantry Division, four agents in the My Tho City National Police headquarters, and 16 other agents in the city. The Ben Tre Province MPS had over 500 fifth column assets. Mo Cay District of Ben Tre Province alone had 150 agent assets, which amounted to more than 18 agents per village in the district.

Each of the six provinces in Region 3 had a 90-man MPS. The Can Tho City MPS had 50 personnel. The Can Tho Province MPS alone had 300 agent

5. **B6 Propaganda Subsection:** 33 personnel who studied and drafted proselytizing programs against ARVN personnel and their dependents. It also monitored RVN radio broadcasts in order to prepare anti-RVN themes for written leaflets and broadcasts over the Liberation Radio. Among its personnel were five ARVN defectors.
6. **B7 Convalescent Subsection:** 7 personnel.
7. **B8 Illegal Courier Subsection:** 40 personnel organized into a five-man headquarters staff and four courier stations.
8. **B9 Printing Subsection:** 9 personnel.
9. **B13 Food Production Subsection:** 34 personnel.
10. **B15 Medical Subsection:** 9 personnel who operated the COSVN MPS dispensary.
11. **B16 Organization Subsection:** 15 personnel organized into personnel and internal security (bao ve) cells, and three 3-man inspection teams. The subsection maintained all personnel files on COSVN MPS officers and enlisted personnel; processed all CDV infiltrators from North Vietnam for headquarters staff and field units; and conducted counterintelligence investigations on cadres suspected of being politically unreliable, of having violated party rules and regulations, and of being doubled enemy agents. The subsection also provided administrative support to cadres attending COSVN MPS meetings and conferences. Security cadres received professional guidance from the COSVN Security Office with which they coordinated counterintelligence investigations.
12. **B20 (former B18) Military Proselytizing Training School:** 12 personnel who prepared and conducted basic military proselytizing and refresher training courses for agent handlers and legal agent assets. It also provided professional training guidance for the training components of subordinate regional-level military proselytizing sections.
13. **B22 Officer's Management Subsection:** 15 personnel responsible for monitoring the activities of recruited ARVN officers, as well as defectors who worked with the COSVN MPS B.6 Propaganda Subsection. Among its personnel were five ARVN officer defectors.

The Forward Line Operations Wing (FLOW) was headed by Deputy COSVN MPS Chief Nguyen Van Thuong, who concurrently headed the COSVN MPS Fifth Column Movement Operations (Penetrations) Subsection and its Mau Than Penetration Group. Thuong had a 40 million piaster (US\$200,000) budget for the year 1973/1974 and a 60 million piaster (US\$150,000) budget for the year 1974/1975. All funds were furnished to the COSVN MPS by the CDV headquarters in Hanoi. Under Nguyen Van Thuong, the FLOW had 450 personnel. Of this number, 300 were assigned to 18 movement operations (penetration) units (doi cong tac phong trao), which had a total of about 60 agent handlers. These units were subordinate to the Mau Than Penetration Group. Established in January 1974, the Mau Than

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Penetration Group had a 35-man headquarters staff organized into a 6-man administrative cell, an 8-man radio cell, a 4-man legal courier cell, a 3-man illegal courier cell, and a 14-man security guard unit. Directly subordinate to its headquarters staff were two 40-man courier stations which were each organized into five courier substations that were responsible for maintaining compartmented courier lines to various movement operations units. In February 1974, six 15-man movement operations units were activated. Each had three to four agent handlers, and were detailed to assist the Eastern Nam Bo Region 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 MPS headquarters in accelerating their fifth column penetration operations. The Eastern Nam Bo Region 1 Unit targeted the ARVN III Corps Headquarters in Bien Hoa, and the VNAF Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut Air Bases. Twelve other movement operations units engaged in operations in the Saigon Capital area, and other areas of South Vietnam. Each target was covered by one unit which tasked subordinate cells with proselytizing officers, and enlisted personnel as follows:

1. Unit 1/731: 15 personnel, including three agent handlers. Following the arrest of Unit Chief Le Van Be in August 1974, 11 penetrations of the ARVN Naval Command surfaced in the Saigon Capital area. Four had been inserted by Unit 731 as in-place fifth column assets. One penetration was a naval lieutenant commander who had penetrated a naval riverine task force in ARVN IV Corps. Unit Chief Le Van Be had been engaged in penetrations against the ARVN Navy since September 1969.
2. Unit 2/651: 30 personnel, including nine agent handlers. Established in November 1970, Unit 651 targeted ARVN Airborne and Armored Cavalry Brigades and ARVN Engineering Department components in Saigon, Hue, and My Tho. Following the arrest of Unit Chief Pham Van Vinh in July 1974, 12 penetrations surfaced. Unit Chief Vinh had engaged in penetration operations in My Tho, Kien Hoa, and Long An Provinces since April 1964. In February 1972, he falsely defected to the RVN; received legal documentation; and directed Unit 651 penetration operations. Unit 651 received personnel and agent assets from the Region 2 MPS.
3. Unit 3: 15 personnel, including three agent handlers. Unit 3 targeted the VNAF Headquarters and VNAF bases in Bien Hoa, Phan Rang, and Pleiku. Following the arrest of Unit Chief Tran Le Quan in May 1974, 20 penetrations surfaced. Unit Chief Quan had engaged in penetration operations against VNAF since 1971. On 8 April 1975, a VNAF penetration, Lieutenant Nguyen Thanh Trung, bombed the RVN Presidential Palace; defected to PAVN with his F-5E aircraft; trained PAVN MIG fighter pilots on how to fly US A-37 fighter aircraft; and guided five MIG pilots flying A-37 aircraft in the 28 April 1975 surprise attack on the Tan Son Nhut airbase which destroyed many VNAF fighter aircraft, several US evacuation aircraft, and which brought to a halt all air evacuation flights before the Communist takeover of Saigon on 30 April.
4. Unit 4: 15 personnel, including three agent handlers. Unit 4 targeted the ARVN 5th Infantry Division in ARVN III Corps. Following the

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arrest of Unit Chief Tran Van Thinh in March 1974, 14 penetrations surfaced.

5. Unit 5: 15 personnel, including three agent handlers. Unit 5 targeted the ARVN 7th Infantry Division.
6. Unit 6: 15 personnel, including three agent handlers. Unit 6 targeted the ARVN 25th Infantry Division.
7. Unit 7: 15 personnel, including three agent handlers. Headed by a female agent handler, Unit 7 targeted the ARVN Quang Trung Training Center and other ARVN training facilities in the Saigon and Bien Hoa areas.
8. Unit 8/800C: 15 personnel, including three agent handlers. Established in November 1972, Unit 8 targeted ARVN officer and NCO personnel and their dependents in An Xuyen, Bac Lieu, Ba Xuyen, and Vinh Binh Provinces in the southern delta area. It received support, personnel, and agent assets from the Region 3 MPS.
9. Unit 9: 15 personnel, including four agent handlers. Unit 9 targeted the ARVN Armored Cavalry Brigade.
10. Units 10 through 12: 15 personnel each, including four agent handlers apiece. One of these units was responsible for targeting the ARVN Joint General Staff, the RVN Presidential Office, and the National Police Command in Saigon. Another unit targeted the Saigon Capital Military District, while another targeted the ARVN Military Security Service and the RVN Central Intelligence Organization in Saigon.

The Region 2 MPS had a 160-man staff which directed the activities of 1,200 personnel throughout the region down to the village level. The Region 2 MPS headquarters staff was organized into a:

1. Administrative Subsection: 30 personnel, who were assigned to correspondence, courier, finance, radio, medical, rear services (logistics), and security guard cells. The security guard cell received professional guidance from the Region 2 Party Committee's Security Section.
2. Propaganda and Training Subsection: 10 personnel who prepared demoralizing propaganda against ARVN personnel, their families, and the ethnic Khmer community in Region 2.
3. F-7 Penetration Operations *Cum* (Unit): 70 personnel organized into a 10-man headquarters staff and six 10-man operational units. Each of the six units had three agent handlers apiece. Three units targeted regiments of the ARVN 7th Infantry Division. Other units targeted the ARVN 12th Artillery and Armored Regiment; the Hung Vuong Training Center; and ARVN ranger and naval riverine units. Border Area Proselytizing Unit 74 was responsible for operations along the Vietnam/Kampuchea border. In October 1972, the deputy chief of Unit 115 was arrested and provided the names of 40 penetrations in the

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ARVN 7th Division and in the ARVN 12th Artillery and Armored Regiment. As of early 1974, the F-7 *Cum* had 16 agent assets in the ARVN 7th Division alone.

4. **Military Proselytizing Subsection:** 20 personnel organized into a headquarters staff and two special teams which monitored the operations of six subordinate provincial MPS in the region.
5. **Religious Proselytizing Subsection:** 25 personnel organized into a headquarters staff and five specialized religious proselytizing cells. The five cells targeted ARVN personnel of the Roman Catholic, Buddhist, Cao Dai, and Hoa Hao faiths, and of the Khmer Buddhist and Theravada Buddhist sects. Each cell had three agent handlers.

The Region 3 MPS had a 300-man staff which directed the activities of over 1,200 MPS headquarters staff and was organized into the:

1. **KC-1 Administrative Subsection:** 50 personnel like the Region 2 MPS Administrative Subsection.
2. **KC-2 Propaganda and Training Subsection:** 30 personnel. KC-2 was organized into assault propaganda, base camp security, finance, detention and interrogation, propaganda and training cells. Its missions were similar to the Region 2 MPS Propaganda and Training Subsection.
3. **F-21 Penetration Operations *Cum*:** 50 personnel organized into a 10-man headquarters staff and two 20-man operational units designated KC-5 and KC-6 with four agent handlers each. Unit KC-5 targeted the ARVN IV Corps Headquarters, and ARVN armored car, ordnance, and naval riverine patrol units. Unit KC-6 targeted the VNAF Binh Thuy airbase.
4. **F-28 Penetration Operations *Cum*:** 70 personnel organized into a 10-man headquarters staff and six 10-man operational units designated KC-3, KC-4, KC-7 through KC-10 with three agent handlers each. The six units targeted the ARVN 9th and 21st Infantry Divisions. As of 1974, the F-28 *Cum* had 10 agent handlers with false identification papers in the ARVN 9th and 21st Division, where they recruited over 60 agent assets.
5. **Military Proselytizing Movement Subsection:** 50 personnel organized into a headquarters staff and two special teams responsible for monitoring the operations of six subordinate provincial MPS in the region.
6. **Religious Proselytizing Subsection:** 50 personnel organized into a headquarters staff and six specialized religious proselytizing cells. The cells targeted ARVN personnel of the Roman Catholic, Buddhist, Cao Dai and Hoa Hao faiths, and of the Khmer and Theravada Buddhist sects. Each cell had three agent handlers. Between August 1968 and May 1971, the subsection trained 40 laymen, 25 Buddhists, 25 Hoa Hao, 10 Roman Catholic, 50 student, and 50 military proselytizing cadres. Trainees in the Buddhist proselytizing course were instructed to

join Buddhist pagodas as monks to carry out proselytizing activities; to recruit draft dodgers to serve in ARVN as penetration assets; and to recruit other Buddhist monks to join the ARVN Chaplain Corps as fifth columnist assets and agent recruiters. The Vietnamese Buddhist An Quang Pagoda in Saigon was the primary target. Other religious trainees received similar missions against other religious faiths and sects.

Operations in Central Vietnam

Unlike the COSVN area where enemy and military proselytizing functions were separated, both were centralized in Central Vietnam under the Enemy Military Proselytizing Sections (Ban Binh Dich Van) of the Region 5 Party Committee and of the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region Political Staff. The Region 5 Party Committee's Enemy Military Proselytizing Section (EMPS) received spot, quarterly, semiannual and annual reports from each of its nine subordinate provincial EMPS, which were prepared into collated reports for submission to the CDV headquarters in Hanoi with information copies for the COSVN MPS and for the SVNLA Political Staff Department's Enemy Proselytizing Office.

According to captured documents, the Region 5 EMPS targeted ARVN, Australian, Filipino, ROK, Thai, and US military personnel. Its activities against US and ROK personnel emphasized the recruitment of Vietnamese interpreters, as well as the preparation and distribution of English- and Korean-language psychological warfare leaflets and pamphlets to subordinate provincial EMPS. It organized intelligence teams to collect information on enemy sweep operations; promoted ARVN, RF/PF, PSDF desertions, defections and mutiny; instigated political struggle protest demonstrations in RVN-controlled and disputed areas; aroused antiwar sentiments in enemy units; countered enemy psychological warfare and open arms (defector) programs; directed programs against ARVN dependents to coerce their husbands and sons to join the revolution and/or desert; directed penetration operations; established political indoctrination and interrogation programs for captured military personnel; and recruited cooperative prisoners to prepare psychological warfare leaflets and to assist in the interrogation of other prisoners.

The Region 5 MPS directed the operations of the Binh Dinh, Dac Lac, Gia Lai (Pleiku), Khanh Hoa, Kontum, Phu Yen, Quang Nam (RVN Quang Tin) and Quang Ngai Province MPS, and the Quang Da (RVN Quang Nam) Special Region EMPS. The primary targets of the Region 5 EMPS were the ARVN I Corps Headquarters in Danang; the ARVN II Corps Headquarters in Pleiku; the VNAF Air Wings in Danang, Nha Trang and Pleiku; the National Police Command Regional Headquarters in Danang and Nha Trang; the ARVN 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 22nd and 23rd Infantry Divisions; ARVN armored, artillery, cavalry, marine, medical, military intelligence, military security, naval, ordnance, quartermaster, ranger, signals, supply and transportation units; provincial national police headquarters; other RVN civil agencies where ARVN personnel were assigned; and US advisory and intelligence facilities. The EMPS recruited long range assets in political struggle movements; ARVN

officers who had the capability of being used as key leaders in creating desertions, defections and mutiny during general offensives and general uprisings; and in-city agents in major cities who used their overt legal status to help document EMPS agent handlers as ARVN officers.

Following the arrest of Region 5 EMPS Major Le Can in January 1969, the ARVN Military Security Service (MSS) arrested 39 civilian and military agent assets and support personnel of the Quang Da Special Region (QDSR) EMPS in Danang City alone. Among those arrested were penetrations of the ARVN I Corps MSS Headquarters; the personal chauffeur of ARVN I Corps Commanding Major General Hoang Xuan Lam; the ARVN I Corps Ranger Headquarters; the ARVN 411th Liaison Group; the ARVN 610th Signals Battalion; the ARVN 10th Medical Company; the ARVN 10th Sentry Dog Battalion; the ARVN 10th Supply Company; the ARVN 2nd Transportation Company; the ARVN Dong Da Training Center; the VNAF 41st Air Wing; the Danang Blood Center; and the Duy Tan Hospital in Danang.

As of April 1975, the Region 5 EMPS had a 250-man headquarters staff which had command over 3,500 personnel down to the village level. The Region 5 EMPS was commanded by CDV Senior Colonel Tran Van Trinh and CDV Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Thai alias Nguyen Trung Thanh. As prescribed by the Region 5 EMPS, eight provincial EMPS had a 42-man headquarters staff with command over 300 to 350 personnel down to the village level. The QDSR EMPS had over 900 personnel down to the village level. One district of the QDSR EMPS alone had 742 cadre with legal status organized into 247 military proselytizing cells. One district of Binh Dinh Province had 375 cadre with legal status. Over 90 agent assets were recruited by the Binh Dinh EMPS during the first quarter of 1969. The Quang Nam Province EMPS, according to a December 1969 captured document, had 150 cadre with legal status, and had the goal of recruiting 100 to 150 agents for the year 1970. The Quang Ngai Province EMPS, according to a 1971 captured document, had 314 agent assets. Other Region 5 Provincial EMPS had similar recruitment successes.

Commanded by CDV Colonel Le Quang and CDV Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Luong Dao, the QDSR EMPS had three 30-man penetration *cums* (units) with four agent handlers apiece. Its 100-man headquarters was organized into four subsections from late 1968 onwards as follows:

1. **Administrative Subsection:** 45 personnel organized into correspondence, courier, finance, medical, rear service, and security cells, and a 25-man food production unit. The security cell received professional guidance from the QDSR Party Committee's Security Section.
2. **Military Proselytizing Movement Subsection:** 15 personnel who supervised the activities of the Danang City and subordinate district party committee EMPS.
3. **Penetration Subsection:** 100 personnel organized into a 10-man headquarters staff and three 30-man penetration *cums* (units) with four agent handlers apiece. The EMPS chief and deputy chief each headed one penetration *cum*.

4. **Propaganda Subsection:** 25 personnel organized into research printing, armed propaganda, and propaganda proselytizing cells. The research and printing cell was headed by an English linguist who monitored US Armed Forces Radio, BBC, and VOA broadcasts to gather background information which was used to prepare English-language leaflets against US military personnel. The cell also had one Korean linguist who processed Region 5 EMPS Korean-language materials received from the Region 5 EMPS for distribution to ROK units in the QDSR. The cell also prepared Vietnamese-language psychological warfare materials. Between 1968 and 1969, over 10,000 Korean-language leaflets were distributed monthly in the QDSR, as well as 100,000 English-language and 100,000 Vietnamese-language leaflets. The armed propaganda cell was responsible for loudspeaker broadcast appeals against US and ARVN bases, and had four English-language speaking members. The propaganda proselytizing cell had five English-speaking cadres who were assigned to US military base areas with the mission of collecting information on US military attitudes towards the war which were later used in the preparation of psychological warfare leaflets against US military personnel.

The Quang Ngai EMPS was, like the other Region 5 provincial EMPS, organized into a 42-man headquarters staff with seven subordinate subsections as follows:

1. **F-1 Administrative Subsection:** 7 personnel.
2. **F-2 Propaganda Subsection:** 7 personnel, who wrote Vietnamese-language psychological warfare leaflet and loudspeaker broadcast materials for use against ARVN, RF/PF, PSDF unit personnel in the province. It organized district-level teams which distributed the leaflets and made loudspeaker appeals. About 10,000 Vietnamese-language leaflets were distributed monthly, as well as about 50 loudspeaker broadcasts monthly.
3. **F-3 Penetration Subsection:** 10 personnel, including six female agent handlers. Female Deputy EMPS Chief Nguyen Thi Ngoc Suong headed the F-3 subsection. As compared to male agent handlers, female agent handlers had better access, were not subject to the draft, had legal papers, and freedom of movement to operate since the RVN was less suspicious of them. Most initial recruitments were made under the direction of the F-3 subsection by district and village-level EMPS cadres. According to a captured document covering the period January-April 1971, the Quang Ngai EMPS F-3 Penetration Subsection had 314 agent assets: 20 in ARVN units; 24 in RF units; 47 in PF military units; 156 in PSDF units; 5 in ARVN special forces units; 8 national policemen; and 54 others who operated in the vicinity of ARVN units and installations. Agent assets assisted in supporting 16 attacks against various outposts in the province, and had organized 25 cases of mutiny in various units during the same period. The EMPS also claimed credit for 1,100 PSDF and 400 RF/PF desertions in four districts.

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4. **F-4 Montagnard Proselytizing Subsection:** one staff member, a Hre ethnic minority tribesman who had been trained by the CDV in North Vietnam and who was assigned to the Quang Ngai EMPS in 1968 to conduct operations against ethnic minority tribes in the province. He had the mission of inducing Montagnard tribesmen to resist RVN control efforts in the five highland districts in the province.
5. **F-5 Enemy Proselytizing Subsection:** 7 personnel under the command of the Deputy EMPS Chief. All subsection members were fluent in English with the mission of preparing and distributing English-language psychological warfare leaflets against US military personnel. Five of the seven subsection members were professional ethnic North Vietnamese CDV staff officers. According to a captured document covering the period January-April 1971, the subsection distributed 4,000 English-language leaflets monthly and made about 50 loud-speaker appeals monthly.
6. **F-6 Training Subsection:** one staff member responsible for giving basic and refresher military proselytizing training to district and village-level EMPS cadres. As of April 1971, the subsection was dissolved and merged into the Region 5 EMPS Training Subsection.
7. **F-7 Detention Camp Subsection:** 9 personnel responsible for maintaining a temporary detention facility for Vietnamese military prisoners. Through effective indoctrination, most Vietnamese prisoners were recruited and released as fifth column assets.

The Quang Ngai EMPS directed the operations of 14 five-man district party committee military proselytizing subsections, which submitted to it quarterly and spot reports. Information concerning the withdrawal of US units was immediately sent in spot reports to the Region 5 EMPS. Quarterly reports contained information on the strengths and locations of US, ARVN, RF/PF and PSDF units; operations carried out by US and Vietnamese units; morale and reaction of Vietnamese military and paramilitary personnel to RVN policies; and the effects of propaganda and military proselytizing activities against US and Vietnamese forces. The district subsections targeted two regiments of the ARVN 2nd Infantry Division; 60 RF companies; over 100 PF/PSDF platoons; and five battalions of the US 11th and 198th Infantry Brigades.

As established by the Region 5 EMPS, the Quang Ngai EMPS had the following objectives for the year 1971: induce 6,000 desertions; destroy the combat effectiveness of the PSDF; establish penetration agents in all ARVN, RF/PF and PSDF units. Each district was tasked with establishing three to five penetration agents in each platoon-size or larger unit; three to five agents in each major area where ARVN units operated; and three to five agents in each major population center. Each of the five highland districts was tasked with inducing 200 to 300 desertions; two to three PSDF units to disband or desert; and two to three attacks and assassinations of ARVN personnel. The Quang Ngai EMPS had great success in achieving these objectives according to its January-April 1971 quarterly report.

The Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region (TTHMR) EMPS had a 100-man headquarters staff with command over 400 personnel down to the village level. Commanded by CDV Lieutenant Colonel Le Quoc Chinh and CDV Major Nguyen Cao Thieng, the EMPS headquarters was organized into administrative, enemy research, propaganda and training, fifth column (penetration), interrogation and detention camp, and American proselytizing subsections. These staff components monitored and provided professional guidance to the 40-man headquarters staffs of the Quang Tri Province, Thua Thien Province, and Hue City EMPS.

The TTHMR EMPS had over 400 agent assets under its control. The ARVN 1st Infantry Division was a primary target. Following the capture in June 1968 of Deputy Quang Tri Province EMPS Chief Senior Captain Phan Huu Them, over 50 penetrations of ARVN surfaced. Among these penetrations were: five in the ARVN 1st Infantry Division; ARVN Naval Commander Huynh Tan Ho; ARVN Major Tran Dinh Khue; and ARVN Colonel Nguyen Ho. ARVN Major Tran Dinh Khue was recruited by the CDV in 1947 as a long-range penetration of ARVN. Khue had participated in an unsuccessful 19 February 1965 coup d'etat in Saigon, and was considered by the COSVN MPS to be a valuable penetration of ARVN. Colonel Nguyen Ho was initially recruited through his wife by the Quang Tri Province Public Security Service in 1954 as a long-range penetration of ARVN. In 1960 and 1961, he attended the US Army Command General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. He served as deputy commander (1963) of the ARVN Special Forces; deputy chief of staff (1964) of ARVN IV Corps, operating under COSVN MPS direction; chief of staff (1965), ARVN 1st Infantry Division of ARVN I Corps; chief (1966) of the RF/PF in ARVN II Corps; and later as head of the ARVN II Corps Inspector General's Office. Between 1965 and 1967, he operated under the direction of the COSVN MPS and its Region 5 EMPS.

The Postwar "Reeducation" and Exploitation of the ARVN

Following the Communist takeover of South Vietnam on 30 April 1975, the CDV and its various forward commands in South Vietnam became responsible for the detention, administration, indoctrination, interrogation, and "reeducation" of over 1,000,000 ARVN, RF/PF, PSDF, and other paramilitary personnel of the former Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Of this number, about 120,000 are still held in CDV-administered camps in South and North Vietnam with little hope of release and reintegration into the new socialist society.

Registration and Reporting

Immediately after the takeover, all persons, regardless of sex, age or profession, were required to register with new authorities by reporting for the "census" which was organized throughout the country. In Ho Chi Minh City, census offices were set up to serve as security screening mechanisms for the planned "reeducation" of the South Vietnamese populace. Each census office was designed to register a certain category of civil servants, a certain grade of military personnel, and certain segments of the rest of the populace. RVN civil

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servants and ARVN, RF/PF, PSDF, and other paramilitary personnel were classified in May 1975 according to their duties and grade. Civil officials were classified as ordinary civil servants, office chiefs, service chiefs, directors and directors general, and vice ministers and ministers. Military and paramilitary personnel were classified into the categories of enlisted, NCO, company grade, field grade, and general staff officers. Each category was given a three-day period, fixed in advance by the authorities, to report to the appropriate census office. Once that time had passed and the person failed to report, valid reasons for failure to register had to be presented to the authorities.

Each person first reported to the people's revolutionary committee in his/her ward of residence, and then on designated days to the appropriate district/precinct people's revolutionary committee agency where the census offices were established. Civilians who were neither ARVN personnel nor civil servants were told to apply for temporary residence identification papers. After registration, census certificates were issued which had to be presented on demand to the authorities. Registered individuals were instructed to remain at home to await orders to depart for compulsory reeducation.

ARVN personnel from the rank of private to aspirant were told they would attend a three-day reeducation course after which they would receive a completion-of-reeducation certificate and would be given a date to apply for temporary residence identification papers. ARVN officers from the rank of second lieutenant through that of captain were told they would be required to attend a 10-day reeducation course. All officers of major rank and above were told they would be required to attend a one-month reeducation course; however, they were not told where it would be held but only the date and time to report for transportation to the course.

Before each reeducation course began, the Ho Chi Minh City Military Management Committee and regional authorities announced the designation of the categories of the participants and the date and place where to report for transportation. At first, the authorities announced by loudspeakers and bullhorns that all former civil servants and military personnel without distinction had to report for a 10-day reeducation course. However, upon reporting, they were told by the authorities that the announced 10-day period was only for travel time and that the duration of the courses had not been firmly established. Each individual was required to bring a three- to ten-day food supply along with clothing and the census registration certificate. For enlisted personnel and NCOs and corresponding grades of civil servants, the course length varied from one week to two months. Courses for officers and corresponding grades of civil servants varied according to the results achieved during reeducation by each individual, and the decision of the authorities; it was indefinite.

Two distinct and compartmented reeducation systems were established: one administered by the Ministry of Interior (BNV) for former RVN civil officials, National Police Command, Central Intelligence Organization, Phoenix personnel, members of political parties, former employees of foreign agencies, and other civilian categories; and the other by the CDV for military personnel. BNV- and CDV-administered reeducation processing centers and

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camps were distinguished from one another by their distinctive letter/number prefix and suffix designations. BNV camps had either an "A" letter prefix or an "NV" letter suffix designation, while CDV camps had an "L" or "T" letter prefix designation.

According to the Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City press, the reeducation process consisted of many phases, ranging from registration and reporting, interrogation, and control and the organization of study programs, to the organization of internees in productive labor and social activities. The June 1975 issue of the *People's Armed Forces Journal* (*Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Doi*) emphasized the importance of:

"... closely combining management and education with interrogation. The management process is a process of continuing interrogation. There must be good interrogation so that management can be tighter. Good interrogation will correctly distinguish between truthful and lying persons, so that management and education of each category can be more appropriate. Interrogation and control must be comprehensive and must include both thoughts and acts, both past and present, etc. Along with the security forces and other forces in the locality, the military organs must also contribute to guiding and organizing the good implementation of timely and close interrogation and control of each person."

Enlisted personnel and NCOs were the first to be called for reeducation. Officer personnel were called next. Many senior ARVN officers were immediately sent to North Vietnam for incarceration and intelligence exploitation. On 15 August 1975, Colonel General Tran Van Tra, Chairman of the Hoi Chi Minh City Military Management Committee, issued a communique on reform study which stipulated the following for ARVN personnel:

- "ARVN officers of major rank and above, particularly those assigned to various branches of the puppet administration in Hoi Chi Minh City or those who came to Hoi Chi Minh City from other regions and provinces, who had reported and registered but had not yet had reform study, must gather at the Truong Vinh Ky High School, 235 Cong Hoa Street, on 17 and 18 August.
- "Puppet Catholic, Buddhist and Protestant chaplain officers of all ranks ... must gather at Phu Tho University, Nguyen Van Thoi Street, on 17 and 18 August.
- "Aspirants of psychological warfare organs and units ... must gather at the Marie Curie High School, 159 Cong Ly Street, Saigon 3, on 17 and 18 August.
- "Puppet aspirants and master sergeants of the riverine police and military police ... must gather at the Chu Van An High School, Ming Mang Street, Saigon 5, on 17 and 18 August.
- "Aspirants and NCOs of the puppet military security branch ... must gather at Phu Tho University, Nguyen Van Thoi Street, on 19 and 20 August.

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- "Personnel holding (military) aspirant rank and (civilian) team leader and group leader ranks of the puppet rural pacification branch . . . must gather at the Le Quang Dinh School at the corner of Chi Lang and Le Van Duyet Streets (Gia Dinh) on 19 and 20 August.
- "Aspirants and master sergeants of the 'Loi Hoi 81' ranger, military sector reconnaissance, and special forces units . . . must gather at the Trung Vuong Girls High School and the Vo Truong Toan School, 3 Nguyen Binh Khiem Street, Saigon 1, on 19 and 20 August.
- "Personnel holding the ranks from second lieutenant to captain in the puppet armed forces in Cu Chi District must gather at the Cu Chi District armed forces agency on 19 and 20 August.
- "Personnel in these categories must attend supplementary study sessions if they have already reported, registered, and had reform study in their localities. Those who did not must do so now . . . must bring paper, pens, clothes, mosquito nets, blankets, mattresses, personal effects, food and foodstuffs (in kind or money) enough for 10 days . . . reception hours 0800 to 1500 daily at gathering places."

At first, the locations of the reeducation camps were kept strictly secret by the authorities. Military personnel were segregated by rank. For the most part, enlisted personnel and NCOs were processed through camps run by district military unit enemy proselytizing subsections. Provincial military unit enemy proselytizing section camps handled for the most part junior company grade officers up to the rank of first lieutenant. Military region enemy proselytizing section camps held officer personnel, and certain categories of ARVN personnel, usually those associated with military intelligence, military police, military security, Phoenix program, and political warfare elements. The segregation of ranks pertained not only to regular ARVN personnel, but also to RF/PF and PSDF personnel and officers.

Indoctrination, Interrogation, and Screening Procedures

For the purposes of management, control, interrogation and indoctrination, personnel of the same rank were organized into reeducation battalions which were further broken down into reeducation companies, platoons of two 10-man cells, and 10-man cells. One camp staff political indoctrination/interrogation specialist was assigned to each reeducation platoon to guide study sessions, and to monitor compulsory discussion groups and self-criticism sessions. Biweekly group sessions were a key part of the program. At these sessions, internee statements were read aloud by camp indoctrinators who asked that anyone who had knowledge of anything left out or of lies in the statement step forward. Each internee was required to step forward and to denounce fellow inmates he knew or suspected of having worked for or with US intelligence (particularly CIA), British or French intelligence, as well as to identify others who failed to report for reeducation. Inmates were told that those with such knowledge and who came forward would be the first to be released, and that those who had lied or had forgotten to include all their crimes would be the last to be released. The majority of inmates were afraid to lie or to conceal information. Most told the truth in their personal history

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statements, with the hope of early release. Those who refused to denounce others or to admit their own crimes or who were uncooperative during interrogation were categorized as "stubborn" (ngoan co) elements. "Stubborn" elements were frequently beaten and placed for periods of up to three weeks of solitary confinement in sealed metal conex containers (6'x4'x6' in size) on short rations until they cooperated with their indoctrinators/interrogators.

It soon became apparent to officer internees that early release depended on telling the same story each time during interrogation. The slightest deviation from answers given previously to a camp staff cadre meant further interrogation and extended terms of imprisonment.

Immediately after reporting for reeducation, each internee was required to fill out a detailed personal history questionnaire before being interviewed. Initial interviews were conducted by a CDV specialist on the internee's family background, service record, and past connections with American officials in and outside Vietnam. Special attention was given to those who had any connections with US intelligence, particularly with US CIA officials. Each internee was interrogated individually on this subject by PAVN military security officers, who believed that they were knowledgeable of US intelligence staybehind (nam vung) assets in Vietnam. The internees were also similarly interrogated for connections with British and French intelligence, and were subjected to detailed reviews of ARVN strategy and tactics with heavy emphasis on small-unit operations. Interrogations initially focused on the personal involvement of the internees in the war with such typical questions asked as to how many PAVN personnel they had killed and how many civilian homes had been destroyed by forces under their command. The objective of which was to obtain confessions of "war crimes." Specialists from various PAVN service branches later interrogated them on sophisticated US weapons systems, such as aircraft, armored vehicles, radar installations, naval vessels, artillery, etc. In addition to learning how these systems operated, the interrogators were also interested in the type of training officers received and in the installations where the training was conducted. Those trained in the US appeared to be of most interest to the interrogators, and were subjected to more lengthy interrogations than other ARVN officer personnel. The internees were repeatedly told that their sentences would be reduced if they provided full, accurate information. Field grade and general staff officers were subjected to late evening interrogation sessions by PAVN military intelligence and military security officers in camps in South Vietnam and later in North Vietnam. The interrogators were obviously carefully prepared for their interrogation sessions, during which they revealed an intimate knowledge of RVN and ARVN files and records. Captured RVN and ARVN intelligence and security service files were extensively used to verify information provided; to identify those with past connections with US, British and French intelligence; and to spot, locate, and arrest other knowledgeable officers who attempted to evade compulsory reeducation. The latter, upon arrest, were subjected to the same screening and interrogation process.

Categorization of Internees for Imprisonment and Release

Later, each internee file was reviewed by CDV specialists, who classified each internee according to the danger he was believed to represent to the new

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regime. ARVN interneers were classified into three basic categories: A, B, and C. Category A interneers were those who had helped to liberate the country, and included previously-recruited fifth column agent assets and a few field grade and general staff officers who actively assisted in locating minefields, turned over arms depots intact, and who had cooperated with the liberation armed forces. Several hundred Category A officers were assigned to positions under surveillance in the PAVN, air force, and navy. Category B interneers were those who were reeducated, had admitted their crimes, had sincerely repented in the eyes of the CDV, had their civil rights restored, and had been assisted by the new regime in finding employment under close supervision and surveillance. Most reeducated Category B interneers were junior-ranking company grade officers and civil servants. Category C interneers were those who had yet to be reeducated since "their hands were stained with blood."

Category C individuals were described by CDV officers as embittered, sullen, antinational, anti-Communist elements who had not yet rid themselves of such views. Most captains and field grade officers from the rank of major upward were classified as Category C: "cruel," "dangerous," and "stubborn" (ngoan co) elements. Others who were automatically classified as Category C "dangerous" elements included former airborne, artillery, armor, marine, ranger, special forces, military intelligence, military police, military security, political warfare, reconnaissance, rural pacification, and Phoenix personnel, and air force pilots. Among them were many military officers who had been detailed to the RVN National Police Command and to the RVN Central Intelligence Organization, and who had initially reported themselves for reeducation as pure military officers with no intelligence or security service affiliation. Their intelligence and security service affiliations were soon detected as almost all ARVN J-2, J-5 (Political Warfare), J-7 (SIGINT), Military Security Service, National Police Command, and Central Intelligence Organization files were left intact for the new regime to exploit and to cross-check personal history statements.

For example, although ARVN J-2 Unit 101 administrative and personnel records were reportedly destroyed in mid-April 1975, operational records were left intact for the new regime along with the vast bulk of ARVN J-2 administrative, personnel, and operational files and records. All Unit 101 officers and enlisted personnel were immediately sent away to reeducation, where nearly all were classified as Category C interneers. Unit 101 Commander Lieutenant Colonel Le Dinh Luan and his deputy Lieutenant Colonel Truong Van Ty were subsequently sent to North Vietnam for exploitation. Other senior ranking ARVN J-2 and Military Security Service officers suffered a similar fate. All Category C interneers were required to complete a minimum of three years' education. Only a few low-ranking ARVN J-2, J-5, J-7, and Military Security Service personnel were released as of early 1977. By early 1977, the vast majority of Category C interneers had been transferred to permanent camps administered by the CDV in North Vietnam. Only a few engineers, agronomists, doctors, and other technical specialists, whose skills were urgently required by the new regime, were released on probation to the trust of state enterprises and the PAVN.

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Upon classification into the three categories cited above, each internee was sentenced to a specific term of imprisonment by the PAVN CDV and military security in coordination with the Military Justice Department of the PAVN General Political Department. Imprisonment terms ranged from three months to several years at hard labor, or life imprisonment. Sentences were kept secret, and were known only to PAVN political officers and CDV camp officers. When considered for release, internees were only told that they had completed their reeducation, and were considered to be ready to take their place in the new socialist society. Continued imprisonment under the guise of "reeducation" is designed to control antiregime elements and to restrict the activities of those who might be of future use to US intelligence.

From October 1975 through January 1976 groups of 100 to 200 officers were released weekly from various CDV camps with much propaganda fanfare for domestic and international consumption. On 10 October, the Reeducation Section of the Ho Chi Minh City Military Management Committee announced that it had authorized hundreds of junior and field grade officers to return home or to work in various specialized and technical agencies or units. Those released were described as not having incurred any blood debt to the people, and as not being dangerous "CIA" elements. The reeducation section further stipulated that all released officers would at all times be confined to their home areas by local revolutionary administrative agencies or units for as long as it was considered necessary for the released officers to become genuine citizens of the new regime. It was also stated that those who did not "resign themselves to reason" or who committed acts against the regime would be severely punished. Similar announcements were made in the Mekong Delta area and in Central Vietnam. Only a few field grade officers were released; most were company grade officers. None had ARVN intelligence or security service affiliations. Most had a past history of cooperation and sympathy with the revolution, according to fellow inmates. By February 1976, all officers who were eligible for early release had returned home or had been reassigned to positions with the new regime. Only six officers of colonel rank were released from the PAVN Military Region 7 CDV camp system.

Virtually all officers of colonel rank were transferred in October 1975 from various PAVN Military Region 7 CDV camps to maximum security prisons at Chi Hoa (Ho Chi Minh City), Con Son Island, and Tan Hiep in former Bien Hoa Province, now known as Dong Nai Province. As of March 1976, most ARVN NCO and enlisted personnel had been released, except those with ARVN intelligence and security service affiliations. Dependents of ARVN officers were systematically removed from civil service positions, and school age children and university student siblings of ARVN officers were expelled from the state public school system. They were left to rely on their own dwindling personal resources; no provision was made by the state for their care, feeding, and employment; medical treatment at state medical facilities was also denied. Dependent families were gradually ordered to report to gathering points with their personal belongings for transport to the "new economic zones" where they would reportedly be joined by their imprisoned relatives.

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Prison Camp Life; Mail and Visiting Privileges

Those who remained under imprisonment in reeducation camps were abruptly made aware of the fact that they had been classified as prisoners of war (tu binh). Camp life was grim. Manual labor was the principal daily activity of each internee and took up virtually all daylight hours. It consisted of cleaning the camp, preparing meals, weeding gardens, raising vegetables, manufacturing articles from wood, cutting wood, building huts, filling bomb craters, etc. Political indoctrination courses were conducted after the evening meal and lasted from 1900 hours to about 2200 hours. After that time, selected internees were subjected to late-night interrogations by PAVN CDV, military security, and various service branch interrogators. The objective of the camp life routine was to keep the internees physically exhausted and docile. Those prisoners considered to be "dangerous," that is, incorrigible and unresponsive, by camp authorities were given the most difficult and hazardous tasks, such as filling bomb craters, cutting large trees, clearing minefields, and removing unexploded bombs or artillery shells. Those who, in the view of the camp authorities, had not worked seriously were given "compensatory" work at night, which further aggravated their weakened physical condition. Food in the camps was marginal. The standard food ration was one or two bowls (500 grams) of rice, and some local vegetables raised by the internees. Small amounts of fish and, rarely, meat were occasionally available. Medical care was virtually nonexistent. No medicines were available. Only the very seriously ill were occasionally sent to medical facilities for treatment. Most internees suffered from serious malnutrition, and varying stages of beriberi, dysentery, malaria, and other diseases.

At first, none of the internees were given mail privileges. Authorities forbade family visits with the internees. For several months, family members did not know where the internee was or even if he was still alive as rumors of executions began to circulate. Beginning in December 1975, the camp authorities permitted certain internees who had shown progress in reeducation to write to their families. In their letters, the internees were only permitted to relate personal news and to provide the letter box number of the intermediate post office in Ho Chi Minh City. After five or more exchanges of letters and the sending of food packages, family members could address a request to the camp commander for permission to visit their relatives. Permission was granted only if the internee had continued to demonstrate "good results" to the camp authorities. The camp commander's decision was final and could not be appealed. If the visitation request was approved, the authorities informed the family of the camp location and issued a pass authorizing the visit and travel involved. Upon arrival at the camp, the visitors were not allowed to approach or speak directly with the interned relative. Family meetings usually took place in large open areas where the visitor and the internee remained about 100 meters apart but close enough to permit visual recognition. Written notes could be exchanged through camp guards at the site. All written notes were reviewed and censored on the spot.

Treatment of VNAF Personnel; the PAVN Air Force Experiment

Until March 1976, former Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) personnel were given preferential treatment. At first, Hanoi had no standard policy towards

former VNAF pilots and mechanics, although their assistance was needed by the PAVN Air Force to fly and maintain hundreds of aircraft confiscated after the collapse of South Vietnam. Treatment varied in part due to where they had been originally interned. Personnel of the VNAF 1st (Danang) and 2nd (Nha Trang) Air Divisions who were stranded in Central Vietnam were immediately classified as prisoners of war (tu binh), while those of the VNAF 3rd (Bien Hoa), 4th (Binh Thuy), and 5th (Tan Son Nhut) Air Divisions, the VNAF Headquarters, Aircraft Control and Warning Group, Air Logistics Command (Bien Hoa), Air Operations Command, and the Air Medical Center at Tan Son Nhut were classified as "surrenderers." All VNAF personnel in the Tan Son Nhut-Saigon area were interned at Camp Davis, Tan Son Nhut, which was converted into a reeducation camp for VNAF personnel. The treatment of VNAF 4th Air Division personnel at the Binh Thuy Air Base near Can Tho illustrates how VNAF personnel were initially processed and later used by the PAVN Air Force.

On 1 May 1975, the first full day of PAVN control, the VNAF Commander of the Binh Thuy Air Base appeared on television and directed all VNAF personnel in the Can Tho area to report to the base on 4 May. After reporting as directed, personnel surrendered their VNAF identification card and weapons permit, and were issued a paper bearing only their name and the date they had reported. During the following two weeks, Saigon Liberation Radio broadcasted instructions for all first and second lieutenants in the Can Tho area to report to the Phan Thanh Gian High School in Can Tho on 15 May. About 2,000 officers, including VNAF officers, reported on 15 May, and were classified in alphabetical order by name, rather than by service, and were assigned in 20-man groups per classroom. Between 0600 and 2100 hours, seven days a week, the daily routine did not vary. Internees were assigned to work details; received two hours political indoctrination daily with each officer taking daily turns as a discussion leader under the guidance of a camp cadre; and were given two bowls (500 grams) of rice with vegetables and fish. The rice ration was cut in half after the first month. Pilots were condemned as the greatest enemies of the people, followed by officers who had served in artillery and armored units. At first, relatives were permitted 30 minute visits on Saturdays and Sundays; however, this privilege was withdrawn after the first month. All mail was censored. No medicines were provided. About 50 percent of the internees suffered from varying degrees of malaria. Only the very seriously ill were sent to hospitals for medical treatment.

In August 1975, the treatment of VNAF internees changed for the better. VNAF pilots and mechanics were released for limited service under close supervision with the PAVN Air Force. In September 1975, the Phan Thanh Gian Camp was closed, and all remaining internees were transferred to the Chi Lang Camp in An Giang Province. At the Binh Thuy Airbase, 30-man VNAF mechanic cells were formed under the supervision of PAVN Air Force officers and NCOs for all engine and airframe maintenance on UH-1, U-17, O-1, and A-37 aircraft. VNAF A-37 pilots were involved in the training of PAVN 937th Air Defense Regiment MIG pilots on the A-37. Other VNAF pilots were assigned to PAVN Air Force bases at Phan Rang and Bien Hoa. As of January 1976, the PAVN Air Force planned to deploy former VNAF pilots

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and mechanics from Binh Thuy to other airbases at Danang, Pleiku, Phu Cat, or Nha Trang. VNAF personnel at Camp Davis, Tan Son Nhut, were similarly assigned duties with the PAVN Air Force at Tan Son Nhut. In February 1976, VNAF 3rd Air Division personnel were released from the Lai Khe Reeducation Camp for limited service with the PAVN Air Force in Central Vietnam.

Following the March 1976 escape of a former VNAF pilot by air to Thailand from the Binh Thuy Airbase, the planned integration of VNAF personnel into the PAVN Air Force was canceled. All former VNAF personnel were subjected to rigid screening procedures for three weeks at the Binh Thuy Airbase and at Camp Davis, Tan Son Nhut. All former VNAF flight personnel were grounded and the PAVN Air Force canceled all flights to discourage other potential defectors, as well as to allow time for the PAVN military security screening mechanism to identify high risk potential defectors who might similarly attempt to escape Vietnam by air. Shortly thereafter, VNAF officers from the rank of captain upward were transferred to reeducation camps in North Vietnam.

The Prison Camp System in North Vietnam

Although some ARVN field grade and general staff officers had been sent immediately to reeducation camps in North Vietnam after the Communist takeover, significant numbers were not sent there until after April 1976. Three separate incidents precipitated this action. These were the March 1976 escape by air to Thailand by a VNAF pilot from the Binh Thuy Airbase, and two massive breakouts of ARVN officers in PAVN IV Corps in April 1976. In April 1976, antiregime resistance forces attacked the Long Giao Reeducation Camp in Dong Nai Province of PAVN Military Region 7, and Hoa Hao resistance forces attacked the Chi Lang Reeducation Camp in An Giang Province of PAVN Military Region 9 in the Mekong Delta area. Several hundred interned officers succeeded in escaping from the two camps, which alerted Hanoi to the danger of escapees joining antiregime resistance forces in South Vietnam.

Hanoi then decided to remove all ARVN officer internees from the rank of captain upward, and all Category C "dangerous" elements from South Vietnam to camps in isolated areas in North Vietnam. Over 7,000 field grade officers were sent to North Vietnam. It was at this time that Hanoi announced that those who remained in the reeducation system would not be released until they had completed three years of reeducation. At least six camps were administered by the CDV in North Vietnam at Muong Trai (21-36N/103-53E), Cao Bang, Lang Son, Nghia Lo, Son La, and Yen Bai. Another six camps were administered by the BNV for RVN civil officials and noncombatant ARVN officers at Phu Luong (Bac Thai Province), Son Tay (Ha Son Binh Province), Nam Ha (Ha Nam Ninh Province), Vinh Phu (Vinh Phu Province), Son Cam (Thanh Hoa Province), and Quang Ninh Province near the Chinese border.

The Cao Bang Camp was a maximum security prison for senior ranking ARVN officers serving 15-year and life sentences. According to prison guards

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at the Muong Trai Camp, the Cao Bang Camp held 22 generals, 376 colonels, and some high ranking Communist officers, who had defected during the war years to the RVN. Five of the 22 interned generals have been identified as: Major General Doan Van Quang, Commander, ARVN Special Forces; Major General Do Ke Giai, Commander, ARVN Ranger Command; Brigadier General Le Minh Dao, Commander, ARVN 18th Infantry Division; Brigadier General Pham Duy Tat, Commander, ARVN II Corps 2nd Ranger Command; and Brigadier General Pham Ha Thanh, Deputy Commander, ARVN Medical Corps.

The Muong Trai Camp held about 4,000 company- and field-grade officers from the rank of second lieutenant to colonel. The camp was commanded by PAVN Colonel Pham Thai, who had a 350-man camp staff, which included about 20 indoctrinators/interrogators and four 70-man security guard companies. Although no figures are available on the number of ARVN internees in the Lang Son, Nghia Lo, Son La, and Yen Bai Camps, they presumably held similar numbers of internees. In spring 1978, PAVN experienced a breakout from the Lang Son Camp near the Chinese border, during which several hundred interned officers succeeded in escaping across the border to China. PAVN then relocated all internees from camps north of Hanoi to new camp sites south of Ha Nam Ninh and Thanh Hoa Provinces. At about the same time, a number of interned officers who had specialized technical or professional qualifications, such as doctors and engineers, were offered release and employment in North Vietnam, where their skills were needed.

As of December 1978, over 40,000 former RVN civilian officials and ARVN personnel were interned in various CDV- and BNV-administered camps in North Vietnam. In December 1978, inmates at several camps in North Vietnam were told by camp authorities that they would not be released since they had only completed three years of "study." The inmates were also told that their three years of minimum "reeducation" would begin in 1979. Camp authorities also announced that their future release in three years (1982) would depend on their behavior during said period, and that decisions would later be made on a case-by-case basis to determine whether further reeducation or release was warranted. Only those who had shown progress in reeducation were allowed mail privileges; they were allowed one letter and one five kilogram parcel every six months. However, very few relatives have received any word from their interned relatives in North Vietnam, according to refugees.

The Prison Camp System in South Vietnam

In addition to the 40,000 RVN and ARVN officials detained in BNV and CDV camps in North Vietnam, there are an estimated 120,000 still held in various CDV and BNV camps/prisons in South Vietnam. Of this number, about 90,000 are ARVN internees held in about 25 CDV camps located in Military Regions 7 and 9 of PAVN IV Corps, Military Region 5 of PAVN III Corps, and Military Region 4 of PAVN II Corps. At one time (1976), the CDV administered over 75 provincial- and regional-level camps in South Vietnam. By October 1976, this CDV camp system was reorganized and consolidated

following the transfer of about 25,000 ARVN personnel to camps in North Vietnam. As of March 1978, about 60,000 ARVN personnel were interned in CDV camps in PAVN IV Corps.

Within Military Region 7 of PAVN IV Corps, there were 20 CDV camps, designated Letter Box Number (LBN) 7590/L1 through L20, in Dong Nai, Song Be, and Tay Ninh Provinces, for ARVN personnel, and two camps (one in Song Be and one in Tay Ninh) for Kampuchean POWs of Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea Army. Five other camps were under the direct supervision of PAVN IV Corps CDV Group 875 in the Ho Chi Minh City area: the Cu Chi, Chau Son (Thu Duc District), and Go Vap Camps each held about 1,000 internees; Camp Davis at Tan Son Nhut Air Base at one time held over 3,000 VNAF personnel; and the Thanh Ong Nam (Hoc Mon District) Camp had over 5,000 officers interned until May/June 1976 when all were transferred to camps on Phu Quoc Island. Extremely "dangerous" Category C ARVN internees were at one time held in the BNV Chi Hoa (Ho Chi Minh City) and Con Son Island Prisons.

Three major camps for junior company grade officers were set up in Tay Ninh Province; the Trang Lon, Cay Cay and Katum Camps, each of which held about 3,000 officers. By October 1976, the Trang Lon Camp held over 10,000 internees, including 7,000 transferred from camps on Phu Quoc Island. Three camps were located in Song Be Province, where they were known as the Nha Do (Don Luan District), An Loc, and Loc Ninh Camps. The Nha Do Camp at one time held over 3,000 internees, while the An Loc and Loc Ninh Camps each had about 500 internees. Ten camps were located in Dong Nai Province; seven in former Long Khanh Province; two in former Bien Hoa Province; and one in former Phuoc Tuy Province, where Phoenix program internees were held. The seven camps in former Long Khanh Province have been identified as the Binh An, Dung Hiep, Hoang Dieu, Long Giao, Long Giap, La Nga, and Tam Dung Camps; the Suoi Mau and Tan Hiep Camps were located in Bien Hoa Province; and the Binh Gia Camp in Phuoc Tuy Province. As of March 1976, the Hoang Dieu, Long Giao and Long Giap Camps each held over 5,000 internees. The other camps held from 500 to 1,000 internees each. The Suoi Mau Camp in Bien Hoa Province had been previously known as the ARVN III Corps Prison Camp, and for the most part held noncombatant military officers, including ARVN Buddhist and Christian chaplains, political warfare personnel, retired officers, and an unknown number of disabled veterans. The Tan Hiep Camp was a maximum security prison for field grade officers who had been processed through other camps and who had been sentenced to terms of hard labor; it held at one time over 300 VNAF pilots, who were categorized as high risk potential defectors by Camp Davis authorities at Tan Son Nhut.

According to PAVN Lieutenant Colonel Bui Thiep, director of the Military Region 7 Reeducation Service, over 21,000 junior company grade officers had registered for reeducation in Military Region 7. In the March 1978 issue of the Soviet *New Times* magazine, Colonel Thiep was quoted as saying that about 60,000 ARVN personnel were still in reeducation centers in South Vietnam, that is, PAVN IV Corps, with 21,000 in his Military Region 7 camp system. Physical security for the Military Region 7 camp system was

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reinforced by the PAVN 5th Infantry Division. By October 1976, all ARVN officers from the rank of captain were transferred to CDV camps in North Vietnam, leaving only company grade officers, NCO and enlisted personnel in the Military Region 7 camp system.

Within Military Region 9 of PAVN IV Corps, the CDV administered at one time 25 camps for ARVN internees in An Giang, Ben Tre, Cuu Long, Dong Thap, Hau Giang, Kien Giang, Long An, Minh Hai, and Tien Giang Provinces. One of the largest camps was the Tran Quoc Toan Camp near Cao Lanh in Dong Thap Province, where several thousand officers from the rank of captain upward were detained under maximum security. Two maximum security camps were located at former ARVN prison camps on Phu Quoc Island, Kien Giang Province; the Duong Dong (Cuu Sung) and An Thoi (Cay Dua) Camps each had at one time over 5,000 detainees. Over 2,600 were held at the Soc Trang Camp in Hau Giang Province; over 2,000 at the My Phuoc Camp in Chau Thanh District, Tien Giang Province; and over 1,500 company grade officers at the Chi Lang (Nui Dai) Camp in Tri Ton District, An Giang Province. The Chi Lang Camp was closed in April 1976 following a raid by Hoa Hao resistance forces which freed about 200 officers. Other camps held about 800 to 1,000 detainees. Among these were: the Thot Not and Long Xuyen Camps, An Giang Province; the Ben Tre Camp, Ben Tre Province; the Long Ho and Dam Lat (Sadec) Camps, Cuu Long Province; the Tan An Camp, Long An Province; the Minh Luong (Kien Tan District), Xeo Ro (Kien An District), Kien Giang Province; the Tra Noc (Phong Dien District), Quan Lao (Chau Thanh District), Thom Rom (Phong Phu District), Canal No. 5 (Kien Hung District), Cai Rang, and Phan Thanh Gian (Can Tho) Camps, Hau Giang Province; the Bac Lieu, Nam Can, Thoi Binh, Dai Ngai Island, Kinh Xang, and Song Ong Duc Camps, Minh Hai Province.

In June 1976, all district-level camps run by district military unit enemy proselytizing subsections for enlisted personnel, NCOs and aspirant officers were closed. Those who were not ready for release were transferred to camps run by provincial military unit enemy proselytizing sections. Those who were classified as "dangerous" elements with "bloody records of crimes against the people" were segregated into maximum security camps where they were given imprisonment terms of up to 10 years. By October 1976, several provincial-level camps were closed and consolidated into one camp for ARVN officers in the U Minh forest about 30 kilometers from Rach Gia in Kien Giang Province; about 10,000 internees are held in this camp complex which is organized into several labor camps. The two major camps on Phu Quoc Island were among those affected by the reorganization of the CDV camp system in Military Region 9. Over 7,000 internees on Phu Quoc Island were transferred to the Military Region 7 Trang Lon Camp in Tay Ninh Province which now held over 10,000 company grade officer internees.

Within Military Region 5 of PAVN III Corps in Central Vietnam, the CDV administered 24 camps located in Dac Lac, Gia Lai-Cong Tum, Lam Dong, Nghia Binh, Phu Khanh, Quang Nam-Danang, and Thuan Hai Provinces. Seven camps were located in Quang Nam-Danang Province; five in Hieu Duc District, one in Duc Duc District, and one near Danang City. Each had one time held over 5,000 ARVN personnel. Four camps were located in

Nghia Binh Province; the An Khe, Mo Duc, Qui Nhon, and Tam Quan Camps each at one time held over 5,000 ARVN. Three camps were located in Phu Khanh Province; the Lam Son and Cung Son Camps had over 4,000 internees while the Khanh Duong Camp held about a 1,000. In summer 1976, about 650 officers from the rank of captain upward were sent from the Lam Son Camp to camps in North Vietnam; the remaining 3,500 internees at the Lam Son Camp were transferred in January 1977 to the Cung Son Camp, which then had over 5,000 officer internees. Three camps were located in Thuan Hai Province; the Ham Tan Camp held 5,000; the Phan Rang Camp about 2,000; and the Song Pha Camp about 1,000. Two camps were located in Dac Lac Province; the Ban Me Thuot and Do Ri (Duc Lap) Camps each held over 1,000 internees. Two camps were located in Lam Dong Province; the Kinh Da (Di Linh) and Don Duong Camps each held over 1,500 internees. Three camps were located in Gia Lai-Cong Tum Province; the Gia Rai, Kontum and Pleiku Camps each held over 1,000 internees. Of the 80,000 ARVN personnel who were initially interned in the Military Region 5 CDV camp system, over 25,000 remained in the camp system as of December 1978. Another 10,000 had been transferred to camps in North Vietnam in 1976.

The example of the Lam Son Camp in Phu Khanh Province is a typical illustration of the CDV camp system in Military Region 5. In Nha Trang City of former Khanh Hoa Province, loudspeaker broadcasts on 21 May 1975 called for the registration of ARVN officers from the rank of aspirant, who were instructed to report with a three-day food supply on 25 May. On 25 May, they were trucked to the ARVN Lam Son Training Center, which was located about 25 kilometers from Nha Trang in Duc My, Ninh Hoa District, Khanh Hoa Province. Converted into a reeducation camp, the Lam Son Center held about 4,500 officers from the rank of aspirant to colonel. The camp was divided into five sections, where officers were segregated from each other by rank. Section 1 contained about 650 officers from the rank of captain to colonel; Sections 2 and 3 each had about 1,000 first lieutenants; and Sections 4 and 5 each had about 900 aspirants and second lieutenants. Each section was further divided into 50-man groups per barracks building. Internees were initially told that they were "students" (hoc vien); on 15 August 1975, they were told for the first time that they were classified as "prisoners of war" (tu binh). The camp had a 350-man staff, which included 20 political indoctrinators/interrogators and four 70-man security guard companies. Indoctrination/interrogation specialists were changed every three months for unknown reasons. In spring 1976, over 600 officers from the rank of captain upward were transferred to camps in North Vietnam. In January 1977, the Lam Son Camp was closed down with about 3,500 internees being transferred to the Cung Son Camp in Tuy Hoa District of former Phu Yen Province.

Within Military Region 4 of PAVN II Corps, only two camps have been identified, although others are believed to exist in the area covering Nghe Tinh and Binh Tri Thien Provinces. The Quang Tri Camp reportedly held about 2,000 ARVN internees, while the Hue Camp held about 1,000.

Annexes

CDV Interrogation Questionnaire for US POWs in South Vietnam

A. Personal information

1. Name
2. Date and place of birth
3. Occupation before entering the military
4. Civilian and military schools attended
5. Ranks and positions held throughout military career
6. If enlisted, whether draftee or volunteer
7. If officer, whether sponsored by a Congressman (Comment: This no doubt refers to Congressional appointments to the Service Academies.) If so, the Congressman's attitude toward the war and his address. If the Congressman appeared susceptible, he would be contacted and informed that one of the men he had sponsored was now a POW; from the Congressman's correspondence it was further to be determined how he could be exploited.
8. Language capability, where he studied the language and for what purpose. This information was used to determine if the POW was ever in intelligence and to point out other areas in which the US Government might have planned to use him.
9. Nonmilitary areas of familiarity (for example, TV repair, photography, rocketry)
10. Previous countries to which assigned
11. Date of arrival in Vietnam
12. Unit to which assigned: its location, mission and morale (including desertion rate); Subject's function in unit
13. Battles fought
14. Military and political training received in preparation for Vietnam assignment
15. Sworn to Code of Conduct?
16. Political affiliations
17. Detailed data on wife, children, parents, other relatives, and friends including names, addressees, occupations, current activities, political affiliations, and socio-economic living standard. Particular emphasis was placed on the details of this portion of the questionnaire.

18. Emotions of mother/wife when POW departed for Vietnam (did she cry?)
- B. Attitudes (both personal and that of fellow military and commanding officers) toward:
 1. Vietnam war, destruction and casualties wrought by US bombing
 2. Thieu/Ky government
 3. Desertion
 4. Participation in demonstrations (names of soldiers, dates of demonstrations, types of demonstration—racial, antipoverty, antiwar)
 5. Martin Luther King's assassination (Negro reaction)
 6. Bertrand Russell trial organized to oppose American participation in Vietnam and knowledge of Russell's trial speech
 7. Criticism or punishment from superiors. Information on this attitude was to be used to incite the POW against his superiors and to decrease his morale by showing him that he lost his status as a free and equal citizen when he entered the military
 8. Race riots in the US; attitude of white soldiers toward Negro soldiers
 9. Vietnamese wives of American military personnel
 10. Laborers in the US toward their government
- C. General and specific details regarding:
 1. Who read VC propaganda leaflets and what types were read
 2. Books read by officers and enlisted men and reasons they liked these books
 3. Conflicts between US Army and ARVN
 4. Dissension between officers and enlisted men
 5. Deserters in the unit: names, dates, locations, causes
 6. Morale, topics of discussion, and factors bothering the military most when serving in remote areas of Vietnam
 7. Names, ranks and home states of American soldiers who killed or raped Vietnamese civilians
 8. What goods POWs intended to buy and bring back to the US with them when they were transferred. In this way, the VC could determine when a unit was pulling out and could direct the appropriate propaganda at the unit in the hopes that some of it would seep back to the friends and families of the soldiers involved
 9. Names and dates of people who had committed self-immolation for antiwar purposes

10. General sentiment/attitudes which the POWs felt were peculiar to the VC
11. Promises made by US Government to the military prior to sending them to Vietnam
12. Number of members of the POW's unit belonging to the laboring class. The Military Proselytizing Section explained to the Americans the senselessness of going to a foreign country to fight when there were so many things, such as unemployment, in their own country which needed to be taken care of. In addition, desired statistics and other information on conditions in the US were sought
13. Awareness of unemployment and misery experienced by Americans in the US
14. Desire of POWs to write letters to their families in the US. The VC/NVA would see that the friends and families of the POW got these letters in the hopes that the letters would cause them to agitate for peace and the resultant return of their loved ones
15. Characteristics and morale of minority groups in the US

During the interrogation, the following questions and arguments were posed to determine the sophistication of the POW:

- A. Why did the US fail at the Bay of Pigs?
- B. Why was President Kennedy assassinated?
- C. Why was Martin Luther King assassinated?
- D. Why was Cuba allowed to become a Communist country? Cuba is a small country with a small population located near the mighty US. Vietnam is a small country with few people, so why should the US bother with Vietnam?
- E. Why did the Americans fight the British in the American Revolution? Is not the Vietnamese war analogous to the American Revolution?

At the end of the interrogation, each POW was asked if he had any questions or needed anything. The POW could thereby express his personal feelings. The effect of the interrogation would thus be indicated, and the way the POW was treated en route from capture could be determined.

Biographic Profiles on CDV Staff Officers

1. **Pham Tran Ban** alias Ba Ban, Deputy Chief, SVNLA Political Staff Department's Enemy Proselytizing Office, 1965 to 1975. Born about 1925 in North Vietnam, Ban held the rank of major in the CDV headquarters in Hanoi before he infiltrated South Vietnam in early 1965 with CDV Major Bui Thanh Ngon. Upon arrival at the SVNLA headquarters, he became the deputy chief of the newly-activated Enemy Proselytizing Office. Ban speaks fluent Chinese and appeared in a SVNLA propaganda film on the January 1969 release of three POWs in Tay Ninh Province.
2. **Le Hong Bien**, Commander, SVNLA Political Staff Department Enemy Proselytizing Office Policy Section's Inter-Unit A camp system for US/foreign civilian and military POWs, 1968 to 1973. Born about 1925 in Binh Dinh Province, Central Vietnam, Bien was a regroupee who held the rank of senior captain. He infiltrated South Vietnam in the mid-1960s as a battalion commander before becoming the deputy chief of staff of SVNLA Regiment Q-16. After being seriously wounded in the left arm, he became the commander of the Enemy Proselytizing Office Policy Section's Inter-Unit A camp system in June 1968.
3. **Le Thanh Binh**, member, Quang Da Special Region Party Committee Enemy and Military Proselytizing Section Propaganda Subsection Proselytizing Unit, 1965 to 1970s. Born about 1935 in Loc Hung Village, Dai Loc District, Quang Nam Province, Central Vietnam, Binh joined the Lao Dong Party in 1954 and was imprisoned by the Ngo Dinh Diem regime before 1963. In 1965, he was assigned to the Quang Da Special Region Enemy and Military Proselytizing Section as an English-language propaganda proselytizing cadre.
4. **Nguyen Canh** alias Chinh, Chief, CDV Propaganda Office, 1958 to 1970s. Born about 1918 in North Vietnam, Canh held the rank of lieutenant colonel and was well known for preparing indoctrination materials for POWs, contributing articles for Radio Hanoi broadcasts against ARVN personnel in South Vietnam, and for preparing proselytizing materials for use by CDV field components against ARVN in South Vietnam.
5. **Doan Chan**, member, Quang Da Special Region Party Committee Enemy and Military Proselytizing Section Propaganda Subsection Proselytizing Unit, 1966 to 1970s. Born about 1943 in Dien Ban District, Quang Nam Province, Central Vietnam, Chan was assigned to the Quang Da Special Region Enemy and Military Proselytizing Section as an English-language propaganda proselytizing cadre.
6. **Tran Chau**, Staff Assistant, SVNLA Political Staff Department Enemy Proselytizing Office's Policy (POW) Section, 1968 to 1970. Born about 1932 in Phuoc Tuy Province, South Vietnam, Chau was a regroupee who held the rank of CDV captain.

7. **Trinh Xuan Chi**, member, Quang Da Special Region Party Committee Enemy and Military Proselytizing Section Propaganda Subsection Proselytizing Unit, 1965 to 1970s. Born about 1944 in Ky Anh Village, Tam Ky District, Quang Tin Province, Chi was assigned to the Quang Da Special Region Enemy and Military Proselytizing Section as an English-language proselytizing cadre.
8. **Pham Chinh**, deputy chief, Quang Da Special Region Party Committee Enemy Military Proselytizing Section Propaganda Subsection, 1966 to 1974. Born about 1926 in Danang City, Quang Nam Province, Central Vietnam, Chinh joined the Indochinese Communist Party in the 1940s and operated during the 1945 to 1954 French Resistance War in Region 5. Prior to his assignment in 1966 to the Quang Da Special Region Enemy and Military Proselytizing Section, he had been an English teacher at the Danang Sao Mai School. Chinh headed the propaganda subsection's research and printing cell, where he specialized in writing English-language leaflets against US military personnel.
9. **Nguyen Thuc Dai**, member, CDV Policy (POW) Office, 1947 to 1970s. Born about 1920 in Nam Dan District, Nghe An Province, North Vietnam, Dai held the rank of major. He was a 1945 graduate of the Khai Dinh High School in Hue, Central Vietnam, and joined the August 1945 Revolution. Between 1945 and 1947, he was assigned to PAVN Hanoi Capital Regiment before his 1947 transfer to the PAVN Political Staff's Enemy Proselytizing Office Policy (POW) Section. Dai speaks English, French and an unknown Chinese dialect.
10. **Le Quang Dao**, Deputy Director, MND General Political Department, in charge of cadre organization (personnel), enemy proselytizing, and military security, May 1956 to date. Date of birth unknown in Tu Son, Bac Giang, Ha Bac Province, North Vietnam. Nothing is known of his activities before June 1954. On 28 June 1954, he was cited for the first time with the rank of senior colonel as a DRV delegate who met with a delegation of the French Expeditionary Corps High Command after the May 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu. Between October 1954 and at least February 1955, he was a PAVN delegate to the Central Armistice Commission in Hanoi. He had been the political officer of PAVN Interregion 3 (Right Bank). On 7 May 1956, he was identified for the first time as a deputy director of the MND General Political Department, heading its Propaganda and Training Department. Dao subsequently became one of the primary exponents of proper party ideology in PAVN. As of February 1960, he held the rank of major general. In September 1960, he was appointed an alternate member of the Lao Dong, the Vietnamese Communist Party's (VCP) Central Committee at the Third National Party Congress. In 1962, he was cited as the director of the PAVN Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Training School. As of 1964, he was cited as heading the MND General Political Department's Cadre Organization Department, which handled the personnel affairs of personnel up to the rank of major. Following the capture of the first

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US naval aviator in North Vietnam in August 1964, Dao directly supervised US POW affairs under the MND General Political Department's Enemy Proselytizing Department (CDV). He specifically supervised the CDV's Policy Office, which was responsible for US, Allied and ARVN POWs and their exploitation. Dao had the authority to grant foreign newsmen and other foreigners access to US POWs for interviews during psychological warfare exhibitions and press conferences in Hanoi. He was also an approving authority for determining which US POWs were to be released early. Dao was concurrently a member of the MND Central Military Party Affairs Committee and a standing member of the Central Military Party Affairs Committee of the VCP Central Committee. In February 1974, he was the deputy secretary of the VCP Central Military Affairs Committee, which established policy guidelines for the CDV as well as for the MND General Political Department's Military Security Department (Cuc Bao Ve Quan Doi/CBV). On 27 May 1974, he was promoted to rank of lieutenant general. Following the Fourth National VCP Congress in December 1976, he was cited as holding the positions of official VCP Central Committee member, standing member of the Central Committee's Central Military Affairs Committee, member of the Central Committee's Control Committee Secretariat, and as a deputy secretary of the Hanoi City Party Committee. In August 1971, he was the political officer of the Forward PAVN Laos Front also known as B70 Corps. In December 1971, he was cited as a member of the Fatherland Front Secretariat. Between January 1973 and September 1974, he directly supervised DRV and PRG delegations to the Four and Two Power Joint Military (Ceasefire) Delegations in Saigon. He supervised directly the activities of the MND General Political Department's CBV Paris Agreement Implementation Office (Office 42B), which had the mission of monitoring enemy actions in fulfilling the articles of the January 1973 Paris Ceasefire Accords, and of drafting appropriate countermeasures for implementation. In this activity, Dao relied heavily upon CBV Director Major General Tran Kinh Chi. Through Chi, who briefed and debriefed returning DRV and PRG delegates, Dao kept abreast of activities performed by them in Saigon, and also personally briefed and debriefed senior DRV and PRG delegates on their activities in Saigon.

11. Nguyen Luong Dao, deputy chief, Quang Da Special Region Party Committee Enemy and Military Proselytizing Section, concurrent head, Penetration *Cum* 2, 1969 to 1974. Born about 1927 in Hoi An Village, Hieu Nhon District, Quang Nam Province, Central Vietnam, Dao joined the revolution as an Indochinese Communist Party member in late 1945, and operated as a military cadre during the 1945-1954 French Resistance War in Region 5. In 1954/1955, he regrouped to North Vietnam and became a factory director. In 1969, he infiltrated South Vietnam and became the deputy chief of the Quang Da Special Region's Enemy and Military Proselytizing Section

with the rank of lieutenant colonel. In late 1969, he became the concurrent head of its newly-established Penetration Cum 2 Unit E-16, which was targeted against ARVN officers in Danang City. Dao came from a middle-class background, and had a wife who was a DRV Third Form (equivalent US 3rd Grade) teacher in Hanoi.

12. **Vo Dau** alias Bay Dau, Staff Assistant, SVNLA Political Staff Department Enemy Proselytizing Office's Policy (POW) Section, 1968 to 1970. Born about 1930 in Gia Dinh Province, South Vietnam, Dau was a regroupee who held the rank of CDV senior captain. He concurrently headed the Policy (POW) Section's Inter-Unit C Camp system for US/foreign civilian and military POWs.
13. **(LNU) Dien**, Deputy Director, CDV, 1954 to 1970s. Born about 1917 in Central Vietnam, Dien held the rank of senior colonel.
14. **Tran Dinh Diep**, Staff Assistant for Security, SVNLA Political Staff Department Enemy Proselytizing Office Policy Section's Inter-Unit A camp system for US/foreign civilian and military POWs, 1965 to 1973. Born about 1930 in Ha Bac Province, North Vietnam, Diep was a CDV senior lieutenant.
15. **Tran Do**, Director, SVNLA Political Staff Department in charge of cadre organization (personnel), enemy proselytizing, propaganda training, and military security affairs, April 1964 to 1975. Born in 1922 in Nam Dinh City, Ha Nam Ninh Province, North Vietnam, Do joined the Indochinese Communist Party's (ICP) University Students and Youth Movement in Hanoi in 1938. In 1940, he became a probationary ICP member and political officer of his native village self-defense unit. In 1941, he was arrested by the French in Thai Binh Province and was imprisoned in the Son La Prison until released in August 1945 by PAVN forces. In August 1945, he became a political officer in the Tam Bien area of Hanoi. In 1946, he became the deputy political officer of PAVN Military Region 2, also known as the PAVN Northwest Military Region 10, along the northern Laos border. Between 1948 and 1950, Do was the deputy political officer of PAVN Interregion 10 Regiment 148. Between January 1951 and November 1953, he was the deputy commander and political officer of Interregion 10 Regiment 209, also known as the Song Lo Regiment, which operated in northern Laos. In November 1953, he became the political officer of the PAVN 312th Division, which took part in the May 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu. In 1955, he was reassigned to the MND General Political Department. Between 1956 and 1963, he was the political officer of PAVN Military Region 3 (Right Bank). Do was promoted to the rank of major general in 1959. In September 1960, he became an alternate member of the Lao Dong Party's Central Committee and a member of the MND Central Military Party Affairs Committee. In April 1964, he was sent to South Vietnam, where he became a Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) Current Affairs Committee (CAC) member, a member of the COSVN Military Affairs Committee, deputy political officer of PAVN's South

Vietnamese Liberation Army (SVNLA), and head of the SVNLA Political Staff Department in charge of cadre organization (personnel), enemy proselytizing, and propaganda-training affairs. Do imposed strict ethnic North Vietnamese control throughout the SVNLA Political Staff Department structure. Three senior PAVN officers who infiltrated with him were appointed Deputy SVNLA Political Staff Department Directors: Colonel Nguyen Lan alias Ba Luu, the cadre organization (personnel) office chief; Colonel Tran Van Phac alias Tam Tran; and Colonel Pham Thai alias Nam Thai, the military security office chief. In 1968, he headed an SVNLA Command Group during the general offensives on Saigon, where he was reportedly killed. This report was later deemed false. In 1969/1970, he became a full Lao Dong Party Central Committee member. Wounded in a B-52 air strike, he returned to Hanoi in 1970 for medical treatment and reassumed his positions with COSVN/SVNLA in 1971. In September 1972, he attended a meeting of PAVN Military Region 5 as an SVNLA representative to coordinate campaign planning. Following the January 1973 Paris Ceasefire Agreement, he became the political officer of SVNLA Command Group 301. Following the Communist takeover of South Vietnam on 30 April 1975, Do attended the Ninth Congress of the East German United Socialist Party which was held in April 1976. From at least January 1977 to present, he has held the concurrent positions of Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) Central Committee member, deputy director of the VCP Propaganda and Training Department, Vice Minister of Culture and Information, and Secretary of the Current Affairs Committee of the Ministry of Culture and Information Party Committee. Do has used the aliases Cuu Long, Truong Son, Chin Vinh, and Tran Quoc Vinh.

16. **Tran Van Du** alias Bay Du, Deputy Chief and later Chief, COSVN Military Proselytizing Section, 1960 to 1975. Born about 1927 in Long An or Dinh Tuong Province, delta area of South Vietnam, Du was a battalion commander during the 1945-1954 French Resistance War who refused to regroup to North Vietnam in 1954. Between 1954 and 1959, he was the personal secretary of Nam Bo/COSVN Party Committee Secretary Le Duan. In 1959, he was reassigned to the Military Proselytizing Section of the Nam Bo Public Security Office as a command-level cadre. When COSVN was reestablished in 1960, Du became the deputy chief of the COSVN



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Military Proselytizing Section under Major General Tran Luong. Du was its acting chief until 1972, when he officially became its head and a member of the COSVN Current Affairs Committee. Du, a colonel, speaks French and Khmer, and a little English. He is an expert administrator. Between early 1964 and 1975, he personally directed a recruitment operation against Duong Van ("Big") Minh who resided in Saigon and in Bangkok (1969-1971). Minh had been the RVN Chief of State for a short period in early 1964, and later was a prominent political opponent of RVN President Nguyen Van Thieu. At the fall of Saigon on 30 April 1975, Minh ordered the surrender of all ARVN forces to PAVN, which had seized power in South Vietnam.

17. **Pham Minh Duc** alias Tu Anh, agent handler/chief, Nam Bo/COSVN MPS Officer Penetration Subsection, 1958 to June 1968. Born in 1924 in Gia Dinh Province, South Vietnam, Duc joined the Viet Minh Vanguard Youth in 1945, and operated in the Saigon Capital area through 1948. In December 1948, he was sent to North Vietnam where he attended a six-month course conducted by the PAVN General Staff's Military Intelligence Department (Cuc Quan Bao/CQB). In 1950, he returned to South Vietnam, and was assigned to the Eastern Nam Bo Region Military Intelligence Section's Battlefield Research Subsection under the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). Following the July 1954 Geneva Accords on Indochina, Duc remained in Saigon as a CQB staybehind asset. In 1958, he was reactivated by the Nam Bo/COSVN Public Security Office's Military Proselytizing Section, and operated under its penetration subsection in Saigon until 1961. Between 1961 and February 1967, he was assigned to the COSVN MPS Penetration Subsection headquarters where he monitored COSVN MPS penetration operations in the Saigon Capital area. During this period, Duc was responsible for the recruitment and handling of at least six ARVN officers who defected to the NLFSVN. Four of these recruitments were ARVN officers who had taken part in the abortive November 1960 coup against RVN President Ngo Dinh Diem. They were ARVN 1st Lieutenants Nguyen Cong Minh, Thai Tran Trong Nghia, Vinh Cuu, and ARVN Captain Phan Lac Tuyen. All four had been recruited in Phnom Penh and were brought to the COSVN MPS headquarters in September 1963 where they were assigned to the COSVN MPS Propaganda Subsection. Duc was also responsible for the 1965 recruitment, defection, and assignment of ARVN Second Lieutenant Le Van Tinh, who was also assigned to the COSVN MPS Propaganda Subsection. In February 1967, Duc became the chief of the COSVN MPS Officer's Penetration Subsection and was dispatched to Saigon, where he assumed direct personal charge over ARVN officer penetrations in the Saigon Capital area. During the 1968 Tet (New Year) General Offensive, he had under his command two 15-man armed propaganda teams, which guided PAVN/SVNLA troops into Saigon, made loudspeaker appeals to ARVN personnel to defect and mutiny, and distributed psychological warfare propaganda

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leaflets to ARVN personnel and dependents in the Saigon Capital area. His armed propaganda teams supported the attack by PAVN/SVNLA forces at the Y Bridge in Cholon; 11 team members were killed and the remainder withdrew from Saigon with Duc. Duc was later captured in Saigon on 22 June 1968.

Under interrogation, he revealed information which led to the arrest of COSVN MPS Major Nguyen Thanh Nhung, who had been dispatched to Saigon to recruit ARVN Chief of Staff Cao Van Vien, ARVN Major Dao Ngoc Diep, and seven other ARVN penetration assets (one officer and six NCOs and enlisted personnel). COSVN MPS Major Nguyen Thanh Nhung, a CDV staff officer, was married to Madame Cao Van Vien's sister in North Vietnam. She reported her contact with Nhung to her husband, who reported the matter to the ARVN Military Security Service (MSS) for investigative action. Through information developed from Madame Cao Van Vien and from captured COSVN MPS Officer Penetration Subsection Chief Pham Minh Duc, CDV Major Nguyen Thanh Nhung was spotted and arrested in July 1968. During interrogation, ARVN Major Dao Ngoc Diep, a staff officer at the Dalat Military Academy, confessed that he had been a CDV penetration of ARVN since 1953 when he was instructed by the CDV to join ARVN as a strategic long-range agent asset. By 1964, he was the chief of RVN Ba Xuyen Province, where he operated under the COSVN MPS. At the time of his arrest in July 1968, Diep was under instructions to obtain an assignment as an ARVN province chief, and was to be provided by the COSVN MPS with RVN 10 to 20 million piasters (US\$55,000 to US\$110,000 at the July 1968 black market exchange rate) to buy the position.

18. Le Phuoc Hai, member Quang Da Special Region Party Committee Enemy and Military Proselytizing Section Propaganda Subsection Proselytizing Unit, 1968 to 1970s. Born about 1945 in Loc Hung Village, Dai Loc District, Quang Nam Province, Central Vietnam, Hai had studied mathematics at the University of Hue and was an English-language proselytizing cadre.
19. Vu Hai alias Sau Vu, member, Nam Bo/COSVN MPS Command Group, 1955 to 1974. Born in 1918 in Haiphong/Hon Gay, North Vietnam, Hai had operated during the 1945-1954 French Resistance War as a PAVN Political Staff Enemy Proselytizing Office agent handler. In 1955, he was dispatched by the CDV to South Vietnam as a refugee fleeing the DRV regime. Upon arrival in South Vietnam, he was assigned to the Nam Bo Region Party Committee Public Security Office's Military Proselytizing Section (MPS). Between 1955 and 1959, he headed the Nam Bo MPS Penetration Subsection, which operated against ARVN division-level units. During this period he was arrested, escaped, and fled to Phnom Penh, Kampuchea, where he reestablished contact with the Nam Bo MPS. When the Nam Bo MPS became known as the COSVN MPS in 1960, he became a member of its command group in charge of research affairs. Between 1964 and February 1967, he headed COSVN MPS Penetration Group 32A, a

cover designation used by the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Special Region Party Committee's MPS. In February 1967, he was reassigned to an unknown position in the COSVN MPS, and later resumed his position as the chief of the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Special Region MPS. Following the ill-conceived Tet 1968 General Offensive, he was criticized for ineffectiveness and became a staff cadre of the reorganized Saigon City Party Committee's MPS. Vu headed two 15-man MPS Armed Propaganda Teams during the second phase of the May 1968 offensive. In August 1968, he was reassigned to the COSVN MPS due to his acts of insubordination to his chief, Major Le Mai alias Tu Kien. Between August 1968 and 1973, he headed the COSVN MPS Enemy Situation Research Subsection and was concurrently a deputy director of the COSVN MPS Training School and a member of the COSVN MPS Command Group. While assigned to the Saigon area, he had 10 ARVN agent assets in the capital area.

20. Song Hao, Director, MND General Political Department, February 1961 to date. Born in 1922 in Nam Dinh Province, North Vietnam, Hao joined Vo Nguyen Giap's Armed Propaganda Brigade for the Liberation of Vietnam on 22 December 1944, attending its Bac Son Military School as one of its first 34 graduates. In April 1945, the Armed Propaganda Brigade became known as the Vietnamese Liberation Army and Hao was assigned to its political staff, which was headed by Van Tien Dung. Between 1948 and 1951, Hao was the political officer of PAVN Military Region 2, also known as PAVN Northwest Military Region 10. In 1951, he became concurrently the political officer of the PAVN 316th Division, which operated in northern Laos. Between 1952 and 1953, he was the political officer of the PAVN 308th Division, which operated near Hanoi. As of June 1954, he held the rank of colonel and was the deputy chief of a PAVN delegation which met with the French Expeditionary Corps High Command to discuss the implementation of the July 1954 Geneva Accords on Indochina. He was later the deputy chief of the Joint Ceasefire Commission. By 1956, he had become a deputy director of the MND General Political Department with the rank of senior colonel. On 2 September 1959, he was promoted to the rank of major general. In September 1960, he became a full Lao Dong Party Central Committee member. On 14 February 1961, the DRV Council of Ministers made the decision to appoint Hao to several concurrent positions. He was named a Vice Minister of National Defense, director of the MND General Political Department, a member of the National Security Council, deputy secretary of the MND Central Military Party Committee, and was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general. Ho Chi Minh announced Hao's promotion and appointment to these positions on 3 March 1961. Hao was also appointed a member of the DRV State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. He has been a National Assemblyman since April 1964, and a member of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee's Central Military Party Committee. In December 1964,

he was one of several high-ranking party and MND officials who met with a North Korean military delegation headed by Defense Minister Kim Chang-pong. Between 1965 and 1973, he was the responsible authority in the MND General Political Department for US POW affairs, participating in decisions for the early release of US POWs. Major General Le Quang Dao, a deputy director of the MND General Political Department, acted on his behalf in US POW affairs. In April 1974, Hao was promoted to the rank of colonel general. At the Fourth Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) Congress in December 1976, he was appointed a member of the VCP Secretariat and head of its Central Control Committee. Hao has traveled to the PRC and USSR (dates unknown), and has used the aliases Mai Huu Thao, Mai Van Tho, Do Huy Tien, and Nguyen The Vien.

21. Nguyen Hiep, member, Quang Da Special Region Party Committee Enemy and Military Proselytizing Section, concurrently chief, Administrative Office, 1968 to 1974. Born about 1935 in Loc Phuoc Village, Dai Loc District, Quang Nam Province, Central Vietnam, Hiep participated in the 1945-1954 French Resistance War in Region 5; regrouped to North Vietnam in 1954/1955; and infiltrated South Vietnam in 1966, when he was assigned to the Quang Da Special Region Enemy and Military Proselytizing Section. In 1968, he became a member of its command group and head of its administrative office.
22. Duy Hoa alias Ba Hoa, Staff Assistant for Training and Operations, SVNLA Political Staff Department Enemy Proselytizing Office's Propaganda Section, 1965 to 1975. Born about 1930 in North Vietnam, Hoa was a squad leader at the time of the May 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu. In 1965, he was sent by the CDV with the rank of captain to the SVNLA headquarters, where he was assigned to the Enemy Proselytizing Office's Propaganda Section. Hoa conducted political indoctrination courses for US POWs who were to be released from the Policy Section POW Inter-Unit A camp system for US/foreign civilian and military POWs.
23. Le Hoa, Deputy Chief, CDV Policy (POW) Office, 1958 to 1970s. Born about 1920 in Hanoi, Hoa held the rank of lieutenant colonel; had written many articles on the morale of US and ARVN troops in South Vietnam; and was familiar with CDV POW listings and files. Hoa is an English linguist.
24. Nguyen Quoc Hoat, Korean-language specialist, Region 5 Party Committee Enemy and Military Proselytizing Section, July 1968 to 1972. Born in 1934 in Hanoi, North Vietnam, Hoat graduated in 1959 as a metallurgical engineer from the Hanoi Polytechnical University. Between 1959 and 1965, he was sent as a postgraduate student to North Korea, where he studied Korean and worked in the Pyongyang Steel Factory. In late 1965, he returned to North Vietnam and was assigned to the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Plant complex. In 1967, he was inducted into PAVN; attended the Son Tay Infantry Officer's School; and graduated with the rank of senior lieutenant. Assigned to

the CDV headquarters in Hanoi, he was sent to South Vietnam in July 1968 and was assigned to the Region 5 EMPS headquarters as its sole Korean linguist. There, he was responsible for reviewing North Korean-produced psychological warfare leaflets for distribution by subordinate Region 5 EMPS echelons; drafted other Korean-language leaflets for distribution against Republic of Korea (ROK) forces in Region 5; and conducted Korean-language courses for Region 5 EMPS cadres. Hoat was concurrently attached to the Quang Da Special Region (QDSR) Party Committee's EMPS Propaganda Subsection as its sole Korean translator, drafting Korean-language leaflets for distribution. His presence with the Region 5 EMPS and its subordinate QDSR EMPS was kept secret from a North Korean team assigned to the Region 5 headquarters to assist the Region 5 EMPS in targeting ROK forces in its area of jurisdiction.

25. Le Hue alias Ut Hue, Deputy Commander, SVNLA Political Staff Department Enemy Proselytizing Office Policy Section's Inter-Unit A camp system for US/foreign civilian and military POWs, 1965 to 1970. Born about 1930 in Long Xuyen Province, delta area of South Vietnam, he was a regroupee who held the rank of CDV captain. Between 1965 and June 1968, he commanded the Enemy Proselytizing Office Policy Section's Inter-Unit A camp system. He was its deputy commander between June 1968 and April 1970, when he became the commander of another Enemy Proselytizing Office Policy Section POW camp system for US/foreign civilian and military POWs.
26. Luu Van Loi, Director, MND Political Staff Enemy Proselytizing Office, 1948 to 1950. Born about 1920 in Nam Ha Province, North Vietnam. Nothing is known of Loi's revolutionary activities until 1948, when he was cited as the director of the MND Political Staff's Enemy Proselytizing Office (Phong Dich Van/PDV). Loi held this position until 1950, when he was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Do Quyen alias Luu Quyen as the PDV director. His activities between 1950 and 1967 are unknown. Loi was assigned periodically to the DRV Paris Peace Talks Delegation and to the DRV/US Economic Talks Delegation between December 1968 and February 1974. Prior to these postings in Paris, Loi held the rank of colonel and served as the DRV Embassy military attache in Moscow. While posted in Paris, Loi had a compartmented operational funds account maintained by the DRV Embassy's Central Intelligence Department (CTB) Center Security Group, and was of sufficient importance to warrant the assignment of a CTB Center Security Group chauffeur. Between 28 January and March 1973, he held the rank of senior colonel as the deputy chief of the DRV delegation to the Four-Power Joint Military (Ceasefire) Commission in Saigon. In September 1975, he was cited as an "assistant" to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
27. Phi Long alias Sau Phi Long, Staff Assistant, SVNLA Political Staff Department Enemy Proselytizing Office's Policy (POW) Section, 1968 to 1970. Born about 1930 in Kien Hoa Province, delta area of

South Vietnam, Long was a regroupee who held the rank of CDV senior captain. He was responsible for contacts between the Policy Section and its subordinate POW Inter-Unit A for US/foreign civilian and military POWs.

28. Tran Van Luc alias Nam Luc, Chief, SVNLA Enemy Proselytizing Office Policy Section, 1966 to 1974. Born in 1927 in Bien Hoa City, South Vietnam, Luc came from a rich South Vietnamese family which held French citizenship. Luc graduated from the Petrus Ky High School in Saigon with French Baccalaureate Parts I and II. In September 1945, he joined the Binh Xuyen Sect Army against the French. He was later arrested by the Binh Xuyen for pro-Viet Minh activities and was sentenced to death. Before his scheduled execution, he was freed by the PAVN Dong Nai Regiment. He and other former Binh Xuyen members formed a PAVN company in which Luc served as political officer. In 1950, he was transferred to PAVN Battalion 302 which was targeted against French rubber plantation workers north of Bien Hoa. Luc directed penetration operations against a pro-French Vietnamese officer training school, and led an attack against it which resulted in the death of all French officers and many Vietnamese officer candidates.

Following the July 1954 Geneva Accords on Indochina, Luc remained in South Vietnam where he was assigned to the Eastern Nam Bo Region Political Staff's Military Proselytizing Section. In 1957, he was recalled to North Vietnam where he attended a three-year course (1957-1960) at the MND Intermediate-Advanced Political School in Hanoi. Upon graduation, he was promoted to the rank of senior captain, and became the political officer of the PAVN 330th Division Engineering Battalion. In 1962, elements of PAVN Division 330 were sent to Laos for operations, and Luc remained in North Vietnam as a battalion-level political officer with Division 330. In July 1965, he was transferred to the CDV. Between August and November 1965, he attended a 12-man training course for CDV POW specialists who left North Vietnam for South Vietnam in December 1965. In April 1966, he became the head of the SVNLA Enemy Proselytizing Office's Policy also known as POW Section, which was responsible for US, Allied and ARVN POWs. Between April and June 1968, he was assigned to a SVNLA Forward Headquarters in Subregion 1, where he was in charge of a 40-man enemy proselytizing section. In July 1968, he was recalled to the SVNLA, where he became the chief delegate for POW exchange matters with the SVNLA Enemy Proselytizing Office's Policy Section. In October 1968, he directed the first release of US POWs in Tay Ninh Province. Luc continued to be responsible for US and ARVN POW release exchanges through 1973. As of 1974, he held the rank of lieutenant colonel.

29. Tran Luong, alias Tran Nam Trung, Hai Hau, COSVN Current Affairs Committee member in charge of civil health, civilian proselytizing, finance-economic, and military proselytizing affairs,

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March 1961-1975. Born about 1912 in Quang Ngai Province, Central Vietnam, Luong joined the Indochinese Communist Party's Nghe Tinh Xo-Viet Movement in 1930. Between 1930 and 1945, he was imprisoned several times by the French for revolutionary activities. In March 1945, he and senior Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) cadre Pham Kiet organized a successful revolt and break out from the French Ba To District Prison in Quang Ngai Province. Between 1945 and 1953, he gained fame as the political officer of the PAVN Interregion 5 Command Group in Central Vietnam. In January 1954, he was cited as a deputy director of the MND General Political Department, and was a member of the Central Agrarian Reform Committee. In June 1955, he led a three-man MND General Political Department delegation which was assigned command over the Pathet Lao Armed Forces. Luong was promoted to the rank of major general in 1958. Following the Third National Party Congress in September 1960, he was appointed a full Lao Dong Party Central Committee member and a member of the MND Central Military Party Affairs Committee. In late 1960, he was sent to South Vietnam under the alias Tran Nam Trung. At Hanoi's Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), Luong became in March 1961 a Nam Bo (COSVN) Current Affairs Committee (CAC) member, secretary of its military affairs committee, and the first political officer of PAVN's South Vietnamese Liberation Army (SVNLA). He was concurrently a vice chairman of Hanoi's National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLFSVN) Secretariat and head of its military affairs commission. He was the Lao Dong Party's representative to the NLFSVN Central Committee. After the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) was established in December 1961 as the Lao Dong Party's southern party branch in South Vietnam, Luong became the PRP secretary-general, and the PRP's representative to the NLFSVN Central Committee. In April 1964, he relinquished his positions as the SVNLA political officer and secretary of the COSVN Military Affairs Committee to Senior General Nguyen Chi Thanh, who replaced Major General Tran Van Quang as the SVNLA Commander. Following the establishment of Hanoi's Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) of South Vietnam in April 1969, Luong became the PRG Minister of National Defense, a paper organization front for Hanoi's SVNLA. Between June 1961 and 1975, Luong in his position as a COSVN CAC member was the direct supervisor of the COSVN Civil Health, Civilian Proselytizing, Finance-Economics, and Military Proselytizing Sections. At an unknown date, he was promoted to lieutenant general. After the Communist takeover of South Vietnam on 30 April 1975, he was listed as a vice chairman of the Council for National Reconciliation and Concord and a member of the National Electoral Commission of South Vietnam. In April 1976, he was elected a National Assemblyman. In July 1976, he was appointed chairman of the SRV Council of Minister's State Inspection Commission.

30. Le Mai alias Tu Kien, Chief, Saigon City/Region 4 Party Committee MPS, August 1968 to 1975. Born in 1923/1928 in Sadec, South

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Vietnam, Mai headed the Sa Dec Province Military Intelligence Section between 1948 and 1954. Following the July 1954 Geneva Accords on Indochina, he was reassigned to the Nam Bo/COSVN Public Security Office's Military Proselytizing Section. In 1958, he was arrested and imprisoned until 1961. In 1961, he was reinstated into the COSVN MPS. Between 1961 and March 1968, he headed the COSVN MPS Penetration Subsection. In March 1968, he became the deputy chief of the Saigon City Party Committee's MPS before becoming its head in August 1968. Between 1968 and 1974, he operated with legal papers in the Saigon Capital area as the head of the Saigon City/Region 4 Party Committee's MPS. He speaks French and English, and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel.

31. Truong Huynh Mao alias Tu Truong, Political Officer, SVNLA Political Staff Department Enemy Proselytizing Office Policy Section's Inter-Unit A camp system for US/foreign civilian and military POWs, 1967 to 1973. Born about 1928 in either Vinh Long or Kien Hoa Province, delta area of South Vietnam, Mao was a regroupee with the rank of CDV senior captain, who infiltrated South Vietnam in 1963. Between 1963 and 1967, he headed the administrative staff of the COSVN Military Proselytizing Section. In 1968, he was transferred laterally to the SVNLA Enemy Proselytizing Office. His wife was also an active member of the COSVN Military Proselytizing Section.
32. Nguyen Thi Na, female agent handler, COSVN MPS, 1954 to 3 July 1969 (captured). Born in 1939 in North Vietnam, Miss Na was dispatched to South Vietnam in the 1954/1955 refugee exodus as a young female CDV agent handler. Assigned to the COSVN MPS Penetration Subsection, as of 1969 she was actively engaged in handling penetration operations against the ARVN 7th, 18th, and 25th Divisions in ARVN IV Corps in the southern delta area. Recruiting under the banner of the Alliance of Democratic Peace Forces front of COSVN, she was in charge of several high-level but unidentified penetrations of ARVN. In December 1968, she was detailed to the Region 3 MPS where she screened leads in the southern delta area for COSVN MPS penetration operations in the Saigon Capital area. After her July 1969 arrest, 15 penetrations of ARVN surfaced. Nothing is known of her disposition since her arrest. She is cited here as one example of a CDV female agent handler who had considerable success in recruiting ARVN personnel.
33. Nguyen Nhon Nghia aliases Pham Huu Loc, Bay Nghia, Chief, COSVN MPS Officer Proselytizing Subsection, 1965 to February 1968 (captured). Born in 1916 in Kien Hoa Province, delta area of South Vietnam, Nghia had operated with the Nam Bo/COSVN MPS between 1948 and 1954 and from 1965 to the date of his arrest in February 1968 as the chief of the COSVN MPS Officer Proselytizing Subsection. He was imprisoned between 1955 and 1963. In February 1968, he and fellow COSVN MPS agent handler Vu Quang Lan were arrested after attempting to recruit ARVN Colonel Vu Quang Tai,

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Commander of the Saigon Capital Military District Ordnance Depot. ARVN Colonel Vu Quang Tai had been approached by his brother Vu Quang Lan, a COSVN MPS agent handler, and reported it to the ARVN Military Security Service (MSS), who put Lan under surveillance which led to his arrest with COSVN MPS Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Nhon Nghia. Lan, a PAVN officer, was transferred to the CDV in Hanoi because he had noted his brother Vu Quang Tai as an ARVN officer. After completing CDV training in December 1966, Lan was sent to South Vietnam where he was assigned in October 1967 to the COSVN MPS Officer Proselytizing Subsection headed by Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Nhon Nghia. Through blood ties, the COSVN MPS hoped to recruit his brother ARVN Colonel Vu Quang Tai as a long-range in-place fifth column agent asset. Nothing is known about Nghia's disposition since his capture in 1968. He is a prime example of a CDV agent handler who was assigned to recruit ARVN field grade officers through family ties.

34. **Trinh Dinh Nghia** alias Nguyen Viet Thanh, Korean-language specialist, Quang Da Special Region Party Committee Enemy and Military Proselytizing Section Propaganda Subsection's Armed Propaganda Unit, February to November 1970 (captured). Born on [] at Xuyen Phuoc Village, Duy Xuyen District, Quang Nam Province, Central Vietnam, Nghia joined the Quang Da Special Region Enemy and Military Proselytizing Section in May 1968; attended a 10-man Korean-language training course at the Region 5 Enemy and Military Proselytizing Section between April 1969 and February 1970; and was a Korean-language specialist of the Quang Da Special Region Enemy and Military Proselytizing Section's Armed Propaganda Unit until the date of his capture on 24 November 1970. He is the only known CDV Korean linguist captured by Allied forces during the Vietnam War. Nothing is known of his disposition since his capture.
35. **Hong Ba Ngoc**, member, Quang Da Special Region Party Committee Enemy and Military Proselytizing Section Command Group, concurrently chief, Penetration Cum 3 Unit E-15b, 1967 to 1974. Born about 1931 in Hoa Chau Village, Hoa Vang District, Quang Nam Province, Central Vietnam, Ngoc participated in the 1945-1954 French Resistance War in Region 5; regrouped to North Vietnam in 1954/1955; and infiltrated South Vietnam in 1965, when he became the deputy secretary of the Hoa Vang District Party Committee. Between late 1967 and 1974, he was assigned to the Quang Da Special Region Enemy and Military Proselytizing Section as a member of its command group and as the head of Penetration Cum 3 Unit E-15b.
36. **Bui Thanh Ngon** alias Ba Ngon, Deputy Chief, SVNLA Political Staff Department's Enemy Proselytizing Office, 1965 to 1975. Born about 1928 in Phong Dinh Province, delta area of South Vietnam, Ngon was assigned to the Nam Bo/COSVN Enemy Proselytizing Office during the French Resistance War. Following the July 1954 Geneva Accords on Indochina, he regrouped to North Vietnam, where he was assigned

to an unspecified position in the CDV headquarters. Holding the rank of major, he infiltrated South Vietnam in early 1965 with CDV Major Pham Tran Ban, and became a deputy chief of the SVNLA Enemy Proselytizing Office. Ngon speaks fluent French.

37. Nguyen Nhan, Korean-language specialist, Quang Da Special Region Party Committee Enemy and Military Proselytizing Section Propaganda Subsection, 1968 to 1972. DPOB unknown, Nhan attended the first Korean language training course given by North Koreans at the Region 5 Enemy and Military Proselytizing Section between early 1967 and early 1968.
38. Duong Van Nhut alias Muoi Ty, cadre, COSVN Military Proselytizing Section, 1963 to 1975. Born about 1914 in Phu My Village, Long Dinh District, Dinh Tuong Province, delta area of South Vietnam, Nhut is the younger brother of former ARVN Lieutenant General and Prime Minister Duong Van ("Big") Minh. Nhut joined the revolution with the My Tho Province Unit in 1945 and regrouped to North Vietnam where he was assigned to PAVN Division 330. In 1961, he was promoted to the rank of major. After the overthrow of RVN President Ngo Dinh Diem in November 1963, Nhut was dispatched by the CDV to induce his brother Duong Van Minh, who had been appointed Prime Minister, to cooperate with the revolution in establishing a coalition government with Hanoi's NLFSVN. In early 1964, Nhut arrived at the COSVN Military Proselytizing Section only to find out that his brother Duong Van Minh had been removed from power by ARVN General Nguyen Khanh. From then on, he was targeted by COSVN Military Proselytizing Section Acting Chief Tran Van Du alias Bay Du against his brother Duong Van Minh. When Duong Van Minh left Saigon for self-imposed exile in Bangkok in late 1969, Nhut was dispatched by Tran Van Du to Bangkok to recruit Duong Van Minh. Nhut maintained courier contact with Tran Van Du, communicating via international mail to a live drop in Saigon through which he sent reports on his activities in secret writing under the guise of innocent letters. Nhut returned to the COSVN Military Proselytizing Section in late 1971, and continued to be targeted against his brother Duong Van Minh. There is no information available to indicate whether "Big" Minh was ever recruited by his CDV brother.
39. (LNU) Oanh alias Tam Thoi, Acting Director, CDV, June 1955 to 1970s. Born about 1917 in Ben Tre Province, delta area of South Vietnam, Thoi held the rank of senior colonel. He joined the Viet Minh August 1945 Revolution and during the French Resistance War was political officer of PAVN Regiment 99 in the delta areas of Vinh Long and Tra Vinh Provinces before becoming the deputy chief of the Eastern Nam Bo Region Military Intelligence Section. Between 1948 and 1954, he headed the Nam Bo/COSVN Political Staff's Enemy Proselytizing Office. A French linguist, Thoi regrouped to North Vietnam in 1955 and became the Acting CDV Director.

40. Thai Thanh Phong alias Quyen, Staff Assistant, SVNLA Political Staff Department Enemy Proselytizing Office's Policy (POW) Section, 1967 to 1975. Born about 1934 in Gia Dinh Province, South Vietnam, Phong served in a PAVN combat unit in the Eastern Nam Bo area of South Vietnam during the French Resistance War; regrouped to North Vietnam in 1954/1955; was demobilized; attended the Hanoi Teachers College; and was an elementary teacher at the Nguyen Khuyen School in Haiphong. Recalled to PAVN in 1963, he was assigned to the CDV and infiltrated South Vietnam in late 1967 when he was assigned to the SVNLA Enemy Proselytizing Office's Policy (POW) Section. A fluent English, French and fair Russian speaker, Phong often interrogated US POWs at camps administered by the Policy Section's POW Inter-Unit A. Phong held the rank of senior lieutenant as of 1970.
41. Nguyen Phu, deputy chief, Quang Da Special Region Party Committee Enemy and Military Proselytizing Section Administrative Office, 1970 to 1974. Born about 1930 in Loc Phuoc Village, Dai Loc District, Quang Nam Province, Central Vietnam, Phu had been a cadre of the Dai Loc District Party Committee's Farmer's Association before his 1967 transfer to the Quang Da Special Region Enemy and Military Proselytizing Section as the head of the administrative office's food production unit.
42. Le Quan alias Ha Quan, Chief, Quang Da Special Region Party Committee Enemy and Military Proselytizing Section, concurrent head, Penetration *Cum* 1, March 1970 to 1974. Born about 1927 in Xuyen Quan Village, Duy Xuyen District, Quang Nam Province, Central Vietnam, Quan had operated for the Viet Minh in Region 5 during the 1945-1954 French Resistance War; regrouped to North Vietnam in 1954/1955; and served as a security guard at the DRV Presidential Palace in Hanoi between 1955 and 1964. In 1964, he infiltrated South Vietnam and was assigned as a deputy secretary of the Duy Xuyen District Party Committee in Quang Nam Province. In 1969, he became a deputy chief of the Quang Da Special Region Party Committee's Enemy and Military Proselytizing Subsection, replacing Tran Vinh Quoc (deceased) as its chief in March 1970. Quan was by then a member of the Quang Da Special Region Party Committee's Current Affairs Committee.
43. Tran Van Quang alias Bay Tien, Deputy Director, MND General Political Department for Enemy Proselytizing Affairs, 1954 to February 1956. Born about 1918 in Nghi Loc District, Nghe An Province, North Vietnam, he joined the revolutionary movement in the 1930s and had become an Indochinese Communist Party member by 1939. Between 1939 and August 1945, he was imprisoned by the French for revolutionary activities. Released by PAVN forces in August 1945, he received unspecified training from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Yunnan. According to French records, he was the political officer of PAVN Interregion 4 between February 1947 and April 1950, heading its administrative and resistance

committee. In April 1950, he was reassigned to the Viet Bac Military Region, where he became the deputy commander and political officer of the PAVN 304th Division. In April 1951, he was reassigned to the MND headquarters before becoming the head of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee's Enemy Proselytizing Board in 1952. In 1954, he was noted as the deputy director of the MND General Political Department in charge of Enemy Proselytizing Department affairs. In February 1956, he replaced Ngo Gia Loan as the director of the MND General Political Department's Military Security Department (CBV) and held this post until June 1958, when he was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff in the MND General Staff Department, a post which he currently holds. Quang held the rank of senior colonel. On 25 February 1960, he was promoted to the rank of major general. At the September 1960 Third National Party Congress, he was appointed a secret alternate member of the Central Committee and a member of the MND Central Military Party Affairs Committee. In late 1960, he was sent to South Vietnam, where he became in March 1961 the deputy secretary of the Lao Dong Party's Nam Bo/COSVN Military Affairs Committee and commander of its South Vietnamese Liberation Army (SVNLA). In June 1964, he was recalled to Hanoi, where he reassumed his position of Deputy PAVN Chief of Staff. By 1966, he had become the commander of PAVN Military Region 4, which directed the operations of Military Region 5 in Central Vietnam from its forward headquarters in the Vinh Linh Special Region (VLSR). Following the establishment in early 1967 of the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region, he became concurrently its political officer. In about 1973, he was secretly appointed a full member of the Lao Dong Party's Central Committee before being promoted to the rank of lieutenant general in 1974. In January 1974, *Hanoi Moi* cited him as a full Central Committee member, a member of the Central Military Party Affairs Committee, a PAVN Deputy Chief of Staff, and as a Vice MND Minister. In November 1976, he led a PAVN delegation to Cuba. Since March 1978, he has been cited by the Hanoi press as a Vice MND Minister and Deputy PAVN Chief of Staff with the rank of lieutenant general.

44. Do Quyen alias Luu Quyen, Director, CDV, 1950 to June 1955. DPOB unknown. Quyen, a lieutenant colonel, replaced Lieutenant Colonel Luu Van Loi as the head of the MND Political Staff's Enemy Proselytizing Office (Phong Dich Van/PDV), which became known as the CDV in 1954. In June 1955, Quyen was a member of a three-man MND General Political Staff Department delegation headed by Deputy Department Director Senior Colonel Tran Luong, which was assigned command over the Pathet Lao Armed Forces. Quyen was replaced as the CDV Director by Colonel Oanh alias Tam Thoi.
45. Nguyen Xuan Su alias Hai Su, Political Officer, SVNLA Political Staff Department Enemy Proselytizing Office Policy Section Inter-Unit A POW Escort Unit 23A, April 1968 to 1973. Born about 1928 in Ha Dong Province, North Vietnam, Su had been an instructor for the

PAVN Son Tay Artillery School after 1954. At later date, he was reassigned to the CDV and infiltrated South Vietnam in January 1968. In April 1968, he was assigned to POW Escort Unit 23A with the rank of senior lieutenant.

46. Le Tam, Deputy Director, CDV, concurrently head of the CDV Policy (POW) Office, 1954 to 1970s. Born about 1919 in My Tho or Sadec Province, delta area of South Vietnam, Tam held the rank of lieutenant colonel and was the principal CDV coordinator of POW administrative and interrogation affairs with the Research (Military Intelligence) Department (Cuc Nghien Cuu/CNC) of the MND General Staff Department.
47. Nguyen Van Tam, Chief, CDV Policy (POW) Office POW Reception Unit, 1954 to 1970s. Born about 1930 in Hung Yen Province, North Vietnam, Tam had been the commander of a CDV detention camp which held French General De Castries, who was captured during the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. In the CDV, Tam functioned as a training instructor and as a US POW indoctrination specialist. He was described as a virtual dictionary of names of US POWs held in North Vietnam. He held the rank of senior captain. Tam speaks fluent English, French, and an unknown Chinese dialect.
48. Nguyen Quang Thai, member, Quang Da Special Region Party Committee Enemy and Military Proselytizing Section Command Group, concurrently chief, Propaganda Subsection and Penetration Cum 3 Unit E-15a, 1967 to 1974. Born about 1926 in Hoa Thai Village, Hoa Vang District, Quang Nam Province, Central Vietnam, Thai participated in the 1945-1954 French Resistance War in Region 5; regrouped to North Vietnam in 1954/1955; and infiltrated South Vietnam in 1964, when he was assigned to the Quang Da Special Region's Enemy and Military Proselytizing Section. When Penetration Cum 3 Unit E-15a was established in late 1967, he became its head and concurrently a member of the Enemy and Military Proselytizing Section's Command Group.
49. Vo Van Thang alias Nam Thang, Chief, SVNLA Political Staff Department Enemy Proselytizing Office Policy Section Inter-Unit A POW Escort Unit 23A, 1968 to 1973. Born about 1932 in Kien Hoa Province, delta area of South Vietnam, Thang was a regroupee with the rank of CDV senior lieutenant. Thang had been the political officer of Policy Section Inter-Unit A POW Camp 21 for US/foreign civilian and military POWs before April 1968.
50. Phan Thinh alias Ba Thinh, agent handler, Saigon City/Region 4 Party Committee MPS, 1965 to 1975. Born in 1928 in North Vietnam, Thinh was dispatched by the CDV to South Vietnam as a refugee after the July 1954 Geneva Accords on Indochina. Between 1955 and 1965, he was a staff cadre of the Nam Bo/COSVN MPS Penetration Subsection. In 1965, he was reassigned to the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Special Region Party Committee's MPS. By 1968, he had become the chief of the Sub-Region 1 Party Committee's MPS, which

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had responsibility for operations in the Saigon Capital area. In 1968, he resided in the servant quarters of a British Embassy residence on Yen Do Street, Saigon, and operated in the Saigon Capital area through 1972. Between 1969 and 1974, he was concurrently a member of the COSVN MPS Current Affairs Committee Command Group.

51. Dao Si To, Staff Assistant, SVNLA Political Staff Department Enemy Proselytizing Office's Propaganda Section, 1965 to 1975. Born about 1925 in North Vietnam, Hoa was a CDV captain who conducted political indoctrination courses for US POWs held by the Policy Section's Inter-Unit A camp system.
52. Ngo Dai Trai aliases Muoi Trai, Muoi Tai, Chief, SVNLA Political Staff Department's Enemy Proselytizing Office, 1965 to 1975. Born about 1920 in North Vietnam, Trai was dispatched by the CDV to South Vietnam with the rank of major in 1963. Between 1963 and 1965, he headed the COSVN MPS Propaganda and Training Subsection. In 1965, he was laterally transferred to the SVNLA Political Staff Department as the head of the Enemy Proselytizing Office, concurrently heading the COSVN MPS B18 (later the B20) Training School, which trained cadres for both the COSVN MPS and the SVNLA Enemy Proselytizing Office. Trai is a Chinese- and English-speaking US military specialist. By 1974, he held the rank of colonel.
53. Nguyen Cong Truong alias Sau Truong. Deputy Commander. SVNLA Political Staff Department Enemy Proselytizing Office Policy Section Inter-Unit B camp system for ARVN POWs, May 1968 to 1975. DPOB unknown, Truong had previously been the deputy commander of the Policy Section Inter-Unit A POW Escort Unit 23A. He was a local SVNLA officer with the rank of deputy company commander.
54. Bay Tui (alias), Staff Assistant, SVNLA Political Staff Department Enemy Proselytizing Office's Propaganda Section, 1965 to 1975. Born about 1935 in either Tay Ninh or Long An Province, South Vietnam, Tui had served in a PAVN combat unit in the Eastern Nam Bo Region of COSVN during the French Resistance War; regrouped to North Vietnam in 1954/1955; and attended a three-year journalism course. After graduation in 1959, he was promoted to rank of senior lieutenant and was assigned to the CDV Propaganda Office in Hanoi, where he wrote articles for radio broadcasts against ARVN troops in South Vietnam. In early 1965, he was assigned to the SVNLA Enemy Proselytizing Office's Propaganda Section, where he became involved in interrogating and indoctrinating US POWs held by the Policy Section's Inter-Unit A camp system. As of 1970, he held the rank of CDV senior captain.
55. Nguyen Van Ty alias Tu Ty, Deputy Chief, SVNLA Political Staff Department Enemy Proselytizing Office Policy Section Inter-Unit A

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
POW Escort Unit 23A, June 1968 to 1973. Born about 1935 in Can Tho, delta area of South Vietnam, Ty was a regroupee with the rank of CDV aspirant. Before June 1968, he had been the deputy chief of Policy Section Inter-Unit A Camp 26, which held US military POWs.

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Detention Facilities for US POWs in North Vietnam

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The Hoa Lo Prison—The "Hanoi Hilton"


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
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
The Hoa Lo Prison—The "Hanoi Hilton"

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
The Hoa Lo Prison—The "Hanoi Hilton"

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
The Hoa Lo Prison—The "Hanoi Hilton"

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The "Alcatraz" Detention Facility


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The "Briarpatch" Detention Facility


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



The "Zoo" Detention Facility

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Hoa Lo Prison, above, became known to its American inmates as "The Hanoi Hilton." Most newly captured Americans were brought here for interrogation and torture. Below, Cu Loc Prison, which the Americans called "The Zoo," is located in southwest Hanoi. Formerly, it had been a film studio.







Xam Ap Lo, above, a grim prison located about 35 miles north of Hanoi, was known to its American prisoners as "The Briarpatch." It was ruled by a lunatic camp commander who tortured men to near-insanity and attempted suicide. Alcatraz, below, is behind Hanoi's Ministry of National Defense. Its tiny, tomb-like cells were home for more than two years for a handful of Americans who were identified as leaders of prisoner resistance.




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Above, a prison known to its American inmates as "The Plantation Gardens" was formerly the residence of the mayor of Hanoi. POWs often were taken to rooms in the mansion to meet visiting press and antiwar delegations. Below, a prison called "The Rockpile," in thick jungle about 40 miles south of Hanoi. Jim Thompson, a prisoner of war longer than any other American in history, attempted his final escape from here.



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From the air and closeup, the prison camp at Sontay, 20 miles from Hanoi, site of a Green Beret attempt in November, 1970, to retrieve some POWs. The Sontay Raiders, organized, trained and led by Army Col. Arthur "Bull" Simon, killed many Vietnamese, but found no Americans on the premises.



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Organization of a PAVN Military Region

Table of Organization: 50,000

Headquarters Staff : 1,000

Military Staff Office (Phong Tham Muu) (500)	Political Staff Office (Phong Chinh Tri) (100)	Rear Service Staff Office (Phong Hau Can) (400)	Specialized Battalions Strength: 250 to 300
Administrative Section (Ban Hanh Chinh) Artillery Section (Ban Phao Binh) Code Section (Ban Co Yeu Mat Ma) Combat Operations Section (Ban Tac Chien) Engineers Section (Ban Cong Binh) Military Personnel Section (Ban Quan Luc) Military Intelligence Section (Ban Quan Bao) Militia Section (Ban Dan Quan) Postal Communications Section (Ban Giao Buu Van) Security Guard Section (Ban Ve Binh) Signals Section (Ban Thong Tin) Special Operations Section (Ban Dac Cong) Training Section (Ban Huan Luyen)	Administrative Section (Ban Hanh Chinh) Cadre (Officer) Section (Ban Can Bo) Civilian Proselytizing Section (Ban Dan Van) Enemy Proselytizing Section (Ban Dich Van) Military Justice Section (Ban Quan Phap) Military Security Section (Ban Bao Ve) Organization Section (Ban To Chue) Policy Section (Ban Chinh Sach) Propaganda and Training Section (Ban Tuyen Huan)	Administrative Section (Ban Hanh Chinh) Finance-Economics Section (Ban Tai Chanh) Military Equipment Section (Ban Quan Trang) Military Medicine Section (Ban Quan Y) Ordnance Section (Ban Quan Gioi) Planning Section (Ban Ke Hoach) Quartermaster Section (Ban Quan Nhu) Supply Section (Ban Quan Luong) Transportation Section (Ban Xe Co)	Antiaircraft Convalescence Engineers Medical Mortar Recoilless Rifle Reconnaissance Security Guard Signals Special Operations Training Transportation Specialized Companies Strength: 80 Convalescence (Officer) Entertainment Physical Sports Divisions: 3 to 4 Strength: 10,500 each Independent Regiments Number Unknown Strength: 2,500 each Province Units Strength: 2,000 each

N.B.: Military Region table of organization varies from region to region depending on the number of subordinate divisions, independent regiments, and province units. For example, the table of organization of Military Region 5 is roughly estimated at 60,000; Military Region 7, at 45,000; and Military Region 8, at 50,000.

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... on the number of ... and province units. For example, the table of organization of ... is roughly estimated at 60,000; Military Region 7, at 45,000; and Military Region 8, at 50,000.

Organization of a Province Unit

Table of Organization: 2,000
Headquarters Staff : 300

Military Staff Section (Ban Tham Muu) (150)	Political Staff Section (Ban Chinh Tri) (50)	Rear Service Staff Section (Ban Hau Can) (100)	Battalions (3) Strength: 350
Administrative Subsection (Tieu Ban Hanh Chinh)	Administrative Subsection (Tieu Ban Hanh Chinh)	Administrative Subsection (Tieu Ban Hanh Chinh)	Specialized Companies Strength: 80
Artillery Subsection (Tieu Ban Phao Binh)	Cadre (Officer) Subsection (Tieu Ban Can Bo)	Finance-Economics Subsection (Tieu Ban Tai Chanh)	
Code Subsection (Tieu Ban Co Yeu Mat Ma)	Civilian & Enemy Proselytizing Subsection (Tieu Ban Dan Dich Van)	Military Medicine Subsection (Tieu Ban Quan Y)	
Combat Operations Subsection (Tieu Ban Tac Chien)	Military Security Subsection (Tieu Ban Bao Ve)	Ordnance Subsection (Tieu Ban Quan Gioi)	
Engineers Subsection (Tieu Ban Cong Binh)	Organization (Personnel) Subsection (Tieu Ban To Chuc)	Planning Subsection (Tieu Ban Ke Hoach)	
Military Intelligence Subsection (Tieu Ban Quan Bao)	Propaganda and Training Subsection (Tieu Ban Tuyen Huan)	Quartermaster Subsection (Tieu Ban Quan Nhut)	
Military Personnel Subsection (Tieu Ban Quan Luc)		Supply Subsection (Tieu Ban Quan Luong)	
Militia Subsection (Tieu Ban Dan Quan)		Transportation Subsection (Tieu Ban Xe Co)	
Signals Subsection (Tieu Ban Thong Tin)			
Special Operations Subsection (Tieu Ban Dac Cong)			
Training Subsection (Tieu Ban Huan Luyen)			
Postal Communications Subsection (Tieu Ban Giao Bui Van)			

N.B.: The Phu Khanh Province Unit of Military Region 5 had about 2,600 personnel under its command. It had, in addition to the above T/O, one 350-man special operations battalion, two 80-man independent special operations companies, and two 80-man coastal patrol boat companies. In June 1979, a joint command structure was established in Phu Khanh Province headed by the Province Unit Commander and by the Provincial Public Security Service Director. This joint command structure presumably applies to all seven provinces in Military Region 5 in central Vietnam.

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Organization of a PAVN Infantry Division

Table of Organization: 10,500
Headquarters Staff : 500

Military Staff Office (Phong Tham Muu) (200)	Political Staff Office (Phong Chinh Tri) (100)	Rear Service Staff Office (Phong Hau Can) (200)	Specialized Battalions Strength: 250 to 300
- Administrative Section (Ban Hanh Chinh) - Artillery Section (Ban Phao Binh) - Code Section (Ban Co Yeu Mat Ma) - Combat Operations Section (Ban Tac Chien) - Engineers Section (Ban Cong Binh) - Military Personnel Section (Ban Quan Luc) - Military Intelligence Section (Ban Quan Bao) - Signals Section (Ban Thong Tin) - Special Operations Section (Ban Dac Cong) - Training Section (Ban Huan Luyen)	- Administrative Section (Ban Hanh Chinh) - Cadre (Officer) Section (Ban Can Bo) - Civilian Proselytizing Section (Ban Dan Van) - Enemy Proselytizing Section (Ban Dich Van) - Military Security Section (Ban Bao Ve) - Organization Section (Ban To Chue) - Policy Section (Ban Chinh Sach) - Propaganda and Training Section (Ban Tuyen Huan)	- Administrative Section (Ban Hanh Chinh) - Finance-Economics Section (Ban Tai Chanh) - Military Equipment Section (Ban Quan Trang) - Military Medicine Section (Ban Quan Y) - Ordnance Section (Ban Quan Gioi) - Planning Section (Ban Ke Hoach) - Quartermaster Section (Ban Quan Nhu) - Supply Section (Ban Quan Luong) - Transportation Section (Ban Xe Co)	- Antiaircraft - Convalescence - Engineers - Medical - Mortar - Recoilless Rifle - Reconnaissance - Signals - Special Operations - Straggler Recovery - Training - Transportation
- Specialized Companies - Strength: 80			- Convalescence - Entertainment - Physical Sports - Security Guard
- Regiments (3) - Strength: 2,500			

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Organization of a PAVN Infantry Regiment
Table of Organization: 2,500
Headquarters Staff : 250

Military Staff Section (Ban Tham Muu) (100)	Political Staff Section (Ban Chinh Tri) (50)	Rear Service Staff Section (Ban Hau Can) (100)	Specialized Companies Strength: 80
- Administrative Subsection (Tieu Ban Hanh Chinh) - Artillery Subsection (Tieu Ban Phao Binh) - Code Subsection (Tieu Ban Co Yeu Mat Ma) - Combat Operations Subsection (Tieu Ban Tac Chien) - Engineers Subsection (Tieu Ban Cong Binh) - Military Personnel Subsection (Tieu Ban Quan Luc) - Military Intelligence/Reconnaissance Subsection (Tieu Ban Quan Bao/Trinh Sat) - Signals Subsection (Tieu Ban Thong Tin) - Special Operations Subsection (Tieu Ban Dac Cong)	- Administrative Subsection (Tieu Ban Hanh Chinh) - Cadre (Officer) Subsection (Tieu Ban Can Bo) - Civilian & Enemy Proselytizing Subsection (Tieu Ban Dan Dich Van) - Military Security Subsection (Tieu Ban Bao Ve) - Organization (Personnel) Subsection (Tieu Ban To Chuc) - Propaganda and Training Subsection (Tieu Ban Tuyen Huan)	- Administrative Subsection (Tieu Ban Hanh Chinh) - Finance-Economics Subsection (Tieu Ban Tai Chanh) - Military Medicine Subsection (Tieu Ban Quan Y) - Ordnance Subsection (Tieu Ban Quan Gioi) - Planning Subsection (Tieu Ban Ke Hoach) - Quartermaster Subsection (Tieu Ban Quan Nhu) - Supply Subsection (Tieu Ban Quan Luong) - Transportation Subsection (Tieu Ban Xe Co)	- Antiaircraft - Engineers - Medical - Mortar - Recoilless Rifle - Reconnaissance - Signals - Special Operations - Training/Convalescence - Transportation - Security Guard - Battalions (3)

Strength: 400

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Organization of a PAVN Infantry Battalion

Table of Organization: 400
Headquarters Staff : 60

Military Staff Subsection (Tieu Ban Tham Muu) (25)	Political Staff Subsection (Tieu Ban Chinh Tri) (10)	Rear Service Staff Subsection (Tieu Ban Hau Can) (25)	Specialized Platoons Strength: 20 personnel
Administrative Cell (10)	Cadre Organization Cell	Finance-Economics Cell	Reconnaissance
Code Cell	Civilian & Enemy Proselytizing Cell	Military Medicine Cell	Signals
Combat Operations Cell	Propaganda and Training Cell	Ordnance Cell	Special Operations
Military Intelligence/Reconnaissance Cell		Quartermaster Cell	Security Guard
Military Personnel Cell		Supply Cell	Transportation
Signals Cell		Transportation Cell	
Special Operations Cell			Companies (3) Strength: 80

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Organization of the PAVN IV Corps¹

Military Staff Department (Cuc Tham Muu)	Political Staff Department (Cuc Chinh Tri)	Rear Service Department (Cuc Hau Can)
Combat Operations Office 1 (Phong Tac Chien 1) Military Intelligence Office 2 (Phong Quan Bao 2) Signals Office 3 (Phong Thong Tin 3) Military Personnel Office 4 (Phong Quan Luc 4) Engineers Office 5 (Phong Cong Binh 5) Training Office 6 (Phong Huan Luyen 6) Political Office 7 (Phong Chinh Tri 7) Code Office 8 (Phong Co Yeu Mat Ma 8) Command Office 9 (Phong Chi Huy 9) Administrative Office 10 (Phong Hanh Chinh 10)	Administrative Office (Phong Hanh Chinh) Border Office (Phong Bien Gioi) Cadre (Officer) Office (Phong Can Bo) Civilian Proselytizing Office (Phong Dan Van) Enemy Proselytizing Office (Phong Dich Van) Military Security Office (Phong Bao Ve) Military Policy Office (Phong Chinh Sach Quan Su) Organization (Personnel) Office (Phong To Chuc) Propaganda and Training Office (Phong Tuyen Huan) Politico-Military School Military Justice Office (Phong Quan Phap) Party Discipline Control Office (Phong Kiem Tra Ky Luat Dang)	Administrative Office (Phong Hanh Chinh) Finance-Economics Office (Phong Tai Chanh) Military Equipment Office (Phong Quan Trang) Military Medical Office (Phong Quan Y) Ordnance Office (Phong Quan Goi) Planning Office (Phong Ke Hoach) Political Office (Phong Chinh Tri) Quartermaster Office (Phong Quan Nhu) Supply Office (Phong Quan Luong) Transportation Office (Phong Xe Co) Rear Service Groups (7) (Doan Hau Can) POL (Petroleum/Oil/Lubricants) Office Transportation Group 70

¹ Formerly known as the South Vietnamese Liberation Army of the Central Office for South Vietnam.

Organization of the PAVN IV Corps 25th Engineering Group

Table of Organization: 3,000

Headquarters Staff : 450

Military Staff Office (Phong Tham Muu)	Political Staff Office (Phong Chinh Tri)	Rear Service Staff Office (Phong Hau Can)	Subordinate Units
Administrative Section	Administrative Section	Administrative Section	D98 Bulldozer Battalion (350)
Code Section	Cadre (Officer) Section	Finance-Economics Section	D278 Bridge and Route Sabotage Battalion (350)
Combat Operations Section	Civilian & Enemy Proselytizing Section	Military Medicine Section	D741 Engineering Battalion (350)
Military Personnel Section	Military Security Section	Ordnance Section	D743 Engineering Battalion (350)
Military Intelligence/Reconnaissance Section	Organization Section	Planning Section	D745 Engineering Battalion (350)
Signals Section	Policy Section	Quartermaster Section	D276 Engineering Battalion (350)
Training Section	Propaganda and Training Section	Supply Section	C14 Reconnaissance Company (70)
		Transportation Section	C62 Reconnaissance Company (70)
			C66 Transportation Company (70)
			C68 Signals Company (70)
			C-- Medical Company (70)
			C-- Security Guard Company (70)
			C-- Training Company (70)

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Organization of the PAVN IV Corps Signals Office


Table of Organization: 3,000
Headquarters Staff : 300

Military Staff Section (Phong Tham Muu) (100)	Political Staff Section (Phong Chinh Tri) (70)	Rear Service Staff Section (Phong Hau Can) (120)	Subordinate Units
Administrative Section (Ban Hanh Chinh) Strength: 70 personnel Correspondence Cell Courier Cell Finance Cell Military Personnel Cell Political Cell Security Guard Cell Security Maintenance Cell Technical Section (Ban Ky Thuat) Strength: 30 personnel Battlefield Situation Cell Radio Cell Telephone Cell	Cadre (Officer) Cell Military Proselytizing Cell Military Security Cell Organization (Personnel) Cell Propaganda and Training Cell	Administrative Cell Finance-Economics Cell Military Equipment Cell Military Medical Cell Ordnance Cell Planning Cell Quartermaster Cell Supply Cell Transportation Cell	D.38 Radio Battalion (350) D.40 Telephone Battalion (350) D.42 Field Telephone Battalion (350) D.43 Field Radio Battalion (350) D.44 Radio Battalion (350) H.19 Training Battalion (100) C.33 Transportation Company (100) C.35 Radio Repair Company (100) C.36 Battery Mfg. Company (100) C.39 Urgent Courier Company (100) C.12 Mobile Radio Company (100) C.22 Mobile Radio Relay Company (100) C.26 Radio-Telephone Messenger Company (100) K.30B Dispensary (50)

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MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
(PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM)
GENERAL STAFF DEPARTMENT

305th Special Operations
High Command



¹Formerly known as the South Vietnamese Liberation
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Organization of the PAVN IV Corps' Special Operations Office

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